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**INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
MANAGEMENT IN GHANA:
THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY YEARS**

KWAME ODEI-TETTEY

**A thesis submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the
requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of
Social Science.**

School for Policy Studies

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Abstract

This study attempts to identify the causes of Ghana's development problems, and determines the extent to which these problems can be eliminated through Ghana's institutional capacity building programme – the NIRP. The study examines the role of Ghana's public sector institutions in managing national development and argues that in order to manage development effectively, it is important to examine the institutional factors that underpin the process. The study evolves on the premise that, structural constraints and lack of skills in the public sector has led to the sector's under performance, and this has consequently caused Ghana's under-development. The public sector under-performance relates to the sector's inability to function effectively at the development policy process especially at the policy implementation stage. This provides the rationale for Ghana's public sector capacity building programme that seeks to accelerate and enhance the nation's development. The Ghana-Vision 2020, which is Ghana's development policy with a 25-year duration and the NIRP, which is a capacity building programme are selected as case studies. The study explores whether the NIRP will be effective enough to build the capacity needed to implement the Ghana-Vision 2020 and thereby enhance national development. The NIRP has adopted a strategy in the form of six component programmes to address public sector management lapses in order to enhance the chances of successful implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. This strategy is intended to turn the public service into a productive and motivated service. This outcome is intended to be achieved through structural transformation, human resource development, transformation of the governance framework, and attitudinal change towards the private sector and the civil society. The study has identified a number of constraints and inadequacies to the implementation processes of both the Ghana-Vision 2020 and NIRP that threatens the entire development process. The study gathered data from interviews, documentary evidence, and observation (at seminars and meetings) from five public sector institutions, the DFID and the Secretariats of the NIRP and its component programmes. The report concludes that firstly, Ghana's under-development is not only a factor of structural inefficiencies and the inadequate skills in public sector institutions. It shows that there are other equally serious and fundamental problems involved in Ghana's public sector institutions' management of the development process. Secondly, the efficacy of the NIRP to enhance and accelerate the development process is uncertain because both programmes are being operated concurrently. Thus, the Vision 2020 implementation would be half way through by the time the NIRP builds the needed capacity for the public sector and folds up. The study argues that by then a lot of issues may have gone wrong already with the Vision 2020 implementation.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Abena Odei-Tettey for her unflinching help and support throughout the research period, especially for stimulating my interest in the development policy process, and to our daughter Ama Gyekyawaa Odei-Tettey. Her cries and sleepless nights kept me burning the mid-night oil. I am thankful to you for the patience during this long period of research work that claimed much of the time we previously shared.

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
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Finally, a lot of individuals deserve mention for helping me in various ways during the research but they do not seek the limelight. However, I wish to make five exceptions to the anonymity of my gratitude to these individuals. They are Mr. Amankrah (MESW), Mrs. Mamle Andrew (CSPIP Secretariat), Dr. Dodoo (Head of Civil Service, Accra), Mike Ayesu (MoF) and Mr. E. A. Sai (Head of Public Services Commission, Accra). I am greatly indebted to all of you and indeed thankful for your help.

Declaration

Kwame Odei-Tettey carried out all aspects of the work contained in this thesis at the School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I declare that the work was done on my own and was not in collaboration with any one else. The views expressed in this report are therefore my own and not that of the University of Bristol.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Kwame Odei-Tettey', is written over a horizontal dotted line.

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(Candidate)

.....
Tom Davies
(Adviser)

Table of Contents

Contents	Page
Title page	i
Abstract	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Declaration	v
Contents	vi
List of Tables	x
List of Figures	xi
List of Acronyms	xii

PART I

Introduction

Chapter 1: Introduction	2
1.1 Profile of Development Management in Ghana: An Introduction	2
1.2 Under-Development of Ghana: The Research Issue	8
1.3 Aims and Purpose of the Study	15
1.4 Operational Definition Of Terms	16

PART II

Theory

Chapter 2: Perceptions and Practices of Capacity Building for Development	19
2.1 Introduction	19
2.2 Dynamics of Development Management	20
2.3 Capacity Building Programme: Key to Effective Development Management	34
2.4 Institutional Effectiveness and the ID Process	50
2.5 Role of Donor Agencies in Institutional Development	65
2.6 Summary of the Debates	68
 Chapter 3: Implementation Theory: A Conceptual Underpinning for the Research Question	 69
3.1 Introduction	69
3.2 Overview of the Policy Implementation Process	70
3.3 Elements of Policy Implementation	72
3.4 Notions of a Perfect Policy Implementation	87
3.5 Models of Policy Implementation	91
3.6 Interactive Policy Implementation and Systems Analysis	103

PART III

Methodology

Chapter 4: Methods and Methodology	113
4.1 Introduction	113
4.2 Elements of the Research Question	113
4.3 Approach to the Enquiry Process	115
4.4 Methods of Data Collection	121
4.5 Interpreting and Reporting Findings	128
4.6 Theory of the Methodology	130

PART IV

Policy Intervention and the Development Management Process

Chapter 5: Institutions and Development Policy Implementation in Ghana	133
5.1 Introduction	133
5.2 The Development Management Process in Ghana	134
5.3 Vision 2020 Implementation and the New Development Management System	145
5.4 The Governance Framework for Vision 2020 Implementation	183
5.5 Challenges of the Vision 2020 Implementation	189
 Chapter 6: Implementation of the Institutional Development Programme	 193
6.1 Introduction	193
6.2 Change and the ID Policy	194
6.3 The NIRP Component Programmes	208
6.4 Philosophy of the NIRP	226
6.5 The Institutional Renewal Policy Outcomes	227
6.6 Methodology for the ID Policy Formulation	232
6.7 The NIRP Implementation Process	245

PART V

Conclusions

Chapter 7: Building Institutional Capacity for Ghana-Vision 2020 Implementation	274
7.1 Introduction	274
7.2 Ghana-Vision 2020 Implementation: A Rational for the NIRP	274
7.3 Dynamics of the Capacity Building Process	280

Chapter 8: The Logic of Ghana’s Under-development and what the NIRP can do	285
8.1 Introduction	285
8.2 Emerging Facts about Ghana’s Under-development	285
8.3 Efficacy of NIRP’s Mitigating Role	291
8.4 Lessons from Ghana’s Development Management Process	297
8.5 Recommendations for Further Work	301
 Bibliography	 304
 Appendices	 325
Appendix A	326
Appendix B	327
Appendix C	328
Appendix D	332
Appendix E	333
Appendix F	336
Appendix G	337
Appendix H (Not included)	340

List of Tables

5-1	Chronology of Development Policy Events in Ghana	134
5-2	Ratio of Private Sector : Public Sector Average	
	Monthly Earnings per Employee in 1990	155
5-3	Comparison of Some Allowances in Selected Public Institutions	156
5-4	Types of Aid in 1992	164
6-1	An Example of the Linkages between some of the Component Programmes	267

List of Figures

2-1	A Development Model of the National Integrity System	29
2-2	Making the National Integrity System a part of the ID Process	62
3-1	Skeletal Flow of Variables for Building an Implementation Capacity	90
3-2	The Top-Down Model of Policy Implementation	93
3-3	An Interactive Model of Policy Implementation	101
3-4	Effects of Actors Performance on Policy Implementation	105
3-5	Input-Output Processes of Interactive Policy Implementation System	107
3-6	Systems Analysis for Interactive Policy Implementation Process	110
4-1	A Methodological Framework for the Enquiry Process	129
5-1	Linking Vision 2020 Administration Reforms to the NIRP	191
6-1	Scope of the NIRP Process	226
6-2	The NIRP Management Structure	249
6-3	PUFMARP Implementation Structure	253

List of Acronyms

AAPAM	- African Association for Public Administration and Management
ADMU	- Aid and Debt Management Unit
AMIS	- Aid Management Information System
BIWIG	- Budget Improvement Working Group
BoG	- Bank of Ghana
BPEMS	- Budgeting and Public Expenditure Management System
CAGD	- Controller and Accountant General's Department
CDTs	- Capacity Development Teams
CHRAJ	- Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice
CIDA	- Canadian International Development Agency
CPM	- Critical Path Method
CPSCMAs	- Central Public Sector Core Management Agencies
CSC	- Civil Service Commission
CS-DRMS	- Commonwealth Secretariat – Debt Recording and Management Systems
CSPGs	- Cross Sectoral Planning Groups
CSPIP	- Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme
CSRP	- Civil Service Reform Programme
DAs	- District Assemblies
DFID	- Department for International Development
ECA	- Economic Commission for Africa
EMS	- Economic Management Support Project
ERP	- Economic Recovery Programme
EXTRACON	- Expenditure Tracking System
FAD	- Financial Administration Decree
FAR	- Financial Administration Regulation
GBC	- Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
GDP	- Gross Domestic Product
GIMPA	- Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration
GNP	- Gross National Product
HCS	- Head of Civil Service
HRD	- Human Resource Development
ID	- Institutional Development
IDA	- International Development Association
IFC	- International Finance Corporation
IMF	- International Monetary Fund
IPPD	- Integrated Personnel Payroll Database
ISD	- Interim Strategic Document
LMIS	- Labour Market Information System
MCI	- Management Charter Initiative
MDAs	- Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDIs	- Management Development Institutes
MDPI	- Management Development and Productivity Institute
MESW	- Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare

MIS	- Market Information Systems
MLGRD	- Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MMDAs	- Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
MoE	- Ministry of Education
MoF	- Ministry of Finance
MTEF	- Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NACVET	- National Co-ordinating Committee for Technical and Vocational Education and Training
NaTCAP	- National Technical Co-operation Assistance Programme
NBSSI	- National Board for Small Scale Industries
NCB	- National Competitive Bidding
NDC	- National Democratic Congress
NDPC	- National Development Planning Commission
NGOs	- Non-Governmental Organisations
NIRP	- National Institutional Renewal Programme
NOC	- National Overview Committee
NPC	- Network Planning and Control
NTG	- National Technical Group
O & MS	- Organisation and Method Studies
ODA	- Official Development Assistant
OHCS	- Office of the Head of Civil Service
PARDIC	- Public Administration Reform and Decentralisation Implementation Committee
PAS	- Public Administration System
PEC	- Public Employment Centres
PER	- Public Expenditure Review
PERT	- Programme Evaluation and Review Technique
PIP	- Public Investment Programme
PITs	- Project Implementation Teams
PNDC	- Provisional National Defence Council
PPMED	- Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation Division
PSC	- Public Services Commission
PSIs	- Public Sector Institutions
PUFMARP	- Public Sector Financial Management Reform Programme
RCCs	- Regional Co-ordination Councils
SAI	- Self Appraisal Instrument
SAP	- Structural Adjustment Programme
SAR	- Self Appraisal Report
SOE	- State Owned Enterprise
SWOT	- Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TA	- Technical Assistance
TUC	- Trade Union Congress
UN	- United Nations
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme

PART I

Introduction

Introduction

1.1 Profile of Development Management in Ghana: An Introduction

This study center on the question that *Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the National Institutional Renewal Programme mitigate these lapses to ensure sustainable development?*" The background to this question is: a relatively weak national capacity in terms of skills and institutional structures in Public Sector Institutions (PSIs) has persistently had negative impact on Ghana's development since the late 1960s. This is a problem that lies at the heart of Ghana's development challenge (Jaycox, 1993:3). The situation became more acute from the 1970s onwards, and the inadequacies have led to perpetual failures in development policy and consequently, development management. This phenomenon has been created by institutional and individual ineptitude in several dimensions of national life ranging from corruption to irresponsible practices. Consequently, this level of ineptitude provides a basis for the need to build national capacity for policy analysis and development management. This concern has taken the center-stage of capacity building efforts in Ghana since the late 1970s.

At independence in 1957, Ghana in its embryonic stage of development had a relatively good reservoir of skilled and properly trained manpower base, as well as efficient and effective public sector structure to manage the country's development. During this

period, hopes were widely entertained that Ghana would be the showpiece of African economic development and model for others to follow (Huo, 1989: 1). Thus with these conditions, the post-independence development scenario offered a promise of hope for continuous progress. However, this promise of hope turned into despair and despondency as the mid-1970s onward saw a rapid quantitative and qualitative decrease in the range and scope of services offered by PSIs and the resultant degeneration of the Ghanaian economy to unprecedented levels.

Nevertheless, the post-independence period in Ghana marked the start of capacity building process for development in Ghana. These capacity-building efforts unfolded at a period when high-level decision-making and the policy process depended very much on technical inputs from a relatively efficient and effective but somewhat less development oriented public service bequeathed by the British colonial administration. During this time the high quality of Ghana's capacity for policy analysis was manifested in the policy content and the efficient structures and processes for policy making, implementation, and monitoring. This scenario of public sector capacity continued until the early 1960s (that is, during the First Republic). But the political and its consequent economic instabilities that occurred from this period onwards started a severe degeneration process of the public sector capacity for policy analysis and further deteriorated the development management practice. This was caused by a marked change in government development strategy that emphasized centralization of policy-making. This situation was made more difficult by the departure of the remaining British colonial technocrats in the public sector and the increasing dependent of government on foreign experts for economic policy advice. These practices reduced Ghanaian ownership of development policy and also distorted the policy process in PSIs. Paul (1983:8) has also attributed this capacity problem to the form and practices of the colonial government. His argument is that almost exclusively expatriate personnel filled public sector posts in the colonial era whereas training

infrastructures were extremely limited in scope and those that existed were rudimentary in nature. Even the few rudimentary training facilities that existed reflected the systems and practices of the colonial government and had no recourse to indigenous social and cultural systems. Nkrumah (1964:xiv) has remarked that the colonial government at independence took every record of the colonial administration away with them and left empty offices, some of them even without furniture. Hence the present writer holds an opinion that Ghana's capacity for policy analysis and development management started crumbling at independence.

However, one of the evidence for the shift in government development strategy in the late 1960s was the use of public enterprises as the main vehicle for the promotion of rapid development in what was considered a mixed economy. Significantly however, the government's macro-economic policies evidently failed to achieve the desired results of economic growth. The question (which is also asked today about the failures of development policies in Ghana) therefore was, are these policy failures the result of weak capacity for policy analysis in PSIs? The answer for the immediate past policy failures and for that matter for Ghana's underdevelopment is unraveled in detail in the subsequent chapters. But for the historical aspect of it, it can be said that Ghana's bureaucracy in the early 1960s had the capacity to offer good policy advice. This was demonstrated by the work of both Ghanaian technocrats at the Planning Commission and the Bank of Ghana (BoG) as well as the use of foreign expert advice¹. Given the quality of Ghana's macro-economic policies and the support from foreign expertise in the domestic capacity building efforts, it can be argued that the policy failures may have been caused rather by the lack of consultation in the policy process and the neglect of institutional requirements for policy analysis (Akuoko-Frimpong, 1994: 6). One school of thought has added that

¹ *The 1963 Seven-Year Development Plan had substantial policy inputs from both Ghanaian technocrats and foreign experts like Nicholas Kaldor, Dudley Seers and W. Arthur Lewis.*

the degeneration from the halcyon and prosperous immediate post independence period to the rather gloomy and difficult development period after the mid-1970s is attributed to the ineffectiveness and degenerated capacity of PSIs. Before this period, PSIs pursued bad and irreversible policies and in certain cases, these institutions abdicated their policy-analysis responsibility. This problem was made more acute by the lack of institutional base to analyze and offer policy options to government (Dotse, 1991). Consequently, Ghana's weakened capacity for policy analysis undermined the subsequent development policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, there have been all together eight national development policies in Ghana since Independence but implementation of these policies have not been very successful (Erbynn, 1995: 8).

The political and economic instability that was associated with the period between 1960 and 1970 also stretched unduly for about a decade, the policy analysis paralysis of PSIs. Consequently in the late 1970s, the problem of weak institutional capacity became an issue for concern especially as the economy declined remarkably. Varying intensity of high inflation, declined productivity and exports, political instability and flourishing *kalabule* also characterized this period². During this time, there was a gradual decline in per capita income, which caused widespread poverty. This situation was accompanied by disparities in income distribution, unemployment and the emigration of skilled professionals (Bank, 1984: xv). The loss of capable professionals in all sectors of the economy also undermined further, Ghana's efforts at capacity building for policy analysis and development management, especially as the country's universities and research institutions experienced a marked decline in their research capacity³. For example by the mid-1970s, the Department of Economics at the University of Ghana had built a

² "Kalabule" is a Ghanaian term for a mix of corrupt practices and other forms of illegal activities. This term may literally be translated as 'cheating on your neighbour'. It is a term that is still used in Ghana.

³Inadequate funding was partly the cause of this problem apart from the income disparities that created the exodus of senior members of staff from the country.

substantial research and training capacity on the strength of about 85% of its full establishment at post but by the early 1980s, the staff strength at the Department was as low as 21% (Akuoko-Frimpong, 1994: 25). This is evidence that the large reservoir of skilled and well trained personnel that Ghana had by the late 1960's had been reduced significantly by the early 1980s as a result of the exodus of these personnel to other countries with relatively better living and working conditions (Bank, 1984: 1). This phenomenon has had a negative impact at capacity building efforts in the successive development years in Ghana. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Ghana embarked on the Economic Recovery Programme – Structural Adjustment Programme (ERP-SAP) policies. Although these policies have been argued as successful, they encountered a number of implementation difficulties that shows that PSIs lack adequate capacity for policy analysis. One of the weaknesses of the ERP-SAP strategies was that it did not take account of the debilitating effects the policies had on the morale and performance of PSIs. This was a serious error because it became clear from the implementation process that an inefficient public sector would constrain the nation's development process (Sai, 1997: 1).

As a result of this lack of capacity, a good number of donor agencies have made inputs to the national efforts at building capacity for policy analysis and development management. Since the launch of the ERP in 1983, various efforts have been made to build Ghana's capacity, notable of which is the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP). But these capacity building efforts were narrow particularly as they focused on financial and administrative reforms, and improvement in the management of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and thus neglected the human resources, governance and attitudinal components of the problems. These reform efforts were therefore not completely successful. This policy failure points to the seriousness of the outstanding institutional capacity issues as these did not help to sustain the ERP-SAP. These

outstanding issues show that the capacity building programmes concentrated on policy contents and neglected the institutional prerequisites for policy implementation. That is, Ghana's low success rate at development may be attributed to an inherently weak institutional capacity to accommodate policy changes, and the necessary administrative and financial systems needed to implement development policies. To illustrate the above argument, Lisk (1996: 53) has remarked that the failures in development policy compounded by the effects of a protracted economic crisis do *inter alia* contribute to under-development. He argues that the persistence of development problems in Sub-Saharan Africa is caused by the weakness and instability in the institutional framework for development management.

The arguments advanced so far sets the context for the purpose of this study, and that is: *to determine the causes of Ghana's under-development, and to examine how effective current capacity building policy intervention can mitigate Ghana's development problems.* The study seeks to provide an understanding of how Ghana's institutional capacity building programme will improve performance in policy analysis and development management. The study therefore investigates the role of institutions in development management, and the variables required to make these institutions effective at this remit. The underlying assumption to the enquiry process is that, *the impact of a nation's development depends on the quality of institutions responsible for planning and implementing development policies and programmes.* Secondly, the institutional framework provides the medium for articulating and prioritizing development issues, defining and accomplishing inter-sectoral complementarity, and serves as the intervening factor for harnessing and mobilising human resources for development. For these reasons, it is important to examine the institutional framework when the development process encounters problems and obstacles.

This report is divided into five parts with eight chapters. Part one is the introductory chapter and it provides a historical profile of development management and capacity building programmes in Ghana. The chapter also discusses the research problem, defines the thesis and stipulates the purpose of the study. Part two discusses the background theory and the conceptual framework of the study. These consequently lead to a discussion in part three about the methodology and methods. Part four contains two chapters that deal with the report and analysis of the research findings, and part five has two chapters that concentrate on the summary and conclusions of the research. The concluding chapter also discusses significance and limitations of the study. There are two ancillary sections that deal with the bibliography and appendices.

1.2 Under-development of Ghana: The Research Issue

The above account of the development management process in Ghana point to one main problem that centers on the structural bottlenecks in PSIs and the insufficient level of skills, and how these impede Ghana's development as indicated in the research question posed at the beginning of the chapter. This is re-stated as *“Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the National Institutional Renewal Programme mitigate these lapses to ensure sustainable development?”*

The Institutional Framework

As discussed earlier, Ghana's development management process has suffered immensely from poor capacity building due to the lack of dynamism in public sector management. These have had such consequent problems as poor accountability, policy discontinuity, and inability to develop the nation's human resource endowment. Ndegwa et. al. (1987:

28) have argued that development creates a growing need for higher levels of effective management which according to Salmon (1992) and McGill (1995) is realized through institutions. However, PSIs in Ghana have failed to appreciate the link between effective management and development. This situation has resulted in distortions in the fundamental framework of institutional structures, processes and procedures, and human resource management. This phenomenon has created bizarre institutions marginalised in the policy process and a legacy of decrepit development process. Secondly, this situation has bred a generation of demoralized and dispirited professionals who perform poorly in PSIs. These have resulted in over regulation, ineffective accountability systems, over centralization, administrative in-capabilities, institutional indiscipline and authoritarian practices that have fomented fertile grounds for corruption, apathy and lack of commitment to work in the Public Administration System (PAS). These anomalies have militated against efficient development management and consequently against development in Ghana. It has also rendered the development management process bereft of ownership and direction.

These enervating variables have also caused the policy process to malfunction in the sense that Ghana's development policies usually concentrate on the policy content, whereas the institutional and technical aspects like good governance and implementation management are neglected. Until recently however, the institutional prerequisites for development policy analysis received less attention. This situation occurred because policy experts and decision-makers took institutional capacity building for granted and gave little attention to it. They envisaged that the capacity building process would empower the workforce and the masses and thereby erode their power base. Thus the political leadership in Ghana has been intolerant of opposing views on national policies from various sections of the masses. Quite recently however, there have been some improvements towards mass participation in the development process. In spite of these

improvements, the top-down policy making practices have until now excluded a sizable number of Ghanaians from the development policy process, whose contribution would otherwise be valuable⁴.

Secondly, Ghana's development process is saddled with short-term crisis management which Ndegwa et. al. (1987: 28) calls a *development bug*. Their argument is that the development of nations very often results in complex economic and social systems that call for higher levels of management abilities and skills that will put management always ahead of evolving situations rather than merely responding to crises. Hence development policy interventions initiated locally or even with external assistance like the ERP-SAP have failed to realize their development objectives and to promote sustainable progress. Thirdly, the failures of these intervention policies are evidence that the increasing involvement of foreign technical experts in national development is not a panacea to development problems. This is because development is about people and it can only be carried out successfully with their participation, and ownership (Ndegwa et. al. 1987: 18; Picard et. al. 1994). Thus, Ghana's PSIs have performed poorly because institutional processes and for that matter the development process are bereft of those aspects of Ghanaian culture that will enhance productivity. This situation has occurred due to the over-indulgence of these institutions with donor agencies that offer technical assistance programmes pre-packaged with western values and standards. As a result, the development process is devoid of strong national roots, which is a *sine qua non* for sustainable development. The seriousness of this problem is exposed by the South Commission Report (1990:45) which argues that culture is a vital pillar of development, and although capital formation and technical progress are essential elements of development, a society's culture provides the environment for their effectiveness.

⁴ This culture of exclusion pertains to the development period in Ghana until January 7, 2001 when the new democratically (National Patriotic Party) government was sworn into office.

Fourthly, Picard et. al. (1994: 2) have explained development in terms of an interwoven series of complex activities that is performed by both public and private sector institutions. This argument emphasizes the importance of public-private sector complementarity as well as networking among institutions in the development process. In Ghana however, PSIs use public policy to impede private sector growth and development, and this has created a restrictive rather than an enabling environment for the private sector in the development management process. Within the public sector itself, institutions do not normally coordinate their policies and programmes. Thus, there is no proper framework for institutional networking and channels of communication, but these are prerequisites for accelerated development. Ndeqwa et. al. (1987:27) have added that the rate and manner at which a nation's development takes place depend on how institutions are organized and mobilized to achieve set goals, as well as on the specific general policies designed to guide the entire process. These policy guidelines for inter institutional organisation and mobilization are generally absent in Ghana and this usually result in programme duplication. Thus, the lack of institutional coordination has contributed to the continuous decline in the standards of institutional effectiveness and efficiency in development policy implementation for example. This shows that managerial performance in Ghana has been inadequate.

These problems have caused PSIs inability to negotiate effectively with donor agencies on policy interventions, as was the case with the SAP-ERP. For these reasons, Bade Animode (1993) has emphasized that the negotiations that take place between the World Bank- International Monetary Fund (IMF) and African governments are negotiations between unequal partners. He argues that programmes like SAP come as impositions rather than negotiations because instructions are sent down from Washington as

conditions for aid to African countries⁵. The South Commission (1990: 2) also adds in support of the above arguments that the perceptions and policies of governments of the North, and multilateral institutions increasingly dictate the development policies of countries in the South, like Ghana. However, the intervention policies designed by these donor agencies and foreign governments, the continued use of overseas facilities and expatriate technical personnel have had unfavourable results on Ghana's development. That is, these donor interventions have not been effective at transferring the highly refined managerial skills that are so critical to building capacity for development. These have perpetrated a system that has kept Ghana dependent on international resources including expatriate technical experts to meet her development management needs, rather than ensuring that these skills are developed locally. In order to shift this paradigm of development, Cochrane (1986: 1) long ago advised that more resources from the donor community should be devoted to improving national institutions. This would facilitate development policy implementation. But Jaycox (1993a: 3) rejects this idea because from his experience, donors design a programme and soon afterwards find a huge mismatch between the programme design and the local capacity to implement the programme. Jaycox continues that in the hope of alleviating this problem, lots of funds and technology assistance are committed to the programme on the assumption that this gap will be bridged, but it never is.

Human Resource Management Problems

The above problems have added in part to the human resource crisis in Ghana apart from the brain drain that started in the 1970's and caused mainly by economic and political

⁵*Professor Bade Animode is a Nigerian Economist. He made these remarks on a British Channel Four Television Network documentary programme called "Out of Africa" in 1993. The import of his argument is that the World Bank is an undemocratic institution much as all other institutions inherited from the Bretton Woods system are unjust and unfavourable to African economies. He sees policy intervention from these institutions as a political programme to re-colonize Africa.*

conditions in Ghana. This loss of capable professionals in all sectors of the economy undermined Ghana's effort at capacity building (Picard et. al. 1994:25), and also caused a practice of filling up vacant positions with less qualified professionals. This has in part contributed to the poor management problem in the public sector, which would have improved if PSIs had devised a meaningful Human Resource Development (HRD) programme to improve skills (The World Bank, 1991:7). To a great extent this problem has not been dealt with comprehensively and it is important for PSIs to have the capacity to develop processes and personnel appropriate for development management (Picard et. al. 1994:14). The NDPC (1994: 35) has added that the efforts of Ghana to develop have partly been impeded by the lack of skilled human resources and insufficient resources to fund massive educational and training programmes.

As discussed earlier, poor managerial performance has also led to indiscipline in Ghana's PSIs. Indiscipline exists on a variety of fronts ranging from absenteeism from work to corruption. These lapses have combined with nepotism, gender and tribal exclusions to deny PSIs of the quality of human resource required for capacity building and consequently for development. Until recently in Ghana, the human resource requirement for development was not given any attention as key groups and individuals were often excluded in the development process. At issue here is the fact that any developing society is one in which many conflicts take place and those societies that succeed in moving ahead steadily and smoothly are those in which such conflicts are successfully faced and resolved as they occur (Ndegwa et. al. 1987). In Ghana however, such conflicts have resulted in exclusions of groups and individuals from the development policy process⁶. The present writer agrees with the observation by Ndegwa et. al. (1987) that this has eroded cooperation and support that are fundamental to the development

⁶*This is a country where the weaker side of the countervailing forces is usually marginalized.*

management process, especially policy implementation. These exclusions tend to impede good governance practices because it has compromised openness, transparency and accountability as well as the legal and institutional framework for the development process.

The problems discussed so far have made PSIs inefficient at managing national development. They show that PSIs capacity to manage development is at its lowest ebb and to a large extent, this is the cause of the country's under-development. This argument is sustained by such evidence as the break down in planning, the inability to relate policy to development needs, the scarcity of appropriate and needed human resources for policy analysis and management, and lastly the prevalent problem of staff training and retention. Summarily, this evidence suggests that the failure of Ghana to achieve the nation's development goals under past programmes such as SAP and ERP I & II, is related to poor institutional structures and processes, and inadequate human resource base.

In the light of these problems and past policy failures, the Government of Ghana (GoG) in association with the World Bank saw the need to embark on a capacity building programme to remove these problems that constrain the public sector in the early 1990s. They consequently created the National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) to drive the capacity building policy. However, one issue of interest is how the NIRP can effectively build public sector capacity to manage the country's development. This is the crux of the problem being investigated in this study.

1.3 Aims and Purposes of the Study

The key aim of this study is *to provide an understanding as to how the capacity building initiative in Ghana's PSIs will enhance the country's development*. In order to achieve this objective, the study seeks to investigate the nature and extent of the development management problems and how these impact Ghana's development. Using the NIRP as a case study, the research examines the efficacy of the capacity building programme in mitigating these lapses and the programme's impact on Ghana's development. To achieve the above goal, and therefore the overall purpose of the study, the under-listed objectives are used as guides:

- a. to show that PSIs play a pivotal role in managing Ghana's development. Hence the importance of strengthening policy implementation and management capacity in PSIs.
- b. to discover the causes of Ghana's underdevelopment and assess whether the NIRP has adequate strategies to amortize these constraints.
- c. to affirm that Ghana's human resource endowment is the fulcrum for the country's development. For this reason, it is important for decision-makers to pay attention to skill development in the attempt to build capacity for national development. Emphasis is put on the fact that HRD as part of any Institutional Development (ID) efforts is vital to a national development policy process.
- d. to re-affirm the need for the donor community to function effectively in complimenting the efforts of local institutions in managing Ghana's development as well as the capacity building programme with emphasis on facilitating indigenous participation and ownership.

1.4 Operational Definition of Terms

Most of the terms and concepts used in this study are defined as they are introduced in the chapters. However, the exceptions below have been made to set the frame for understanding subsequent chapters.

1. Development Management

Development Management in this study refers to public sector management of the development policy process. The development management process involves such activities as planning, policy formulation and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation. The development management system on the other hand refers to the framework within which these tasks are harnessed.

2. Institutions

The concept of institutions in the current study encompasses public organizations at the country level. These include public units such as Ministries, Departments and Implementing agencies (MDAs). These are public policy management units that are also responsible for development policy analysis.

3. Sustainable Development

The concept of sustainable development refers to the kind of development that persists over time and also based on the aspirations of the society. The meaning in the context of this study has nothing to do with ecology or environment as the concept defined by the United Nations.

4. Structural Inefficiencies

This refers to the distorted procedures, processes, governance framework, legislative framework, statutes, values and practices in PSIs. This does not refer to physical structures like office buildings but rather the way of doing things in the public sector.

5. Insufficient Level of Skills

This is the inadequate manpower requirement for the development management process. It encompasses the lack of education and training, brain drain, professional practices and the practice of rejecting postings to remote regions.

6. Governance

Governance refers to the exercise of legal authority to manage national affairs, for example the development process. The concept does not necessarily mean governing or government. It centers on the legal framework for mobilising human and material resources, and organizing these to promote the national interest.

PART II

Theory

Perceptions and Practices of Capacity Building for Development

2.1 Introduction

To expand the research question and relate it to the research methods, the present writer explores the welter of literature that exists on the subject of development management. There is a pool of constantly emerging theories on the fledgling discipline of capacity building with emphasis on ID as an aide to the development management process. There has also been a lot of debate both within and outside the development community on donor-sponsored capacity building programmes in developing countries. The debates concern the form and nature of the capacity building process, the role of international development agencies (IDAs) in the process as well as whose capacity these agencies are committed to building. The debates are attempts to put institutional processes and the human resource endowment of developing countries in an analytical perspective to determine the panacea to Third World development management inefficiencies. Adamolekun (1990: 5) has explained that IDA's are committed to these efforts because "institutional weakness...constitutes a roadblock to development in developing countries". This problem of institutional weakness according to Adedeji (1991) and Adamolekun (1990) is very severe in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the monolithic manner in which capacity building programmes are conceived and devised has engendered debates that question the actual objectives of these programmes. That is, are these policy interventions tailored to address country-specific institutional bottlenecks? Secondly, is the design

intended to build the capacity needed to manage local development? Mutahaba and Bologun (1992: 55) have argued that ID and for that matter capacity building perspective in development management has not yet received the attention it deserves.

This chapter essentially discusses the theory, practices and perceptions of the role of PSIs in development management and why it is important to build public sector capacity through ID programmes to manage development. In order to develop detailed research questions, the chapter is divided into six sections. The first section introduces the theme of the chapter discussions. Section two discusses the concepts and theories of development management. This discussion links up with a discourse on theories of building capacity through ID in part three. Section four looks at the urgency of making institutions effective in the ID process and part five discusses the role of IDAs in Third World capacity building programmes as well as the rationale for their involvement. The last section summarizes the main arguments in the chapter.

2.2 Dynamics of Development Management

Development management involves the practices of development planning and development policy analysis. Griffin et. al. (1987: 185) holds a view that the dynamics of the concept of states convey an idea that development management is one of the most important and fundamental functions of states. Wuyts et. al. (1995) support this position and argue that the subject of "development" was enacted on the assumption that the state will act as the main lever for bringing about development. This has far reaching implications for the relationship between the state and society where the state has the responsibility to bring about development, and the civil society is required to offer its services to the state to make development possible. The underpinning assumption of these two positions is that no country can be managed effectively without a responsive and efficient machinery of government that is manned by well-trained and motivated men and

women. Winkler (1996: 3) also argues that much of the development management activities require a strong and efficient state role. This is the economic nationalist argument that conveys the idea that the state is required to provide leadership in national development.

White (1995: 27) has said however that the 1980s saw the rise of a new orthodoxy about the developmental role of the state that criticised the developmental states of the post-colonial era for excessive *economic dirigisme* and advocated for a reduction in the role of the state. It also emphasised freeing up markets and private enterprise along neo-liberal lines. This criticism according to White extended to *political dirigisme* in the 1990s, which shifted the emphasis to the rise of another orthodoxy that focused on the developmental role of political regimes. This new orthodoxy emphasised the developmental deficiencies of authoritarian regimes. According to White's perspective, by mid-1990's, these two critiques converged into a comprehensive strategic vision of both political and economic probity. This strategic vision emphasised that development can best be promoted through a 'market-friendly' state that is presided over predominantly by capitalist economy in a liberal democratic polity. This is the neo-liberal persuasion and it provides a different perspective to the developmental role of the state by challenging the idea that development should be led by governments (see Hettne, 1995; Commins, 1988: 2).

Kaul (1996: 132) agrees with White on the position that government's role in the planning and management of development has in recent years undergone fundamental re-assessment. He advances the neo-liberal argument by stressing that the over-riding concern with economic growth has led to a refocusing and narrowing of government institutions and responsibilities. For this reason, Kaul (1997: 14) continues that most countries now seek models of government that avoid the errors of central and corporate planning approaches because they have recognised the need to make changes in the functions of the state as a route towards better development. He argues that this has caused the role of

government to change from acting as the principal vehicle of development to a guardian and facilitator of development – what is now called providing an enabling environment for development. The neo-liberal view puts emphasis on private sector leadership because this will better serve the purpose of promoting development (Wuyts et. al., 1995). The view is also based on the idea that the activities of modern governments have become so diverse, complex and big in scope the world over, that even in small states, government business cannot be conducted through the use of monolithic organizations (AAPAM, 1984:129). Hence, this perspective calls for a rapid decrease in the role of the state in development management.

It is however important to put developing countries' socio-cultural circumstances into perspective before making any judgment on these two views, because the socio-cultural environment is critical to a nation's development path. The social structures of some Third World Countries do not permit the state to leave the responsibility of development management to the private sector. A United Nations (UN) report (United Nations, 1981: 12) has argued that in spite the two views discussed so far, and in view of the socio-cultural factors in developing countries, the state has the responsibility to provide the blueprint for the development process. Thus from the point of view of the current writer, the private sector in most developing countries is not well developed and therefore not dynamic. Hence the private sector cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of leading national development. In most of these countries, the state has also not laid down any effective framework to delegate this role to the private sector. This has necessitated the state's role in managing development. Accordingly, the GoG has argued that even in a liberalised economy, the government does not have to do withdraw completely from economic activities because it has a catalytic role to play in national development (MESW, 1996:15).

For the state to perform this role effectively however, it requires its institutions to act as agents of development and to be responsible for development policy analysis including

planning and implementation. According to Evans et. al. (1985: 50), this is achieved through Max Weber's bureaucratic organization because it is the most effective way by which states organize massive development administration activities. The view may be challenged because Weber's management model is intrinsically 'top-down' and it is argued that this model characteristically stifles initiative (see Grindle et. al. 1991). Besides, this model of management has been criticised as one of the factors that contribute to the distortions in development management.

The discussion so far has shown the critical role of the state in the development management process and it provides the rationale for the role of PSIs as agents of the state in the development process. This is the core of the research question and it is discussed in details below.

2.2.1 Role of State Institutions in Development Management

PSIs act as agents of the state in the development management process. Hence, these institutions are responsible for planning and implementing development policies. This is the basis for McGill's (1997) argument that institutions are the conduit of policy analysis, and therefore they are fundamental to the development management process. One important requirement for PSIs to fulfill this task effectively is for the various institutions to be responsible for specific tasks in the development management process. Thus, there must be functional differentiation of roles for specific institutions.

Ndegwa et. al. (1987) have added that in the overall inter-relationship between the state and management of the development process, political leaders must assume the role of managers with the responsibility of overseeing and making decisions regarding the development of the society. In view of the fact that development management is an on-going managerial process, the *management team* must be efficient at responding to

emerging situations spontaneously to enhance rapid development. Ndegwa et. al (1987) and Sandhu et. al (1989) have added that public servants who also form part of the state management team support the government's role of coordinating the focus of development. They claim that a crucial indicator of efficiency and effectiveness of the development management process is the level of interactions and working relations between the state and public servants - where confidence is maintained in one another. Together, the state and public servants are required to create the requisite state machinery for managing the development process, and an enabling environment for people-centered development (Ndegwa et. al., 1987; Hill, 1997; and Evans et. a., 1995). Thus, the process must create an atmosphere of participation by the masses.

Ndegwa et. al. (1987) continue that in managing development, state institutions must act as providers, facilitators and partners of other development agents. These functions show state institutions as the bastion for the development management process, and they enjoin these institutions to facilitate development delivery, create the enabling environment for private sector participation and collaborate with donor agencies.

Cavanagh et. al. (1994: 9) however provide a caution regarding this view of development management. Their argument is that state institutions should not be seen as a panacea to development problems. They rather advocate for a perpetual vibrancy of community organisations to be central to development management in order to make development sustainable. The current writer however holds a view that, it is important for the governments to play the important role of facilitating the transfer of development initiatives into a national reality and therefore state institutions are needed to mobilise these community organisations. Cavanagh et. al. (1994: 9) agree that state institutions can perform this task by: helping to build up an economic infrastructure and an internal market; creating a network of social services; and setting the rules for the country's integration into the world economy. Cavanagh et. al. (1994) draw on lessons from South Korean and

Taiwanese experiences, which indicate that governments should not be taken out of economic development. They argue that strong government standing above vested interests is essential to create the social and political infrastructure for development. That is, strong public institutions are needed to create a dynamic private sector. This is especially urgent in developing countries where the state cannot delegate this function to the private sector due to the exploitative nature of the sector and where the sector is not well developed to lead the development process. But Ndegwa et. al. (1987) have also added that due to self-interest and the consequent conflicts in the state, public institutions are needed to play a coordinating and balancing role. These two perspectives emphasise that development management should not be abdicated to the private sector and other interests to manipulate it. However, this characterization of the private sector as a self-seeking and conflict-prone and therefore incapable of providing leadership to the development process is contentious because the public sector cannot be absolved from this characterization either. PSIs in developing countries are equally self-seeking and are prone to conflicts as the data in chapter 5 will reveal. The self-seeking and conflict-ridden nature of Ghana's PSIs has been the cause of policy coordination problems in the country's development. Ndegwa et. al. may have recognised this fact and therefore have suggested that the supervision of PSIs by senior political managers must be made a condition to ensure probity, accountability and efficiency in the operations of these institutions (Ndegwa et. al., 1987: 33-6).

Ndegwa et. al. have also suggested the use of PSIs to carry out some defined development tasks and have shown what should constitute an appropriate balance between public sector and private sector responsibilities. Their argument is that for the state to accomplish its development objectives, it must develop an appropriate mix of public-private involvement to reflect the forces and influences that are capable of effecting change in the society. Cavanagh et al. (1994) support this position by emphasising that without effective government institutions in South Korea that stood against the policies of international agencies and big business interest, the foundation of heavy and high-tech industries for

world-class high value-added commodities would never have been laid. Ndegwa et. al.(1987) therefore assign the responsibility for articulating the operational concept of development to PSIs, and a facilitating climate for private sector operations to the government (Ndegwa et. al., 1987:15-16). The current researcher holds the view that government must extend this to define an operational framework for the voluntary sector and IDAs to operate.

This responsibility of the government requires efficiency and strong ethical practices in PSIs management of the development process. The state must also have the capacity to define clearly what the national development policy objectives are. This will enable PSIs to undertake their programmes in such a manner to bring coherence and fulfill the national objectives (Ndegwa et. al., 1987). Thus, the research seeks to show that PSIs have identifiable roles to play in managing development and these must compliment one another. Secondly, this research intends to emphasise that the state has a responsibility also to create an enabling environment for other sectors and community organisations to pursue productive activities because these are the productive agents in the development process. The arguments advanced thus far on the importance of PSIs in the development management process forms an element of the broad question being investigated in this research. This is stated in 4.2 (i) as *“PSIs play an important role in managing the national development process. How have these institutions performed this role, and within the framework of the NIRP, how are they required to function in the overall national development environment?”*

2.2.2 Good Governance Practices for Development Management

Brautigam’s (1991: 1) idea that the exercise of power and authority lies at the heart of governance emphasizes the current researcher’s contention that governments use their power and authority to establish and maintain institutional framework for development

management. This also enables the state to enforce the laws on accountability, transparency and probity in the development management process. The institutional framework also enables governments to interact with the citizens to determine the preconditions for a thriving or declining development. These assumptions suggest that the imperatives of good governance, such as openness, transparency, accountability and best practices for policy analysis that are needed for accelerated development hinges on the good and effective use of power and authority. This suggest that corruption and other mal practices that associate the development management process in developing countries are a product of bad governance through ineffective use of power and authority. Sandhu et. al. (1981) best illustrates this position by stating that in Singapore the state has since independence adopted good governance practices that are advanced through the effective use of power and authority. This has made effective the rule of law in Singapore. This practice according to Sandhu et. al.'s argument has unleashed a disciplined workforce with best practices for development management. According to their argument, systemic indiscipline is non-existent in Singapore and this has facilitated the efficient working of institutions and the development environment it serves. The above illustrates the argument that institutional practices for development management is made effective partly by laying the foundation for effective rule of law. Thus, the rule of law in any country is vital to the country's development management process. The imperatives of good governance are generated into a research question in 4.2 (ii). The question seeks to explore how Ghana intends to address such good governance values that are currently non-existent, to enhance the development management process.

In Ghana, the distortions in the legislative processes have created managerial problems for the country's development. But Ramphal (1979) has declared that development is all management and therefore good public management is vital to development. He shows that if other pre-requisites are present to a sufficient degree, and if public management is generally good, then there will be developmental progress. However, if these other pre-

requisites are present but public management is poor, there will be less progress and perhaps none at all⁷. Hence the World Bank (1982) has stressed the need for PSIs to build capacity for development policy management. In Ghana, public sector management of the development process has been inadequate due to lack of innovation, dynamism, and the failure to mobilize the available material and human resources to manage development efficiently. Consequently, ineptitude such as over-regulation, the lack of public accountability, and over-centralization has impeded the development management process in Ghana. These have in turn acted as catalysts for corruption, cultural and human resource management distortions, and exclusions in Ghana's PSIs.


a. Corruption

Stevens and Gnanaselvam (1995: 102) have argued that the poor development performance of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is linked to corruption. Their argument suggests that in order to make the development policy processes effective, it is important to eliminate corruption because it breeds inefficiency. Gould et. al. (1983) and Rose-Ackerman (1996a) have argued that the evidence for corruption is seen in increases in the cost of goods and services, the promotion of unproductive investments and the decline in the quality of public services. According to this perspective, any nation with this background will perform poorly at development except the situation is intervened. This underpins the need for Ghana to build its public sector capacity to eliminate lapses like corruption. This will consequently lead to an increased national capacity for development. This argument is captured as an element of the research question in chapter four and it stresses the negative impact of institutional ineptitude on development management.


⁷ *This is an idea from the valedictory address by the Commonwealth secretary-general at the 18th World Management Congress held in New Delhi on 8 December 1978.*

When lapses like corruption become institutionalised as it is in the case of Ghana, it renders the development management system fragile and incapable of handling the development process. PSIs then perform poorly because the laws governing the development process are weak. These institutions will then lose the chemistry for development management. This accounts partly for the contradictions in the development processes in most developing countries.

Figure 2-1
A development model of the national integrity system



Source: Modified from Stapenhurst et. al., 1997.



It then becomes imperative for countries engulfed in corruption but who also want to develop to establish a development model of a national integrity system that will seek to make corruption a high-risk and low-return venture. Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) have noted that such approach will seek to change systems rather than concentrating on individual officials. Stapenhurst has identified eight pillars of a typical national integrity system. They recount these as public sector anti-corruption agencies; public participation in democratic process; public awareness of the role of civil society; accountability of the judicial process; the media; the private sector and international co-operation. Find in figure 2-1 (above) a development model of national integrity system that is an improvement on Stapenhurst and Langseth's eight pillars of national integrity system (see Stapenhurst et. al., 1997: 319).

In figure 2-1 the national integrity system provides the platform for effective development management and consequently the medium through which development is sustained. The figure also shows that this assumption is upheld by the rule of law whereas the national integrity system itself is upheld by nine pillars, namely: the people, administrative efficiency, watchdog agencies, legislature, the media, judiciary, and institutions from the public-, private- and voluntary sectors. The figure also shows a mutual support mechanism between the rule of law and the national integrity system because in Third World societies, individuals wielding the force of the gun can *hijack* the rule of law. This is therefore necessary to enable public officials deliver their responsibilities without any fear of intimidation.

b. Cultural Distortions

Development in any country is sustained by the country's cultures. This is because culture is a major determinant a nation's values. To ensure maximum effectiveness of PSIs' role in the development management process, the state must generate among its citizens, consensus on a set of dominant values covering all areas of development discourse. Such

dominant values may include national integrity systems that will seek to eliminate undesirable practices like corruption, discrimination and nepotism that are inimical to development. A development process require a set of rules, an ideology to justify these rules, and a conscience in the citizens which makes them strive to carry out these rules. These result in legitimacy and support for development programmes and the stronger the appeal, the greater the support for the programme. Culture provides the framework for this conscience in the citizens and an institutional base for the development process to continue even when there is a change in government. The cultural imperative of the development process reflects the research question (see 4.2 (vii)) that seeks to explore Ghana's strategy for eliminating the cultural problems that have set the development clock back.

c. Manpower Development

The quality of a nation's human resource endowment is a vital element in the development management process. This assumption is emphasised by Nancy Baster (1972:96) who in her Technological-education model of development has associated technical knowledge and skills with development. Her argument is that the human resource endowment of the nation is made efficient through education and training. She continues that apart from imparting knowledge, education is also instrumental in the development process through other intervening variables such as the inculcation of national values, national consensus and higher levels of homogeneity in the population (Baster, 1972: 141). Baster's argument emphasizes the usefulness of education and training to the development management process. Where these are lacking, the nation may be forced to trade up its competitiveness and import skilled labour from other countries. This practice will eventually work against the development of the importing nation. Currently, most countries have learnt from the mistakes of the United States and will in fact attempt to hold back the economy of the host country by transferring limited expertise (to the local partners in the host country). For example, Japan is determined not to repeat the American mistake. For this reason Japanese companies transfer strictly limited expertise to their local partners in Thailand, Malaysia

and Indonesia to forestall the sort of competitive backlash that Japan unleashed on American industries after its post-war acquisition of American technology⁸. Consequently, countries that are currently supplying developing countries with their experts will in certain terms adopt this strategy. The current writer therefore contends that it is imperative for developing countries to develop its own needed human resource to avoid any attempts to hold back their economies through the importation of expatriate skills. Kamoche (1997) endorses the above argument by stressing that the practice of developing expertise from a nation's human resources endowment plays an indisputable role in the efficient running of institutions and consequently on development management.

This position is very well illustrated by the *human-capital theory* that sees education and training as social welfare improvement and an investment that contributes to future development by improving the quality of labour (Sandhu et. al., 1989: 172). This theory enjoins states and its institutions to invest in personnel training and development to engender such skills and expertise that are best suited for making institutions effective at development management. The current writer argues that this require an educational system that would serve national development needs, rather than one that is modeled on foreign systems, otherwise the investment will not reap its full benefits. The current writer has observed that in most developing countries, a counter theory that see such investment in education as a *consumption good* underpins the national policy on education and training. The consumption good theory holds the view that the cost of making such an investment will undermine economic growth because it competes directly with productive investments for scarce resources. Consequently, most developing countries have cut subsidy on education. This has resulted in a poor and unfavourable educational system with grave implications for manpower development. These two perspectives are reflected in a World Bank view, which maintains that education must be considered as an investment

⁸After World War II, America made Japan benefit from its technology to re-build the Japanese economy. From the 1970s however, Japan developed its industries to a level of competitiveness to American industries.

consumption good (The World Bank, 1982). The World Bank's argument suggests that educational cost must be balanced against potential private and social benefits and has therefore recommended to Third World governments to cut subsidy on education. It is important however for developing countries to re-consider these educational policies to enhance their manpower development efforts. This review must subject the policies to proper cost-benefit analysis and to evolve an educational system that is responsive to national needs. The reason being that without laying the appropriate foundation for training and education, IDAs and donor governments will continue to supply developing countries with expatriate experts to the detriment of the host country's development. The present writer makes a point here that in order to make manpower development comprehensive, training and education must go together with better working conditions else, the training programme may be frustrated by brain drain problems. These human resource problems that underpin the development management process constitute one of the questions that this study seeks to explore (see 4.2 (iv)). The question indicates that the human resource crisis in Ghana has had a negative impact on the development management process. The study therefore sets out to investigate how these problems are being addressed in the capacity building programme.

d. Inclusion

The concept of managing diversity at the workplace recognizes the fact that the workforce usually consists of a diverse population of people. Diversity itself entails visible differences which includes factors such as gender and class differences. McDougall (1996: 64) has said that harnessing these differences will create a productive environment in which everybody feels valued, where their talents will be fully utilized and organizational goals will be met. A lot has been said in the literature about the exclusion of women in the development process. Schuurman (1993) has observed that women need to be integrated into the development process because the role played by women in society is an important element in the process. Schuurman's argument calls

for equal representation of women in all areas of a nation's development. But Moser (1989) sees this equity approach as problematic to development management. His argument is that gender issues in the context of development management must involve enhancing opportunities for women to play their expected role in development management alongside their male counterparts rather than a strict adherence to the equality approach. Secondly, the strict adherence to equality will require increased education and training for women which may take a little while to be achieved and would not necessarily mean that equal women and men must be educated. According to the present writer, this is not demographically possible.

There also exist groups of classes in developing countries with varying interests that often lead to conflicts in the development process. Coordination of these interests in a manner to enhance support for the achievement of the national development objectives is vital for sustained development. In Ghana for example, the growth and maturation of participatory development management and effective support institutions have been inadequate and these have had an enormous setback on the country's development. The building and maturation of participatory structures and effective support institutions must be accorded with urgency in the development management process. This inclusion problem is captured as a research question in 4.2 (iii) and (viii). These questions seek to explore how diversity issues are being addressed under the capacity building programme. Secondly, the study seeks to investigate how sectional interests are being managed in the new development management system in Ghana.

2.3 Capacity Building Programme: Key to Effective Development Management

The discussion in this section relates to the second part of the broad research question regarding the NIRP's impact on Ghana's development process which is re-stated as "... *In*

what way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national development?" Dia (1996: 25) has stressed on the urgency of capacity building to the development management process and remarks that capacity building is no longer an issue of controversy to development. Lisk (1996: 153) and Dia (1996: 25) have argued that the importance of capacity building is related to the ability to manage the development process including policy analysis in order to attain the development objectives. According to Lisk, building capacity for development refers to a comprehensive process involving the ability to identify constraints and to plan and manage development. The process of attaining the above objectives usually involves the development of human resources, institutions and a supportive policy environment. The present writer holds a view that Lisk's description will also require existing capabilities and resources to be improved upon, and it is important to use these efficiently in the development management process.

Lisk (1996: 54) has noted however that the issue of capacity building has more recently been the focus of attention by the international community. This is why Jaycox (1993a) has described capacity building as the missing link in Africa's development. Lisk adds that the United Nations' agencies spearheaded by the UNDP have been active in promoting capacity building as a major requirement for attaining sustainable development. This action coincided with the introduction of the *programme approach* to development by the UNDP. This UN idea emphasizes the centrality of national development programmes as the hub for integrating UN technical assistance activities with national efforts. The UN approach according to Lisk, also emphasizes the use of national skills in the development process. This approach suggests that the overall responsibility for managing UN supported development activities and accountability remained with the government and other state institutions that are the beneficiaries of these programmes. Lisk turns to the World Bank's activities in capacity building and argues that the Bank's interest in capacity building across Africa is more closely linked to the need to develop administrative and technical capacity at the national level for policy analysis and development management.

Definitions

The *capacity building-development management* linkage as discussed above has been the basis for Berg's (1993: 58) definition of capacity building as "the practice of strengthening sustainable indigenous capacity to manage economic change and growth". Morgan (1993) has also defined capacity building as "the ability of individuals, groups, institutions, organisations and societies to identify and meet development challenges over time". Morgan's definition suggests that it is not enough to only acquire the capability to manage development but it is equally important to equip institutions with the capability to anticipate what problems are likely to come up in the development management process. However, Morgan's definition is time bound and this puts some limitations on the essence of capacity building. That is, it may be argued that capacity building is also a process that continually improves the capabilities of individuals, groups, organisations and societies to manage the national development process. Mentz (1997: 13) calls such a process a sustainable development process. Mentz has argued that the size, scope and performance scale of the entire development management system, that is both output and input systems, must be included in any definition of capacity building and this must be related also to the efficient implementation of development policy. Mentz continues that capacity building refers also to rationality in the sense of exercising reason and sober judgments in the development management process. This view of capacity building is close to the Weberian concept of bureaucracy, which is an unpopular concept in development administration (see Peters, 1995). A more comprehensive definition of the concept is provided by the Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) in a framework document submitted to its 1994 conference of Ministers. The ECA's definition identifies three broad areas of capacity building as the human, institutional and infrastructural development. A number of problems however associate this definition and these relates to the absence of any fine distinctions between specific policy objectives and the capacities needed to attain them, or between factors which promote these objectives and those which impede capacities in any given area.

Some other perceptions focus the concept on skill development. Cohen (1993: 26) has said that

“capacity building seeks to strengthen targeted human resources (for example, managerial, professional and technical) in particular institutions and to provide those institutions with the means whereby these resources can be marshaled and sustained effectively to perform planning, policy formulation and implementation tasks through government on any priority topic”.

He remarks that the capacity building process is problem solving in orientation. This definition however overlooks the urgency of building the capacity of other public servants that are equally needed to ensure continuity and institutional learning. Besides, these personnel can also upgrade their skills to reach managerial level and that is the basis for experience. In fact, this is the reservoir from which senior officers are drawn and the process of upgrading skills constitutes a part of the essence of capacity building. Hiderbrand and Grindle (1994) who see capacity building as “the ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively and efficiently” discuss this shortfall in Cohen’s perception. This definition is broad enough to involve all categories of personnel whose skills are required to manage the development process. Bologun (1997:78) perceives capacity building beyond HRD. His definition of capacity building also takes into consideration the material, financial and organisational resource development and argues that these are essential for the successful management of the development process. Bologun argues that capacity building Excludes the development of skills that are either not relevant or not properly harnessed.

Elements of Capacity Building

A number of theorists have attempted to categorize the concept of capacity building on the basis of specific activity or task for which the capacity is needed, and this determines what these theorists see as the elements of capacity building. Dia (1996: 27) has discussed the idea of increasing the supply of skills and transferring new technology, methods and systems to institutions. He calls this process *technical capacity building*. Dia’s perspective

may be equated to training, education and technical assistance that complements local efforts in the development process. He however distinguishes technical capacity building which he see as the supply side of capacity building from *institutional capacity building* which he describes as the demand side of capacity building. Institutional capacity building according to Dia's argument focuses on the ability of a country to make optimal use of the existing technical capacity and resources in a sustainable fashion.

Mentz (1997: 11-15) has identified two layers of capacity building, which he calls *personal capacity* and *non-personal capacity*. He says that personal capacity has to do with people in the sense that people staff institutions and it is their innate capacities which ultimately determines service delivery and the general performance of institutions at development management. Mentz stresses that the non-personal capacity is the framework for managing the capacity building process and this provides the context in which personal capacity is developed. Batnargar et. al. (1992: 112) also adds another dimension to the capacity building discourse by identifying '*group capacity*'. They argue that group capacity may be divided into internal capacity and external capacity. They describe internal capacity as learning how to manage resources collectively. The external dimension is learning how to negotiate with and make claims on other agencies.

Morgan (1993) has outlined what he see as the main elements of capacity building as: wider and holistic, a contribution to the institutional environment, related to HRD and training, a response to some of the major development theories, a sustained activity over a longer period of time, beyond administrative techniques and project implementation, and accelerating interaction between organisations and their environment. Loubser (1993) has also argued that any capacity building programme must:

- i. have specific objectives that deals with vision, values, policies, strategies and interests,

- ii. emphasize variables such as will (that is the motivation and drive), energy, concentration, work ethics to attain efficiency,
- iii. possess capabilities like intelligence, skills, knowledge and mental sets,
- iv. have basic resources including human, material, technological, cultural and financial resources, and
- v. have a framework of activity schedule. Such a framework must include planning, designing, sequencing and mobilizing.

Loubser's views on what constitutes the elements of capacity building differ fundamentally from Mentz's. However, both views are very important because the relevance of each position depends on the context for building the capacity in question. This shows that definitions and classifications of the concept of capacity building are determined by the development challenge for which the capacity is being sought. Bologun has noted that until an operational meaning is given to the concept of development and precisely what kind of capacity is needed to ensure development, nations cannot respond meaningfully to the analytical and practical problems encountered in the process of formulating, managing and reforming development policies.

Conditions for Successful Capacity Building Programmes

In order however to make capacity building effective at dealing with development challenges, certain minimum conditions must be achieved. Bologun (1997) has identified these minimum conditions as:

- a. the strength of political institutions and their ability to formulate and sustain the capacity building programme
- b. the commitment of policy makers to national capacity building as reflected in their readiness to support capacity building programmes and user institutions, and to overcome internal and external resistance to change.
- c. the credibility of formal capacity building institutions and their effectiveness in undertaking policy analysis, institution building, ID, and HRD activities.

- d. the preparedness of agencies in PSIs and the private sector (formal and informal) to implement innovative management initiatives, and
- e. the extent to which a culture of accountability, efficiency and responsiveness can be developed in place of patrimonial and rent-seeking tendencies frequently encountered at different levels of officialdom.

These managerial issues form the background to one of the questions under investigation in this study (see 4.2 (v)). The question acknowledges the retrogressive impact of managerial performance on the development management in Ghana and therefore seeks to explore the NIRP's strategies for addressing these managerial problems.

Institutional Development: A Jewel in the Crown

Lisk (1996) has stressed that capacity building is different from ID but identifies ID as a part of the capacity building process. Berg (1993: 62-3) has added that capacity building as defined above is broader than ID because capacity building involves all types of skill development and procedural reforms that extend beyond the boundaries of a single institution and one development programme. This suggests that capacity building involves a number of activities including ID. According to Berg, the skill upgrading component includes general education, on the job-training, and professional deepening in crosscutting skills such as accounting, policy analysis and information technology. The procedural improvement on the other hand refers to functional changes or system reforms such as introduction of new budgeting arrangement or replacements of *ex ante* controls over public enterprise by greater autonomy and *ex post* supervision. Both Lisk and Berg emphasize however that the concept of ID focuses on particular or selected institutions and the process involves the development of the human and material resources, organisational management and administrative capacities of these selected institutions. This study explores how these ID imperatives are being applied to Ghana's capacity building programme under the NIRP.

Berg (1993: 62-3) has argued that capacity building is less comprehensive than ID as broadly defined because capacity building excludes the specific goals of changing social norms and creating societal support for capacity-creating changes. Thus according to Berg's argument, ID has a much deeper and more complex objective. The present writer however contends Berg's argument on the grounds that his assumptions are based on the context of his analysis and cannot represent all capacity building situations. For example, if country x decides to build a capacity for human resources, this capacity building policy may require specific goals like changing the existing social norms and practices. The study therefore seeks to investigate which specific norms and practices Ghana is seeking to change under the capacity building programme.

2.3.1 Institutional Development and the Development Process

More (1995: 90-91) has remarked that a large academic literature exists on the subject of ID but the positions taken on the subject by the various writers are fundamentally divergent. These disagreements according to More, dates as far back as the 1950s when the subject was first debated. Berg (1993: 60) has also pointed out that there has been no general consensus on the exact meaning of ID despite the numerous and complex literature on the subject. He argues however that there is a modicum of agreement on certain fundamental ideas on the subject. Berg's (1993: 61) idea on the subject is that, ID means more than just structural or functional changes in institution. According to this perspective, ID involves fundamental social change, and the transformation of patterns of behaviour that are specific to the institution. He argues that ID is a much more profound process than organizational development. The assumption is that ID seeks to improve significantly, the outputs and impacts of institutions concerned with development management, public administration (including project management), enterprise development etc. in both public and private sectors (see Lisk 1996: 53). The current study therefore seeks to explore the

strategies being used by the NIRP to improve the outputs and impacts being made by Ghana's PSIs on the nation's development.

North (1993: 3) and Adamolekun (1990) have argued that the dictates of economic theory and cliometric history underpin the need to promote the awareness of and to appreciate the role of institutions in development management. For this reason, North calls for an analytical framework to integrate institutional issues into the development discourse. The UNDP (1989: 35) has also shown the urgency of this analytical framework by pointing out that the ID components of many of its programmes were ignored or sometimes dealt with superficially. These, according to Commins (1988: 41) normally cause a number of setbacks to the management of the programmes. The UNDP's perspective attributes the institutional gap to programme designs. They show that the ultimate objective at the time of designing these programmes was to achieve their technical goals. It was assumed then that as a matter of consequence, this would lead to greater institutional capacity. In practice however, this expectation was not achieved. According to the UNDP, the lessons unleashed by the setbacks to these programme designs have shown that, ID has to be judiciously integrated through reforms to make development policies successful. ID and for that matter capacity building has therefore remained a very vital imperative of UNDP project design and it emphasizes the idea that capacity building is a key determinant in the success or failure of development policies (see United Nations, 1972: 37). This observation from the UNDP is evidence that ID is an important component in the development processes of Third World countries. This evidence emphasizes that efficient and dynamic institutions are a *sine qua non* to the effective management of development. Hence, the present writer maintains an opinion that ID programmes must reflect the culture, value systems and the institutional needs of individual societies. The present writer argues further that ID activities need to focus on providing governments with information base, analytical tools and decision points to facilitate the development process. Paul (1990: 2) has also identified three major objectives of the ID process. He has listed these as:

- a. facilitating the development policy implementation,
- b. contributing to the sustainability of the development policy (that is contribution of the benefits beyond the programme period), and
- c. supporting the development of sector or sub-sector level institutions and the linkages among them.

These objectives are also emphasised by the UNDP's view on the subject, but Paul's perspective does not focus on the entire spectrum of development management. The present writer maintains that the ID process should not be limited to the implementation or sustainability of specific policies. It must have a broader objective that encompasses the efficient management of the entire development process of a nation. The study therefore seeks to investigate the scope of the NIRP objectives.

Elements of ID

Paul (1990) has outlined what should constitute the basic elements of an ideal ID programme. He says that these should consist of institutional restructuring and strengthening, building a policy and planning capacity, as well as regulatory and procedural reform. The present writer sees these elements as necessary but also adds that the process will require efficient and well-equipped manpower base to make the ID process successful. This gap in Paul's argument is discussed by McGill's (1997: 258) revealing emphasis on HRD when he defines ID as the act of strengthening the technical capabilities of cadres of personnel, both technically and managerially. According to McGill, this is achieved through a gambit of training programmes including overseas training for personnel.

Picard et. al. (1994: 119) have also noted four elements as necessary to the ID process and consequently for managing development. According to their perspectives:

- i. the roles for the various institutions and actors must be clearly specified.
- ii. institutions must be provided with adequate resources and training for policy analysis.

- iii. processes need to be developed to improve communication among the different sector institutions to facilitate policy coordination, and
- iv. appropriate processes must be used to ensure effective monitoring and evaluation for timely identification of problems in order to take the appropriate remedial action.

McGill (1997) see the above as inadequate and has argued that the specific nature of ID needs to center on five concepts. Blaise (1986), Honandle (1982), Uphoff (1986), Brinkerhoff et. al. (1989), and Israel (1987) also endorse these concepts. The ID programmes according to their argument must focus on:

- i. the functional role of values in distinguishing institutions from organizations where the value of these institutions transcends the immediate tasks.
- ii. making sustainability the test of development. That is, the development process must have the capacity through ID to induce a process for self-sustaining activities that seek to improve human well being.
- iii. making exploration the key to ID practice because all development initiatives are real world experiments.
- iv. making learning an essential aspect to ID such that the feedback mechanism must represent an experimental solution.
- v. creating a special unit and making it responsible for institutional effectiveness.

The third element raises a problem regarding the strategic nature of the ID process. It may be argued that the ID process must be approached with a clear set of objectives and goals, and with clear strategy for attaining these goals and objectives (Hill, 1997: 99-101; Tinbergen, 1964; and Keohane, 1984), what Hill (1993: 35) calls a *logical path* of policy making.

The World Bank (1993: 4) has also added three aspects of ID that are predominantly required to accelerate development. These changes must:

- a. de-emphasize top-down management for an interactive one. This will shift controlled economies to a new model in which the state will guide the growth of the economy through indicative planning
- b. emphasize a shift from public-private competition to partnership; and
- c. emphasize decentralization and devolution of responsibilities.

Berg (1993: 61-2) has outlined seven elements of ID that are somewhat distinct from Picard et. al. and McGill's ideas on the concepts. He sees these as: changing the incentive structure for individuals and institutions to induce personal and bureaucratic behaviour that is responsive to development needs; enhancing skills through training and education; strengthening institutional performance; reforming procedures or systems of coordination between institutions; increasing financial capabilities (that is, the command over resources); nurturing societal support; and cultivating new norms and values like abhorrence to corruption, participatory styles of management and delegation of authority. These elements constitute the background of the issues being investigated in this research, especially in chapter six.

ID as a Pre-requisite for Effective Development Management

Cooke (1998) has argued that the distinctive purpose of ID is to achieve good management of social and economic development through better institutions. From the present writer's point of view, this will require the ID process to equip institutions with the capability to emphasise the right thing at the right time to adjust appropriately should circumstances change. These are crucial requirements in development management because in the development process, it is impossible to do all desirable things concurrently, and the inability to adjust to changing circumstances in time often lead to enormous policy implementation problems and difficulties. Hyden et. al. (1979: xv) who perceived development management as increased differentiation of roles to effectively deal with change, inequality in the allocation of society's resources, and enhanced capacity for institutional performance supports this argument. They continue that development

management implies increased choice and enlarged opportunities in the decision-making process. These are however sustained or better performed by building the capacity of institutions that have responsibility to carry out these tasks through the ID programmes.

Most PSIs in developing countries have demonstrated through their inadequate performance that they lack the capacity to meet the challenges of their national development. This provides the *raison de etre* for the numerous debates on ID programmes in these countries. The most popular ideas on these debates are those used by the Inter University Research Programme on Institutional Building Scholars (see Blaise 1986: 332). This perspective suggests that the ID process involves planning, structuring and guidance of new or reconstituted institutions. According to Blaise (1986: 332) therefore, the ID process embodies: changes in values, functions, physical and social technologies; the establishment, fostering and protection of normative relationships and action patterns; and the attainment of support and complementarity in the ID environment. The emphasis here is that ID processes encompass the instruments, standards and objects for performance. This perception however discounts the quality of human resource endowment needed to make the ID process functional and it constitutes a gap, which is discussed by Paul (1990), McGill (1997) and Israel (1987). Paul (1990: 7) provides an operational checklist for a typical ID programme. His idea on the subject require the ID process to incorporate the analysis of: manpower inadequacies, including skills; coordination problems; gaps in planning, monitoring and evaluation systems; weak local capacity; the need to restructure and decentralize institutions; problems of financial management that is, cost recovery and support systems, budgetary controls; constraints, compensation and incentive structures; and autonomy issues.

McGill (1997: 26) and Israel (1987: 1) who have explained ID as a process of improving the ability of institutions to make effective use of human and financial resources share the views above. Horberry et. al. (1991: 385) have also contributed to the perceptions of ID by

stressing that its main objective is to create or strengthen the capacity to manage development and to develop structures which will strengthen the development responsibilities of institutions. Horberry et. al.'s perspective also calls for an ID programme that seeks to improve the quality of human resource. This argument shows the need for ID programmes to provide incentives for individual and collective action. The present writer believes that this view of ID requires a long-term policy process where ID programmes are tailored to suit the local political, economic and cultural conditions, but these must be preceded by institutional assessment (see Appendix A for a sample analytical framework for institutional assessment). Horberry et. al. (1991) has argued that it is important to tailor the process to suit local conditions especially in developing countries where institutions are unique, complex and deeply traditional. It is inferred from Horberry et. al.'s argument that in the final analysis, a wholesale ID programme importation will be ineffective at building capacity for development management. This argument is important in two ways for the current research. These emphasise harnessing and integrating a nation's culture and value systems into mainstream institutional processes for development management. The second aspect relates to the origins of the capacity building programme in Ghana. These issues put donor agencies and their contribution to the capacity building programme in Ghana under a microscopic assessment and this is reflected in the research question (see 4.2 (viii)). This question explores how the NIRP is seeking to remove the distortions that accompany donor involvement in the capacity building programme in particular and the development process in general.

Conditions for Successful ID Programmes

Paul (1990: 1-2) has said that the effectiveness of ID is influenced by five factors. These include: a macroeconomic policies that provide a positive or enabling conditions for ID efforts; the fit between the project and the relevant strategy including the directional changes being planned on the institutional front; the responsiveness of the policy to its clients that is facilitated either by competition in the environment or by strategies to

mobilise demand for the policy; the capacity of actors to effectively organise their internal structure, functions, systems and skills; and adequate resources and leadership to manage the programme and create the organisational values and institutional linkages. Paul (1990: 2) goes on to say that projects that benefit from all of the above factors are likely to perform better than those that are affected negatively by the weaknesses in one or more of these factors. These factors also influence the ID process over different time frames, namely; short, medium and long-term time frames.

Buyck (1995: 5) has broadened the dimension of the concept by saying that an ID process is the creation or reinforcement of the capacity of institutions to generate, allocate and use human and financial resources effectively to attain development objectives, public or private. McGill (1997) has pointed out that Buyck's perspective includes not only building and strengthening institutions but also retrenchment or liquidation of institutions in the pursuit of institutional, sectoral, or governmental-wide rationalization of expenditure to enhance the development process. Both writers agree however that the flaw in current ID practice is the emphasis placed on planning, policy, investment and appraisal without regard to policy implementation. Buyck suggests that operationally, the ID process must seek to improve and strengthen the following aspects of institutions: internal organizational structures; management systems, including monitoring and evaluation; financial management (budgeting, accounting, auditing procedures) and planning systems; personnel management, staff development and training; inter-institutional relationships; institutional structures of sectors and sub-sectors; legal framework; and government regulations and procedures (Buyck, 1995: 5). Gray et. al. (1990: 12) have also set some benchmarks that converge with Buyck's checklist but they depart on Gray et. al.'s argument that ID means more than the mere strengthening of institutions to facilitate policy implementation. According to this perspective, ID also means strengthening the: legal and para-legal systems; internal organization and distribution of functions; physical and financial capacity for project implementation; personnel policies and reward systems; and competency and

skills levels in the institutional environment. The study seeks to explore how the NIRP is incorporating these ID imperatives in Ghana's capacity building programme.

The UNDP has also suggested that institution building strategies should tackle key functions like applied analytical capabilities, planning and programme design capacities, management and implementation capacities as well as monitoring and evaluation capacities through standard policy interventions which emphasise changing management strategy. The UNDP's perspective advocates for improved management efficiency and effectiveness, changing systems and structures, matching programmes to environmental demands, and changing management structures (UNDP, 1991: 51-2). The UNDP's position can be understood on the basis of their experience in managing particular development programmes. The present writer holds a view that the UNDP's argument to apply standard policy interventions is contentious for such reasons as variations in the cultures, value systems and local circumstances of individual countries. McGill (1997) has elaborated on this position by saying that it is not a good practice to prescribe or impose a standard model of ID programme in any country. The present writer suggests that the practice of applying standard policy interventions is one major reason for policy failures in developing countries. This idea is captured by the research question in 4.2 (viii). The question seeks to investigate how the NIRP intends to remove this donor practice and how this practice affects the NIRP itself. McGill has added that as far as possible any ID programme must seek to create the enabling environment for local managers to construct the country's own ID programmes (McGill, 1997: 27). Paul (1990: 1) illustrates this point by remarking that the role of indigenous institutions in the development management process is very critical to the development process. The argument also underpins Moore's (1996: 4) view that the long-term objective of the ID process is to increase the capacity for self-determination.

Blaise (1986: 335-39) has described five variables that are critical for successful ID programmes. These are leadership, doctrine, programme, resources and internal structure. Blaise's variables underpin the problems that associate public sector capacity in most developing countries. Blaise stresses that institutions' relationship with the environment is fundamental to ID and therefore it is always important to build institutional capacity that respond to the development environment it is supposed to serve. McGill (1997: 28) notes that the institution-environment relationship connotes a feedback mechanism that enables institutions to respond or learn accordingly. Blaise has explained these feedback processes that associate ID. He argues that institutional response to the environment through a feedback mechanism shows an important shift in development management practice in developing countries due to the top-down nature of the policy process. He stresses that most of the early literature on ID placed emphasis on social engineering and a top-down approach to development management whereas recent literature is centered on a participatory, bottom-up approach and the learning process approach (Blaise, 1986: 401; Uphoff, 1986: 192; McGill, 1997: 254). Israel (1987) and More (1995) have warned that in spite of all of these arguments, ID is a low specific activity. Their reasons are that there is: the absence of a well developed idea as to how ID is best achieved; no guideline or work plans that those responsible for such programmes should follow; no precise techniques for increasing progress; and no automatic mechanism through which failures or poor performance will have a major, intense or immediate impact and stimulate investigation for corrective action.

2.4 Institutional Effectiveness and the ID Process

The concept of *institutional effectiveness* is a useful variable in explaining the ID process. It emphasizes that all institutions that acts as units of the development management process need to achieve an optimal level of effectiveness in order to play their part in the development management process successfully. The basis for this argument is that

effectiveness leads to efficiency. Powelson (1972:39) has described three criteria for measuring institutional effectiveness. He calls these *identification criterion, rules criterion and consensus criterion*. The identification criterion considers the institution's capacity to identify problems within its domain, provide solutions to the problem and to appreciate the precise consequences of the solution. The rules criterion emphasizes the capacity of institutions to establish and enforce rules so that similar problems are dealt with in predictable ways. The consensus criterion stresses the acceptability of institutions and their mandates to all persons or groups that have a stake in the institutions' remit. The present writer believes that in order to establish effective institutions in the ID process, it is also important to consider the variables listed below as important benchmarks for the process. These are:

a. Efficient Administration

The present writer believes that efficient administrative processes are important prerequisites for institutional effectiveness. In his Administration Theory, Beuchner (1968: 4-20) long ago identified four major approaches to administration that is functional to development management. These he calls traditional, behavioural, decision-making, and ecological approaches.

According to Beuchner's argument, the *traditional approach* emphasizes institutional form and scientific management. The institutional form is expressed in an organizational chart in a form of a pyramid, with executives at the top and others with different levels of responsibility at the bottom. Information flows from the base towards the apex, and instruction flow downward. Only crucial information reaches the top where only crucial decisions are made. Thus in this process, less crucial information are deliberated upon at the bottom where most decisions are also made, even though the executive remain in charge. The scientific-management element in this approach is concerned with the issue of whether there is one particular way of organizing institutions and performing the functions required of it. It also seeks to determine whether the organizing process is universally

optimal in a manner that effectiveness is automatically maximized when that form is adopted. Critics of this approach have said that despite the inter-system similarities, the behavioural and environmental impacts on the various institutions are so distinct and for that matter peculiar to each. According to the argument, this is proof that universal optima are illusions. Secondly, this approach reflects top-down management (see 3.5.1), which has become unpopular in policy analysis for the constraints that they put on the policy process.

The *behavioural approach* according to Beuchner's theory focuses on the effect of the diverse characteristics of human behaviour on management. This perspective provides a framework for measuring effectiveness or the lack of it in an institution on the basis of variables like definable cultural attributes of employees. Thirdly, the *decision-making* perspective stresses that, institutions are units consisting of many decisional situations in which the administrator is the decision-maker. Under this perspective, Beuchner argues that one test of efficiency in any institution is whether right decisions are made at the right places. This requires the officers in-charge at each level to have the right number of staff with the proper amount of training and perception. Lastly, the *ecological approach* stresses the role of the environment in determining organizational forms and processes. Beuchner explains that the differing pressures from interest and sectional groups on the administrative system as well as the expectations from these institutions determine the kind of structures and operational procedures that is adopted to maximise effectiveness. The present writer contends that for institutions to be effective, it is not sufficient to only adopt any of these four models of institutional effectiveness. It is important to back the model up with practices such as joint consultation, research and development, empowerment and structured work ethics.

b. Integral Value Systems

The utility of value systems to the development management process is one important issue that the current research seeks to investigate. This issue is captured by the research question in 4.2 (vi). The question explores how the absence of strong value systems in Ghana's development management process has distorted the process, and also seeks to investigate how the NIRP intends to correct this problem. In order to make institutions effective in developing countries, ID programmes must incorporate value systems such as openness, high levels of transparency, accountability, and the appropriate legal and institutional framework for policy planning, implementation and monitoring. Secondly, it behoves on the ID programmes to clearly define and integrate these values in public sector practices. To make these values operational and effective, it is important also to develop the manpower base that can identify with these value systems. To achieve this, developing countries need to build a superstructure management that is able to oversee and check any abuses in the development process. Such a superstructure management system is expressed in what Staphenurst et. al. (1997) calls the national integrity system. Ndegwa et. al. (1987) illustrate this position by defining development management as a superstructure management involving managing the managers of individual productive enterprises and performing governmental functions (Ndegwa et. al., 1987: 18). The superstructure management process require a high calibre manpower base to act as custodian of the development management process. According to Staphenurst et. al. (1997: 311), these issues regarding the national integrity systems have largely been ignored in ID programmes until recently.

Another dimension of value system for institutional effectiveness is inclusion. Inclusion has attracted a wider attention in the literature because participatory structures and effective support institutions are very important in contemporary development management. The present writer therefore argues that the ID process must build the capacity of institutions to coordinate class interests and to ensure that all stakeholders in the policy outcomes have

equal chance of participating in the process. The South Commission (1990: 13) has argued that the prime objective of development must be to end poverty, provide productive employment, and to satisfy the basic needs of the people, and to share fairly, the nation's resources. This objective of development shows that development is about people. For this reason the citizens must be made to participate and facilitate the attainment of development. Cavanagh et. al. (1994: 11) have added that the democratic participation of people at all stages in the formulation and implementation of development policy is crucial to determine the viability of the policy. Cavanagh et. al (1994: 121) concludes that inclusion of the local population is of crucial importance to strengthening a nation's capacity for development. The inclusion problem in Ghana's development is investigated in the study and it is captured by the research questions in 4.2 (iii) and (vii).

Picard et. al. (1994: 8) support the above position by revealing that top-down governance practices create powerful central political and administrative élite whose contacts with donor agencies alienates the masses and renders the policy-making process bereft of popular participation. According to this perspective, the historical nature of the policy-making process and the dynamics of donor-recipient relationships in post-colonial Africa also accounts for the setbacks to development in terms of popular participation. They draw a lesson from Ghana's 1987 decentralization programme and show that in this programme, the decentralization policy focused on restructuring institutions and processes to enhance the participation of people at all levels of administration, and creating efficiency and productivity in institutions. They argue that, the Provisional National Defence Council's (PNDC) government through this restructuring sought to expand popular participation in decision-making" (Picard et. al., 1994: 30-31). They illustrate this point with the "success" of Ghana's district assembly programme. The alleged success of the District Assembly programme is disputed by Odei-Tettey (1990) who has argued that the programme was ill conceived due to the nature of the selection process. Thus, it is true that one of the cardinal values of the PNDC's decentralization policy in the late 1980's and early 1990's was to

expand popular participation in the decision-making. However, whereas the programme sought to include people from the grassroots, the policy also excluded educated and professional people because the revolutionary government official policy saw these category of people as the privilege few in the society who are responsible for the country's under-development. The decentralization process therefore excluded these "privileged few" from presenting themselves for elections to serve on the Assemblies. Secondly, the District Assembly system could not contain the few of the "privileged people" who got elected and their less educated counterparts in the Assemblies because there were clear disparities between their levels of perception and analysis and this led to antagonism. Hence in as much as the programme had good objectives, the means to achieving these objectives were not properly planned. This is the reason why the process started disintegrating in the mid 1990's.

Sandhu et. al. (1989) draws another example from the Singaporean experience. They claim that in the national development planning, Singapore used the strategy of *tripartism*, which is a concept based on the collaboration of government, labour and management. This has remained the main pillar of development management in Singapore. The concept places emphasis on the fact that no matter how people are aggregated, that is as labour, government or management, all are ultimately co-owners of the nation, and therefore co-determinants of its welfare and destiny. It is therefore important for every stakeholder to participate in the development process. They argue further that, right after independence the government of Singapore enlisted the support of civil servants. This facilitated the subsequent planning and implementation of development policies resulting in rapid development and progress for Singapore in subsequent years (Sadhu et. al., 1989: 93-9).

c. Human Resource Development

The South Commission (1990) has described development as a process that enables human beings to realize their potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of fulfillment.

According to the report, development also frees people from the fear of want and exploitation. That is, a movement away from political, economic, or social oppression (South Commission, 1990: 10). This idea of development suggests a process of growth in human aspirations but runs contrary to the concept of development in the post-Keynesian and Marxian economics where the concept is considered as a process of capital formation as determined by the level of investment (Hettne, 1995: 15).

This classification of development also disregards the micro aspects of Third World development goals and rather concentrates on the macro elements. The prerequisites of development in these countries involve structural transformations which presuppose cultural, social, political and economic changes with growth as the central element (Hettne, 1995: 15). This perspective implies improvement in individual lifestyles and collective self-reliance. Ndegwa et. al. (1987: 6-7) have also said that development must be defined in relation to the development of the individual. This perspective prescribes a development environment in which the citizens identify and perceive development as happening to, by and through them over a period of time. It also means the right for the individual to make choices and decisions. This view of development states that development occurs with the knowledge that people have a duty to the society in the context of social, economic and political organization (Ndegwa et. al., 1987: 7). The urgency of citizens' participation in the development process makes a case for the effective mobilization of the masses for productive ventures. These concerns have brought awareness in Africa that effective human resource management plays a vital role in effective institutional performance (Kamoche, 1997: 268). This is because the human resource endowment of any nation is the cornerstone of the nation's wealth (Damachi et. al., 1978; Harbison, 1973). Besides, the learning process approach to development management is dependent on human capacity which reflects Uphoff's (1986) view that even though ID seems to refer to things such as structures, procedures and abstract performance capabilities, it should always call to mind people, their skills, motivation and personal efficacy. He stresses that when one talks of

ID, it is necessary to understand how the talents and energies in the relevant population can be enlisted, upgraded and committed on a regular basis to improvements in the operations of institutions. For this reason Uphoff argues that any ID initiative requires particular attention to the human aspects of institutional capacity.

Uphoff's (1986) argument calls for the mobilization and training of all levels of personnel and putting citizens who have the capability to work in productive employment. In most developing countries however, HRD programmes focus mainly on top-level management and occasionally on middle-level management. The skills of personnel at the bottom of the ladder are usually left undeveloped (see also Kamoche, 1992). They explain that the underlying assumption for this approach to HRD is that it is cost-effective to impart new skills through formal training to those officials engaged in managerial and middle- to senior-level administrative duties. It was felt this kind of training would have a cascading effect on the lower level staff whose training had hitherto been ad hoc. Kamoche (1992) has pointed out that this practice is increasingly typical with private sector institutions in Africa. The present writer argues however that this HRD practice can also be identified with public sector institutions in Africa. Horwitz (1994) has observed that managerial development schemes are saddled with problems. He argues that these pitfalls relate to the design of the management schemes that put emphasis on development. These training schemes are essentially the development of individual manager's needs rather than institutional needs. Kamoche (1992) has added to this catalogue of pitfalls by indicating that development management is prone to political patronage.

Singapore has provided a modern demonstration of how the state can effectively forge its development process through the careful creation, allocation and utilization of human resources (Aryee, 1994; Sandhu et. al., 1989). Developing its policies based on the *human capital theory*, Singapore's economic progress is largely attributable to the utilization of its scarce human resources, especially due to the proactive shaping of skills, knowledge and

abilities (Sandhu et. al., 1989; Kamoche, 1997: 270). Sandhu et. al. (1989) acknowledges that in the development process, Singapore has paid detailed and particular emphasis to the development of its human resources through training (Sadhu et. al., 1989: 129-39). Kamoche (1997) extends the debate in another dimension by rejecting the notion that sending officials on training courses is in itself a panacea to institutional capacity building" (Kamoche, 1997: 271). Jones (1990) supports Kamoche's argument because he has also refuted the assumption that training is "an act of faith" capable of solving all institutional problems. Schaffer (1974) says that this notion has created a spectre of "trainingism" which Kamoche (1997: 271) defines as "a pervasive ideological support for training". Drawing a lesson from the Singaporean experience, Kamoche (1997) has called for an alternative approach to HRD that seeks to create a pool of expertise to correspond with the requirements for productive activities in the ID process across Africa.

The present writer contends that the ID programme must more importantly be geared towards developing the skills and expertise of workers to manage development effectively in developing countries. Usually, managerial inadequacies in these countries' PSIs lead to poor management of development because the system fails to mobilize and harness the nation's human resource for development. Ndegwa et. al. (1987: 28) have expressed that development creates an increasing demand for higher levels of effective management because the development process results in more complex development structures and systems which require management to be ahead of evolving situations rather than merely responding to crises. Thus, the present writer argues that effective management in PSIs is the emotive force for effective institutional performance. This means that ineffective management creates ineffective institutional performance. This underpins Ndegwa et. al.'s (1987) argument that many of the weaknesses in the development process, both at the planning and implementation stages are the products of poor management in the sense of poor managers and incomplete or unsound managerial processes. Ndegwa et. al. (1987: 15-16), Kamoche, (1993) and Kiggundu, (1989) have further indicated that a lack of

agreed *operational definitions* for development in Africa also contributes to ineffective management. Added to this are limitations in infrastructure, personnel development and the restrictions on innovation imposed by bureaucracy (Ndegwa et. al., 1987: 16). According to Nti (1989) these have created difficult problems of weak and inefficient decision-making processes. Okereke et. al. (1995) has noted also that the absence of dynamic leadership in African institutions have been the cause of limited progress for which reason the development of managerial skills must be given a top priority. This managerial problem is a central theme to the broad research question and therefore the study seeks to investigate the extent to which the HRD programme under NIRP will aid the successful implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020.

d. Consultative Processes

Several recent studies have also shown that inter-organizational and macro-social factors such as regulatory pressure, and the more traditional intra-organizational factors like performance through networking, influence the likelihood of imitating institutional innovations. This position is evidenced in the works of Baron et. al. (1986), Davis (1991), Palmer et. al. (1993). These literature emphasise the importance of institutional cooperation and networking process. The current research will therefore investigate networking processes in the context of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP to establish the extent to which these are aiding the implementation processes. Network theorists have argued that networking can have an enormous influence on institutional effectiveness through position- and cohesion-based mechanisms. Those theorists who focus on position-based mechanisms suggests that networks provide a basis for social differentiation of institutions into status groups on the basis of their position or importance in relation to the national agenda for development. Burt (1987) has therefore suggested that institutions of similar status are more likely to imitate each other. This perspective suggests that communication ties or networking encourage *mimetic isomorphism* through the dissemination of information about legitimate practices, and where normative pressures are

exerted for conformity (Galaskiewics et. al., 1989; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer et. al., 1993). Under this theory, the ID process requires a forum for heads of institutions to meet on a regular basis to develop and compare strategies to remove the challenges that face the respective institutions in the development management process and how to manage these. This is also a place where important decisions are made on support incentives and information sharing. Network theorists who ascribe to the cohesion-based mechanism maintain on the other hand that information flows through network ties through cohesion rather than position. This forms the fundamental basis for network diffusion (Westphal et. al., 1997). This perspective argues that communication ties facilitate "a match between technology and organization" through helping decision-makers to learn about innovations that fit unique institutional needs and opportunities (Levitt et. al., 1988: 330).

In spite of their differing arguments, both perspectives see the utility of networking as a vehicle for social learning which leads to institutional efficiency. Network ties facilitate knowledge transfer about what procedures satisfy specific institutional objectives and which one exploits the focal institution's distinctive capabilities and resources. Networking under the two theories benefit from the efficient utilization of resources as these processes lead to the avoidance of programme duplication. The present writer holds a view that this brings coherence and consistency in the overall national development policy and the management of this, and it is also useful for collective bargaining. The reason being that within the networking framework, institutions become aware of the kind of development they are required to serve and as a result they focus on the nation's expectation of them. Networking and co-operation also have the added advantage of participation from all stakeholders in the development process. That is the expertise required for managing national development is made available through consultation, networking and co-operation. It is important to note however that networking can be used as a tool for mismanagement. For this reason, the legal framework must be effective and should have provisions that make such practices a high-risk activity in the networking process.

e. Institutional Processes


Evans et. al. (1985:51) have argued that an effective ID process must re-shape the goals, priorities, and commitments of members of the institution concerned. The ID process must also inculcate shared assumptions and expectations on which a common rationality can be based. This idea of the ID shows that the process transcends individual rational-instrumental behaviour. That is, the ID process must build enforceable statutes to regulate institutional practices.

Okereke et. al (1995) have argued that distortions in institutional processes such as the lack of accountability systems, and corruption have contributed to the development management problems in developing countries. McGill (1997: 253) has argued that in such circumstances, policy interventions are required to serve as corrective mechanisms. He uses the World Bank SAPs as an example of such policy intervention but the present writer argues that the implementation of the SAPs were not completely successful. Stapenhurst et. al. (1997: 311) has also noted that the World Bank-IMF SAPs prescribed for a lot of developing countries have not been effective at building the capacity they originally intended. They show that whereas the SAP emphasized effective and efficient use of public resources by effective and efficient PSIs, ID activities in developing countries have immensely focused on:

- a. capacity development where public institutions lack the requisite capacity and expertise to adjust the market economy.
- b. introduction of results-oriented management which emphasizes the importance of monitoring performance and measuring results, and
- c. public participation in the reform process, underscoring the need to tap into the valuable resources and creativity of civil society.

Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) have shown that institutional processes are better sustained through the promotion of a *national integrity system* that is also the anchor for any successful ID (see figure 2-1 for a typical national integrity system).

Figure 2-2
Making the National Integrity System a part of the ID process



Source: Stapenhurst et. al. (1997).

According to Stapenhurst et. al. (1997), the issues of capacity development, result orientation, public participation and the promotion of national integrity must be addressed holistically to make PSIs efficient and effective, and to enable them create the enabling environment for private- and voluntary-sector participation. They rest this argument on the theory that mal-functioning institutional practices inhibits performance and the optimal use of resources. They argue therefore that the national integrity system must work in tandem with ID programmes. Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) has provided a model of how the national integrity system must be integrated into the ID programme. See figure2-2 (above) for this model.

Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) have shown that wrong practices like corruption has a militating effect on ID processes and consequently on development. A number of factors including over-centralization, administrative in-capabilities, over-regulation, ineffective systems of public accountability and top-down management processes engender these wrong practices. Stapenhurst et. al. (1997: 312) and Rose-Ackerman (1996b) have added three factors that engender corruption. They list these as: the nature of the overall level of resources at stake, the risk inherent in corrupt deals, and the relative bargaining power of the briber and the bribed. Stapenhurst et. al., (1997:312) also claim that corruption is effected where there is congruence between opportunity and inclination. According to Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) and Rose-Ackerman, (1996a), when corruption is endemic in a nation, it imposes a disproportionate high cost on the society where the heaviest cost is typically not the bribes but the underlying economic distortions they precipitate. Hence corruption has a crippling effect on institutional effectiveness and therefore the ID process must adopt strategies to eliminate the practice. Stapenhurst et. al. suggests that corruption must be eliminated through a systematic ID exercise that seeks to minimize the opportunity for corruption, while reducing the inclination through effective enforcement of deterrent mechanisms which reflects the national integrity system. As part of a programme to fight corruption in the attempt to develop institutions, it is important for the ID programme to start when a framework and rules of the national integrity system is well defined.

f. Effective Management of Diversity

McDougall (1996: 64) admits that the concept of managing diversity connotes an environment in which a society's workforce consists of a diverse population of people. According to this view, diversity entails both visible and non-visible differences which include factors such as sex, age, individual background, race, disability, personality and work style. She explains that these are founded on the assumption that harnessing these differences will create a productive environment in which everybody feels valued, where their talents are fully utilized and in which institutional goals are met (McDougall, 1996:

64; Kandola et. al., 1994: 8). Gender and tribal issues have plagued the development management process in most developing countries, and institutions have done very little to evolve practical solutions to deal with the problems. In environment like these, the procedures for recruitment and personnel development are often disregarded. Personnel are usually selected by ascription instead of recruiting people who are imbued with the required skills and are best suited for institutional needs. These issues about diversity if not properly managed will incapacitate institutional performance. This is an issue of concern to the current study and is therefore pursued in the enquiry process.

The utilization of individual talents to meet institutional goals will to a large extent be attained when ID programmes are designed to ensure that training is tailored to respond to the need of institutions, and without regard to gender or tribe. According to Kamoche (1997), this notion of improving individual skills to correspond with changes in task and job requirements is an important element in managing diversity and essential ingredient in development management. Collins et. al. (1990), Montgomery (1986) and Jones (1990) have disputed the empirical link between the nature and value of training and its propensity to improve individual and institutional performance in the manner suggested by Kamoche (1997). Their argument emphasizes the fact that the utility of training is realized if the institution's core strategic activities are allowed to determine the requisite skill levels rather than merely filling the gaps in these levels. Jacobs (1990) also says that there is a conceptual difficulty in identifying the tangible benefits derived from training.

Kamoche (1993) and Fombrun et. al. (1984) have indicated that socio-cultural factors like orientation to work, demographic issues, employer-employee relations and educational levels are elements of diversity and they have enormous influence on the availability and quality of labour. It is important therefore to take diversity issues seriously in the design of any ID programme.

2.5 Role of Donor Agencies in Institutional Development

The study acknowledges the role played by donor agencies in Ghana's development but also notes that donor involvement has contributed to the distortions and under-development in Ghana. The research question (see 4.2 (viii)) therefore seeks to explore how this problem can be eliminated in Ghana through the capacity building programme.

McGill (1997: 255) has noted that ID programmes in developing countries are externally driven through World Bank and other donor policy intervention but not necessarily through government action. He argues that such programmes are often used as conditions for securing loans. This donor practice leaves developing countries with no choice than to accept and implement the programmes. The current writer holds a view that this practice has been possible because developing countries have increasingly shown weak institutional capacity in terms of human and financial resource inadequacies to manage development. However, to make development sustainable and to end the donor involvement in Third World development, donor agencies should be committed to impart the skills of their expatriate technical experts to indigenous managers. This will require both donor and local institutions to create the enabling environment for indigenous managers to acquire these skills and expertise. This is very important to ID programmes because it will remove the distortions and waste that accompanies donor policy interventions. Picard et. al. (1994: 8) have observed that a cardinal contributing factor to the failures of past donor policy-interventions is the inadequate framework for formulating and implementing these policies. They attribute this inadequate policy framework to the lack of local inputs to the policy initiative. Segasti (1995: 601) adds to this argument by stating that knowledge plays an important role in development. He defines development in terms of the capacity to generate, acquire, disseminate and utilize knowledge, both modern and traditional. According to Segasti's argument, knowledge is the instrument for effective management of development, especially if the forces of

development essentially spring from within the developing society. Segasti does not suggest total exclusion of donor agencies from the development management processes. Rather, he advocates for a culture in which development is conceived and managed by indigenous people with donor assistance if required. This perspective suggests that the foundation of any country's development must be its own material and human resources fully used to fulfill its aspirations. This point is well established by the South Commission's (1990:13) argument that although external assistance may promote development, this level of support need to be consolidated into the national effort and adopted to suite the purposes of those it is intended to benefit. The Commission bases this argument on the assumption that sustainable development is driven by self-reliance and it is self-directed.

Secondly, Picard et. al. (1994) makes the point that, cultural differences have rendered western management systems incompatible with African management requirements. They argue that in the face of the challenges posed by this environment, it will be inappropriate for governments and international donors to confine their efforts at development to policy analysis, infrastructural investments and technological assistance. Esman et. al. (1984) have suggested that development programmes must be extended to include institutional and HRD activities that according to Picard et. al. (1984) also accommodates the norms of the society. Picard et. al. add that donor intervention programmes that seek to ameliorate the deficiencies in development management will not succeed unless there is a sustained commitment to this brand of ID. The basis for this argument is that African development require a:

"satisfactory level of donor and national commitment of resources, a cadre of LDC administrators who can take control of technical assistance program, and an institutional capacity for organisations to plan and implement HRD activities" (Picard et. al.,1994: 7).

The idea is that a cadre of indigenous personnel can best relate the cultural norms of the society to the development process. This process will also aid the local capacity building

efforts. Picard et. al. acknowledges the contradiction in the Ghanaian situation where expatriates are increasingly being substituted for Ghanaian managers and administrators, and in the meantime, no serious effort is being made to train indigenous manpower to assume the ever-increasing managerial responsibilities. The World Bank (1991: 5) has consequently commented that the replacement of indigenous personnel with expatriate officials have no long-term solution as in the final analyses, there can be no substitute to Africa having its own indigenous capacity.

McGill (1997: 256) has identified four key interventions in World Bank prescribed reform programmes. He argue that these interventions are to tackle: excessive public sector wage bills; the surplus of civil servants; the erosion of public service salaries; and wage compression. McGill, (1997: 256) and Dia (1993: 4) see this World Bank's policy intervention as inadequate in dealing with Third World development management problems. Dia therefore provides alternative framework for intervention with emphasis on governance. Dia's perspective has some similarity with McGill's idea of doing less but better, yet they differ in terms of the targets of intervention. Dia's model targets:

- a. institutional performance which encompasses changes in governance procedures, that is the role of the state, the rule of law, and public accountability
- b. supportive incentive performance including the rewards and sanctions involved in encouraging personnel to perform
- c. performance in national economic and policy management with implications for resource mobilization, budgetary process, and regulatory framework, and
- d. the quality of service delivery which should be the end product of the preceding three interventions.

Picciotto (1995: 12) provides a third perspective to donor policy intervention. He calls this perspective *institutional economics* that seek to enhance the impact of development programmes. Institutional economics calls for ID programmes that is based on institutional remits. Picciotto argues that, this will ensure balance among the remits of the various

institutions and engender a positive interplay between the public-, private- and the voluntary sector- institutions. Thomas (1996: 6) has taken a less optimistic stance on these perspectives of ID programmes. He argues that the changes sought under ID efforts are only:

- i. products of politics than management
- ii. popular models of organisational change derived from the experiences of small samples of private firms rather than the complications involved in managing change in the public sector.
- iii. the mistaken belief that there is one best way for management in the public sector, and
- iv. the false notion that the fundamental institutional change is inherently uncertain, risky and likely to create conflict.

2.6 Summary of the Debates

The chapter has discussed the dynamics of development management and argued that in order to manage development effectively, it is important to examine the institutional implications. This may require either an introduction of new institutional structures or changes to the existing ones. The discussion has consequently examined at the various debates on the models of ID programmes and established that it is a wrong practice to apply a standard model of ID in any country due to the socio-cultural differences in various societies. There is an argument that most IDAs, especially, the World Bank and IMF have followed this practice by persuading developing countries to adopt standardized ID programmes that are also conceived outside the socio-cultural environment. The implementation of such programmes has normally failed. This phenomenon questions whose capacity these IDAs are seeking to build. The discussions have also established the differences between capacity building and institutional development processes.

Implementation Theory: A Conceptual Underpinning of the Research Question

3.1 Introduction

Hill (1993) has said that the implementation process is complex and as a result, implementation researchers are not in agreement about what constitutes the subject of their enquiry. O'Toole (1986) and Hill (1993) have discussed this complexity and differing conceptions of the subject and concluded that a welter of arguments abounds regarding the principal components of policy implementation and how the process operates. The present writer has therefore put together a number of perspectives to construct a model implementation theory as the interpretative framework for this study. That is, the concept of implementation is used as a framework data analysis in this research.

The chapter is divided into six sections beginning with an introduction in section one. Section two provides an overview of the subject while section three discusses some important assumptions about the concept. Section four examines what the elements of a *perfect policy implementation* are. Section five discusses three main models of the concept namely, the top-down, bottom-up and interactive models and determines which of the three models will be suitable for analysing the research data. Section six draws on systems analysis to explain the dynamics of managing the implementation of complex policies such as the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP using the interactive model.

3.2. Overview of the Policy Implementation Process

Jordan (1982) has described the implementation process as a means to goal achievement which are normally defined in the context of policy initiatives like the Ghana-Vision 2020 or the NIRP. According to this argument, the policy implementation process is subject to a variety of outcomes such as success, failure, and implementation logic⁹. These outcomes are factored on the capacity of policy makers to understand the location, strength, stakes and strategies of attempts by those affected by the policy to promote, alter or reverse the policy. Grindle et. al. (1991) have added that, time, complexity and demands of the implementation process affect the performance of implementers and for that matter are great determinants of the outcome of any implementation effort. Another crucial determinant of policy implementation is the ability to bring together institutions, men and material in a cohesive organisational unit and motivate them in such a way as to carry out the policy objectives (Williams, 1971: 144; Flingstein, 1985; Burt, 1987; Palmer et. al., 1993). Secondly, it may be argued that the implementation process is inextricably knit to policy and therefore the level of policy-implementation linkage also impacts enormously on the outcome of the implementation process. The policy-implementation linkage is usually influenced by such variables as policy standards and objectives, policy resources, inter-organisational activities, characteristics of implementing agencies¹⁰. This linkage is further influenced by factors like economic, social and political conditions (such as resources, nature of public opinion and interests groups support), as well as disposition of the implementers.

⁹ *Implementation logic may be defined to include such things as strategies for the implementation process, mechanisms for delays, motives of individual implementing agencies and coalition building to fix the outcome.*

¹⁰ *The Characteristics of implementing agencies include variables like staff size, degree of hierarchical control, Organizational ability and validity etc.*

A pioneering work on the subject by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) suggests that sometimes the implementation process become a means of subverting policy goals. Their work takes as its premise the ways in which institutional and inter-institutional forces tend to transform policy and it shows that the relation between implementing agencies and implementation issues explains this behaviour. This situation normally occurs under conditions of:

- a. evasive and non-supportive behaviour in terms of involvement with the process. This may not be a sign of weakness or sabotage only but a reflection of institutional response to political and economic constraints (Aryee, 1992); or
- b. compliance supportive behaviour which indicates cooperation and participation in the context of institutional response to reward systems.

Pressman and Wildavsky show that the policy implementation process is fundamentally based on policy interpretation and response by implementing agencies. Thus the implementing agencies must have the ability to appropriately interpret the policy and to coordinate and manage the various elements required for attaining the intended policy outcomes (see 3.3 for a discussion on these elements). The present writer holds a view that, the implementing agencies' ability to interpret and respond well to policy is influenced by factors like the level of information that is available about the policy, the psychological characteristics of actors, their perception based on training and experience, the degree of change that is required to implement the policy, style of intervention, and interests of implementing agencies. From the point of view of the present writer, the subjective nature of these perspectives shows that policy interpretation and the consequent response to it by implementing agencies are sometimes bereft of rationality. Barret et. al., (1981) therefore argues that, it is dangerous to assume that policy implementation is based on rationality which can be understood scientifically. This underlines the idea that the policy implementation process does not produce any specific rules by which the process can be moved. Thus, in the implementation process many actors pursue sectional interests, and these determine their support or opposition to the

policy. It is important therefore for policy makers to estimate these dynamics of the policy implementation process to enable them plan effective strategies for the policy implementation process. This imperative suggests that it is important to make *implementation estimates* a part of policy analysis to examine the dynamics of the implementation process. This must include analysis of such intervening factors as compliance, resistance, costs, resources, strategies, etc. According to Hargroves (1975), implementing agencies must be capable of analysing these alternatives by conventional cost-benefit analysis. The logic of implementation estimates is that if it is identified that it is going to be very difficult to achieve the targeted policy objectives, it becomes imperative to put in extra efforts find alternative ways of accomplishing these. The implementation estimates connote both a theory of how problems will develop and steps needed to remedy the problems. This requires an understanding that very simple sequences of events depend on complex chains of reciprocal interaction. As a result each part of the chain must be built with others in view. This makes it improper therefore to separate policy formulation from implementation (see 3.3.1). This position is strongly shared by Pressman et. al. (1973) and Hill (1993). On the basis of the above discussion, the study seeks to investigate the implementation processes involved in two major development policies in Ghana to explore the answers to Ghana's development problems. These two policies are the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the National Institutional Renewal Programme.

3.3 Elements of Policy Implementation

The present writer holds a view that the elements of any policy implementation process are factored on what is being implemented because policies differ in content and context and are complex phenomena. It is therefore generally inconceivable to have a set of elements that may be universally applicable to all policy implementation cases. However, it may be argued that certain variables are very basic to almost every

implementation process irrespective of the context, content and complexity of the policy. These basic variables are:

3.3.1 Policy Orientation

It may be argued that the implementation process is policy oriented and this idea provides an opportunity for the research to explore the policies associated with Ghana's development and to investigate the implementation processes involved in these policies. Pressman et. al. (1973: xiv) have argued that “ a verb like ‘implement’ must have an object like policy”, and Ham et. al. (1984: 96) see implementation as a process of putting policy into action. In order to put policy into action, the policy process must among other things define the actors and agencies and their interactions because these provide the clue as to who is influencing what, how and why. Besides, the policy to be implemented must have clear goals against which to judge implementation. These are important causal factors in the implementation process.

It is debatable however, whether one can set “clear goals” in the policy process. Ham et. al., (1984: 101) have argued that policies are complex phenomenon that consists of a web of interrelated decisions and these are normally vague. This perception about policies therefore makes it difficult for implementers to work with policy. It may be inferred from the above argument that, most implementation difficulties are caused by the nature of the policy-making process which may have excluded some stakeholders in order to reach a stance. However, if one accepts the definition of policy making as a means of translating a stance, as for example building the capacity of Ghana's PSIs or a commitment to reduce the size of the public sector, or making Ghana's private sector the engine of national development, then all stakeholders who either do not favour or were excluded in taking that stance will oppose its implementation.

Lane (1987), Hargroves (1975), Parsons (1995), Pressman (1973) and Ayee (1992) have argued that implementation processes are built around an asymmetric relationships between the formulators of policy and the implementers because implementation theory suggests that public policy becomes a legitimate concern for implementers once it has been decided on formally. This means that very often implementation considerations are discounted during the policy making process. This practice creates implementation problems that normally lead to series of contradictory policies that distort the entire policy process. Thus since 1975 (Hargroves, 1975) till recently (Parsons, 1995), the idea of fusing implementation and policy making has been a missing link in policy analysis. This is a procedural problem in the policy process that normally puts policy implementation at risk¹¹. Thus the canons of policy implementation suggests that there must be no sharp divide between policy making and policy implementation because what happens at the implementation stage is determined usually by the policy making process. Hogwood et. al. (1984) have therefore argued that policy formulation and implementation must be interdependent. To ensure effective implementation, policy makers must be involved in the implementation process and vice-versa. They show the importance of this idea by stressing that in the policy process there is always the need to follow the policy through - to cover loopholes and fill in the details during the implementation stage. Elmore (1979) has argued that if this link is kept in policy analysis, policy makers will usually arrive at a better policy (see also Majone et. al., 1978; Barret et. al., 1981). The above argument provides the basis for this study, and that is to investigate the extent of this practice in the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP and what has been its usefulness.

Thirdly, it is important to classify policies into distributive and regulatory types so that the classification can be used as a basis for analysing the implementation process because

¹¹ Policy is usually said to be put at risk when it pertains to the following causes: bad execution; bad policy; and bad luck

each category will generate different types of reaction to the policy. The classification process also provides a useful tool for estimating the dynamics of the implementation process. Hargroves (1981) and Davies et. al. (1982) have suggested that re-distributive policies are more difficult to implement than distributive ones, and secondly, the success of regulatory policies may rest on the extent to which they have re-distributive consequences. Van Meter et. al. (1975) have also said that it is important to take account of the content or type of policy in implementation analysis because the effectiveness of implementation will vary across policy types and policy issues (see also Davies et. al., 1982). Thus the idea that different kinds of policies evoke different sets of participants and levels of participatory intensity is helpful to understand the policy implementation process.

Moreover, the canons of policy implementation require policy makers to make certain crucial but appropriate decisions during the policy making stage. This means that effective policy implementation depends on knowing what one wants to do, the availability and ability to mobilize and control required resources, communicating what is required with implementers, and monitoring their performance. According to Lane (1987), Pressman et. al. (1973) and Barret et. al. (1981) however, such decisions are often left to the implementation process for reasons such as the:

- a. inability of policy makers to resolve conflicts during the policy-making stage,
- b. ability to make key decisions only when all the facts are available,
- c. fact that professional implementers are better equipped to make the key decisions than anyone else,
- d. fact that little is known in advance about the actual impact of the new measures, and
- e. recognition that day to day decisions will have to involve negotiation and compromise with powerful groups.

Pressman et. al. (1973) and Barret et. al. (1981) have further stressed that policy-making is a process that continues during implementation. This process may require continuing flexibility and a process of back and forth movement between policy and action. Thus most policies normally fail because policy makers usually underestimate the complexity and difficulty of coordinating the tasks and orientating agencies involved in implementing policies. This is evidence that implementation is a policy-action continuum in which interaction and negotiation processes take place over time between policy makers and implementers (Pressman et. al., 1973; Barret et. al., 1981: 25) due to their differing perceptions of the policy.

The present writer argues therefore that it is wrong to assume that implementation processes are smooth and straightforward. In the policy process many things go wrong between policy formulation and implementation. However, it may be argued that the chances of successfully implementing a policy will be increased if thought is given at the policy design stage to potential problems of implementation. This has implications for the current research because there is an apparent gap between the formulation of Ghana's development policies and their outcomes, where the gaps are created by public sector structural inefficiencies and inadequate skilled personnel for policy implementation.

3.3.2 Implementation Structure

An implementation structure is composed of all agencies or actors who seek to put policy into effect through a variety of activities. Hogwood et. al. (1984) have said that in modern society, the implementation structure is very instrumental in policy implementation. Their argument stresses that the process for policy implementation encompasses a variety of important tasks that are provided through multi-institutional programmes that consequently combine to realise the policy outcome. The implementation structure is normally interconnected clusters of institutions, firms,

governments and associations that come under the framework of the policy to be implemented. Hogwood et. al. have stressed that it is therefore almost impossible for any single institution to fully execute the implementation process on its own.

To constitute an implementation structure, the nature of the policy to be implemented must offer the framework to adequately define the combination of institutions required to carry out the programme. These institutions are normally constituted into technical and administrative units. The selection of implementing agencies and the task of assigning them to the appropriate unit depends on the type of policy to be implemented, and the roles the respective agencies are required to play in the process. For example in the NIRP implementation process, the MoF has been assigned to oversee public sector financial reforms and the Attorney General's Office to oversee reforms in the legal sector. These actors participate in the NIRP process for a variety of goals and motives, and view the policy to be implemented as their fundamental or instrumentally important interests. The policy therefore puts these institutions in a confounding set of relationships with a single objective of achieving the overall goals of the NIRP.

Davies et. al. (1982: 121) have stated that within the implementation structure, subgroups of actors also perform specialist roles, namely: decision making, planning and intelligence gathering, resource provision, intermediary and coordinating roles, services provision, and evaluation. These make consensus building and agreements important characteristics of the implementation structure. Hanf (1982: 160), Hjern et. al. (1981:214) and Hogwood et. al. (1984) have added that the implementation structures offer a strategy for analysing purposive action within a framework where parts of many public and private institutions cooperate to implement a policy

Secondly, the role of implementing agencies and the work processes in the implementation process differ from those in day to day tasks of institutions because in an

implementation structure there is less formal structure and fewer authoritative relations. Thus, the work structures are more dynamic and shifting in an implementation structure as the cluster of actors does not represent a legally defined unit with a corporate charter and office building. Besides, the decision to participate in any programme is fuzzy as it is based on consent and negotiation. Thus, the network of institutions is not an administrative entity. It provides the resources for making the implementation process functional.

Hogwood et. al. (1984) have added to this argument by stating that the policy implementation process requires a brand of implementation structure that has some organic features such as relatively undefined tasks, relationships and reduced emphasis on hierarchy. From their point of view, these organic features are appropriate in an uncertain or fast-changing environment because they enable institutions to adapt more speedily and effectively to the changes envisaged by policies. According to Hogwood et. al., this happens because the organic features offer implementing agencies with wide latitude to process information quickly compared to the shortcomings of the traditional bureaucratic organisation that insist on official channels and vertical communications. The implementation structure as an element of policy implementation provides the instrument for exploring the structures being used to implement Ghana's development and capacity building policies (see chapters five and six). This will be particularly important in determining the impact that members of the implementation structure makes on the development process.

3.3.3 Cross-Institutional Linkages

It has been noted above that the processes of implementing policies are not done by any one institution. The process requires a combination of a number of institutions to perform differing roles to achieve the set objectives. This element of policy

implementation shows that it is imperative for policy makers to design processes for effective cross-institutional linkages at the policy making stage to enable the implementation process meet the set target. These institutional linkages may involve institutions within the implementation structure or outside the structure but who have a stake in the policy to be implemented. The level and kind of linkage is determined by the nature of the policy.

Putting such linkages in place alone does not guarantee a successful implementation. Mountjoy et. al. (1979) have acknowledged that cross-institutional linkages also creates problems for policy implementation due to role duplication and institutional self-interests. For example, implementation of the NIRP process involves a multiplicity of sub-programmes and these require the involvement of a large number of institutions. However, these implementing agencies may have distinctive interests that account for differential motivation for their implementation efforts. Besides, there may be a number of decision points associated with the NIRP implementation that require clearance to enable the programme to continue but this may provide grounds for disagreement and delay (Ayee, 1992) and may hinder the implementation process (Lane, 1987). The present writer hold a view that these problems will occur whether implementing agencies belong to a single institution or not, because they have a degree of independence and a relative autonomy due to their respective specialised areas of operation. Besides, these agencies may also have their own legitimacy or links to the outside environment and therefore are not substitutable. As a result, any level of control is limited by the amount of power available to the controlling agency¹². These will ultimately lead to conflicts and to eliminate these, it becomes important for policy-makers and implementing institutions

¹² The 'amount of power' refers to resources, legitimacy and authority to apply sanctions and incentives possessed by one agency vis-à-vis those it is seeking to control.

to interact through negotiation, bargaining and compromise processes. Barret et. al. (1981) have added that it is important to secure performance through compromise in any policy implementation process. This is best achieved through networking. From the discussions made so far, one can infer that the policy implementation process is characterised by conflicts and therefore it is very important to incorporate in the process a strategy to anticipate obstacles and how to prevent or eliminate these – that is *implementation estimates*.

As discussed in chapter two, networking is very important for policy implementation as it draws attention to project interdependencies and future resource needs. But to make networking useful, a process has to be designed to guide the behaviour of all actors in the network. This process must be communicable, acceptable, feasible, and credible to all actors in order for the network to function effectively. This strategy need not be seen as separate from planning other more technical strategies at the policy formulation stage. Nixon (1980) has said that communication is an important function of networking and institutional linkages. He argues that communication is therefore an important variable in policy implementation. He puts emphasis on clarity and consistency in the communication of policy to all stakeholders. The thrust of Nixon's position is that institutions are interdependent but the asymmetric distribution of resources that normally accompany policy implementation also creates conflict in inter-institutional relationships. Hogwood et. al. (1984) has suggested that where there are actual or potential differences among institutions, the government agency wishing to promote the policy to be implemented will have to exercise political judgment about which strategy is most likely to improve the chances of successful implementation. This task can best be achieved through effective coordination and negotiation skills. Ham et. al. (1984) have added that in some policy areas, these conflicts are eliminated by the clarity of institutions' mandate and security regarding their resources. *Network analysis* may be a useful tool in explaining the policy failures that characterise Ghana's development. This is captured by

the research question in 4.2 (iii). The question seeks to investigate the processes and impact on institutional coordination and networking on the development process.

3.3.4 Environmental Reaction

The environmental reaction to policy implementation is underpinned by the idea that policies are often characterised by uncertainties and conflicts that create opposition to the policy implementation process. This normally results in organised anarchy that confuses the policy goals and creates fluid participation in the implementation process. Such situations underpin the need for implementation estimates during the policy formulation stages to assess the programme feasibility regarding support and opposition, the stakes involved, and the political and bureaucratic resources needed to sustain the policy implementation process. Thus, implementation estimates are important to policy implementation because the nature and intensity of stakeholder reaction to the implementation process determines the success or failure of the policy. Elmore (1978) has said that environmental reaction to a policy may range from those that question the viability of the policy to those that threaten its existence, and these normally take the form of overt actions to reverse the policy to covert actions to undermine it¹³. Moreover, the characteristics of the policy to be implemented also determine the type of reaction that is generated. For example, the distribution of the cost and benefits of the policy, its technical complexity, administrative intensity, short- or long-term impact, and the degree to which it encourages participation determine whether the reaction to the policy will be:

a. A Public Reaction

This is the type of reaction from society at large towards national policies that takes the form of total rejection, alteration, shaping or sustaining the policy. For the public to react, the policy must have a direct impact on broad sectors of the society or on

¹³ These happen when those to implement the policy are unwilling to comply with the policy proposals. Elmore (1978) calls this behaviour "dynamic conservatism" which is the tendency to fight to remain the same.

politically important interests in society. Such policies must be readily visible to the affected groups. The stakes in pursuing this kind of policies will be high and can even threaten the continuation of a government (see Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Policies with these characteristics require policy makers to secure a large political capital to sustain it. Where this is absent, they would have to think about ways of accumulating support and managing public opposition to the policy (see Elmore, 1978). Or

b. An Institutional Reaction

The outcome of some policies is determined by how bureaucratic agencies, public officials and administrative routines respond to the policy. Thus, agencies, officials and routines are able to shape, alter or reject the policy to be implemented. These are policies that usually have no direct impact on large sectors of the population and as such are not readily apparent to the public. Such reforms normally concentrate cost in government, disperse benefits, have high administrative or technical content, limits participation, and have long-term duration. The government's stake in implementing this type of policy will be low and the implementation process will emphasise institutional competence and compliance. However, alliances between factions or individuals in institutions and external interests can sabotage the implementation process (Grindle et. al., 1991). Furthermore, the implementation of such policies provides a platform for competition and conflict among individuals and groups who have been excluded from the policy process. These groups therefore seek to pursue and assert their interests and this sometimes, leads to indifference and inertia which Bowen (1982) has said are constraints to implementation in much the same way as active opposition.

These two forms of reactions emphasise that the environment's reaction to policy does not occur in the context of simple acceptance or rejection. Bowen (1982), Hogwood et. al. (1984) and Grindle et. al. (1991) have argued that there are also a range of possible reactions from active acceptance through passive acceptance, indifference, and passive

resistance to active resistance. To reduce these threats of resistance to policy implementation, Hogwood et. al. (1984) have argued that it will be useful to:

- a. provide full information at an early stage about the policy, including the reasons, objectives and means involved.
- b. engage in an extensive consultation with affected parties inside and outside the institution, and to make policy decisions participatory where possible.
- c. use valid communication and persuasion (rather than command) to convert informal leaders and group 'influentials' or opinion leaders to the canons of the policy¹⁴.
- d. create an atmosphere of trust by showing concern for people's interests and for their less obvious feelings such as loss of work mates and personal insecurities.
- e. create an atmosphere in which people will express their fears in relation to the policy as these are often the reasons for resistance.
- f. give assurances that changes will not be rushed, that resources will be adequate, that the effects of any change due to the policy will be reviewed and mitigated, and that there is some flexibility in the plan.

The environmental reaction to policies is an issue that is investigated by this research. Thus, the study seeks to explore the effects of this reaction on the capacity building programme and how this would shape the outcome of the policy and consequently, the development process.

¹⁴ *Valid communication here is defined as being frank about problems and dangers of the policy implementation, and the benefits of the policy.*

3.3.5 Resources Mobilization

Any policy implementation requires resources to make the process operational. Ham et. al. (1984) have said that policymaking must go with the procurement of adequate resources to make action possible. These resources may be political, financial, managerial and technical or a combination of these. However, the exact combination of resources required for any policy implementation is determined by the policy in question. Grindle et. al. (1991) maintain that securing these resources constitute a part of the challenges that policy makers and policy managers have to grapple with. Thus, policy makers must be capable of identifying which of these resources or a combination of which are necessary for implementing the programme and, where and to secure them.

The capacity to mobilise essential resources is one of the key elements to successful implementation of any development policy. Even though resources are by definition limited, Grindle et. al. (1991: 148) have argued that they are not fixed and so if policy makers are effective, they can mobilise resources through conscious and concerted efforts. The resource mobilisation efforts are most effective when policy makers are able to analyze the existing resources. This will provide a good idea of what level of support is needed for the implementation process¹⁵. *Resource analysis* in the policy formulation stage is essential as it is a basis for adjustments in policy and implementation structure. These have direct relevance for substantive output of policy. Resource problems, especially human resource are captured by the research question as a problem for investigation. The question seeks to explore how this resource affects the development management process.

¹⁵ *Resource analysis is a part of implementation estimates.*

3.3.6 Management Procedures

Hogwood et. al. (1984) have argued that it is important to develop appropriate processes and procedures, including management procedures for the implementation process. These management procedures and processes directly relate to how members of the implementation structure will manage the process. They specify who is responsible for what, how, where and when tasks should be done.

Hogwood et. al. (1984) have recounted a sequence of procedures and processes for managing the policy implementation process. These imperatives are however rarely achieved in practice. According to this theory, the policy process must:

- a. design a programme that incorporates task sequences and clear statements of objectives, performance standards, cost and timing.
- b. execute the programme through mobilising appropriate levels of resources including structures, staffing, funding, procedures and methods.
- c. build in appropriate scheduling, monitoring, and control processes to ensure that the programme proceeds as intended, and if deviation happens, to adopt appropriate corrective plan immediately.

These procedures are only theoretical guide to managing the policy implementation process because they assume a very high degree of control over the policy to be implemented and its outcome that are not achieved in practice. Furthermore, they are insulated from the environment and hence not realistic.

Hogwood et. al. (1984) have suggested that the managerial technique that may best handle the implementation process is Network Planning and Control (NPC). The NPC provides a framework for policy-making and implementation through identifying the tasks to be accomplished, the relationships between these tasks, the agencies responsible for each tasks and the logical sequence in which they should be performed. Hogwood et.

al. have added that the Programme Evaluation and Review Techniques (PERT) may complement this method. The PERT allow for probability estimates of the duration of each task. It calculates the critical path to ensure that no slippage will occur to delay the entire project. The method also seeks to monitor any slack elsewhere in the network and reallocation of resources, time, technology and task management to permit activities on the *critical path* to be completed on time (Hogwood et. al., 1984). Managerial problems are central issues to the research question (see 4.2 (v)). The question explores how managerial pitfalls affect Ghana's development management and how the capacity building programme intends to solve these problems.

3.3.7 Evolutionary Process

This element emphasise the idea that policy and implementation is a continuously changing process (Ayee, 1992). That is, the implementation process has certain dynamic properties which negates the conventional concept of implementation under which policy goals are decided by one agency and the means to achieve them are left to another agency. Majone et. al. (1978) has also said that when practitioners act on policy to implement it, they change it. This implies that the actual policy to be implemented evolves during the process of execution. Linders et. al. (1987: 466) have said that policy is a construct that emerges from interactions, and as such has no life of its own. These propositions discount goals of central decision-makers in favour of the understanding and bargains that develop among actors in the implementation process.

The import of this element is that implementation is a learning and exploratory process, during which an organization can utilize implementation failure as a route to implementation success. That is, for example in evaluating a policy implementation process, the lead agency may consider not only the achievement of the stated objectives but also discoveries made during the implementation. Lane (1987) supports this idea that

implementation is a learning process by conceding that the process results in the redefinition of objectives and the reinterpretation of outcomes and this makes implementation an endless process. The evolutionary nature of the policy implementation process provides a platform for innovations and discoveries in the organisational learning process (see Argyris, 1978; Senge, 1990). This is explored by the current study in chapter 6. The chapter examines the evolutionary nature of the NIRP and how this affect the capacity it is seeking to build.

3.4 Notions of a Perfect Policy Implementation

Policy implementation outcomes are not easily determined during implementation because this is an ongoing process between implementing agencies and the policy environment each with differing interests. Consequently, their response or anticipated reactions to the policy implementation also varies. Implementing agencies that work as strategic managers in a complex policy within an institutional framework are essentially concerned with achieving politically, institutionally, developmentally and economically viable outcomes. These outcomes are determined to a large extent by environmental pressures like support or opposition. The environmental reaction may require either removing the policy from agenda entirely or modifying it to meet the environmental expectations. This explains why policy implementation processes normally lead to outcomes quite different from those intended and anticipated by policy makers.

Thus, a judgment about implementation depends on the interpretation of the implementation environment and hence there is no single model of policy implementation that can guarantee successful implementation (see 3.5 for a discussion on the different policy implementation models). However, the various models seek to structure implementation in such a manner that there will be high probability of policy success. Secondly and as noted before, implementation success will depend on the

ability to plan the implementation process alongside the technical content of the policy (Grindle et. al., 1991). Thirdly, environmental factors such as resources, technology and characteristics of clients and services are also important for implementation success (Hargrove, 1975).

Hill (1993) has also argued that there is no theory of implementation that commands general agreement on the requirements for implementation success because policy experts continue to work from diverse theoretical perspectives and use different variables. Hogwood et. al. (1984) have also stated that perfect implementation is unattainable in practice because perfection is an analytical concept and an ideal that is not achieved in practice. The thrust of these two arguments is that most of the logical preconditions of perfect implementation like 'perfect obedience', or 'perfect control' are morally and politically unacceptable and unattainable in a pluralist democracy. Furthermore, implementation research tends to view the process from the purview of central decision-makers rather than from the target group or the policy environment. Hence, the degree to which central policy goals are realised become the primary measure for assessing effective implementation (Hanf, 1982) but these goals are usually different from the aspirations of the policy environment which may judge the outcome differently.

3.4.1 Building Capacity for Implementation

An implementation capacity is the ability of institutions to bring together human and material resources in a cohesive organisational unit and motivate them to execute the policy objectives (Barret et. al., 1981). Grindle et. al., (1991) have argued that when actors lack implementation capacity, the implementation process normally fails. The elements of implementation discussed in 3.3 provide implementing agencies with the capacity to deliver the intended policy outcomes. The absence of any one of these constitute an *implementation deficit*, and the absence of a number of them lead to a

cumulative deficit which consequently lead to weak institutional capacity for implementation.


Sabatier et. al. (1979; 1980) have described the under-listed factors as necessary for effective implementation although it is difficult to attain them in practice. These factors are:

- a. the policy must be based on a sound theory that relates to changes in target group behaviour in order to achieve the desired objectives.
- b. the policy and its associated statutes must contain unambiguous guidelines for the implementation structure, such that the policy requirements will dictate the performance of implementing agencies.
- c. the leaders of the implementing agencies must have substantial managerial and political skills and must be committed to the statutory goals.
- d. organised groups and key legislators or the chief executive must actively support the policy, with the courts being neutral and supportive throughout the implementation process.

Figure 3-1 below shows the essential variables required for building an implementation capacity. They are organised in a critical formation to show the linkages in the variables. These conditions affect different stages of the implementation process and they provide benchmarks for building implementation capacity for the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP. Many of the attempts to ensure effective policy implementation management follow the logic of organisational theory. The theory assumes that if management structures and processes, channels of communication and clarity of communication are in good form, then a strong capacity for implementation has been established and the policy outcome has a great chance of succeeding.

Figure 3-1

Skeletal flow of variables for building an implementation capacity



Source: Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 542).

Hargrove (1975:74) has emphasised the importance of incorporating implementation estimates in policy planning right from the outset as a capacity building measure. This perspective demands that as a capacity building benchmark, the institutional capability that launches the programme must be maintained for its execution.

3.4.2 Reasons for Implementation Failure

Implementation failure is central to the research question as the study seeks to explore how these failures have contributed to Ghana’s under-development. Implementation failure may be seen as a product of lapses in planning, specification and control as well as the lack of consensus and commitment among implementers. The nature of policy implementation failure may be distinguished into two, namely:

- a. non-implementation which means a policy is not put into effect as intended probably because those involved in the execution have been uncooperative and inefficient, or because their best efforts could not overcome obstacles to effective implementation, and
- b. unsuccessful implementation that occurs when a policy is carried out in full, and external circumstances are favourable but the policy fails to produce the intended outcomes.

Ayee (1992) have said that some of the causes of policy implementation failures in developing countries are bureaucratic sabotage, inertia, lack of resources, non-commitment by political leaders, poorly designed policies, opposition from interest groups, and questions about legitimacy of government. Elmore (1978) add that most policies fail because no single unit of government is sufficiently powerful to force others to conform to a single conception of policy. The present writer holds a view that in developing countries the executive arm of government usually emerges as the most powerful institution that coerces other institutions and stakeholders to conform to policies. In these circumstances, the outcome of the policy in question conforms to Elmore's argument that this will result in implementation problems because people and institutions alike engage in various behaviours to sabotage the policy as a result of the coercion.

3.5 Models of Policy Implementation

Policy implementation may be classified into three models based on the approach to the policy making process. Elmore (1978) has argued that none of these models however is able to fully explain the complexity of the implementation process. The three classifications are the top-down, bottom-up and interactive models.

3.5.1 Top-Down Model

The *top-down model* has also been called *Forward Mapping* (Elmore, 1978) and *Linear Model* (Grindle et. al., 1991). Hogwood et. al. (1984) have said that the top-down model is managerially oriented and is centered on policy. In this model, implementers become agents of policy makers. Basically, the model starts with policy making by government officials and then seeks to shape the actions of implementing officials and target groups to conform to the policy objectives and procedures (Sabatier, 1986; Elmore, 1980). That is, the top-down approach tends to view implementation in terms of hierarchical structures and management processes, where policy is introduced at the top and transmitted down the hierarchy. Hanf (1982) has argued that this model centers on steering the relationships between superiors and subordinates and compliance by the administration and target groups. Consequently, the outcome is measured in terms of the original statement of intent.

The model begins with elaborate objectives that come with specific set of steps for achieving these objectives. This is then measured against the intended outcomes which serve as the basis for measuring success or failure. Elmore (1979) has noted that this process is consistent with the standard framework of policy analysis and with conventional techniques of management science and decision analysis. The assumption is that implementing agencies are linked to the policy in a hierarchical relationship. Thus, the closer one is to the source of the policy, the greater one's authority and influence. Secondly, the ability of implementing agencies to respond to implementation problems depends on specifying clear lines of authority and control in the implementation process.

The Top-Down Model of Policy Implementation



Grindle et. al. (1991) have observed that most policy implementation processes use the top-down model because of the methods involved in conceiving the policy in question. That is, a proposed reform gets on the agenda for government action on the basis of society's needs. Consequently, the government makes a decision on the proposal and

93

attempts are made to implement the decision as illustrated in figure 3-2. The decision stage is seen as the critical choice and it becomes the focus of policy makers, whereas the implementation stage is either ignored or considered to be the responsibility of a different agency namely, the implementing institution.

The top-down model normally encourages international agencies to substantially support efforts to strengthen policy analysis in developing countries. They assume that improved policy choices will generally result from rational policy analysis. Grindle et. al. (1991) have argued that these international donor agencies use the linear model in proposing policies to governments of developing countries. There are however some rare instances where these international agencies have been concerned about the implementation process. In such circumstances, they have emphasised the need to strengthen implementing agencies and government commitment in the policy process. The Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP are examples. This explains the enormous financial and technical support that these two programmes have obtained from donor agencies. The top-down implementation model is captured by the research question in 4.2 (ii). The question recognises this model as a problem to policy implementation and therefore seeks to explore how this will be eliminated under the NIRP.

a. Strengths of the Model

The main strengths of the model are the pre-occupation with effective implementation of specific policies, and ability of elected officials to guide and constrain the behaviour of public servants and target groups. However, this notion of hierarchical control in the sense of tightly constrained behaviour may be objected to on the basis that it is possible to keep the behaviour of implementing officials and target groups within acceptable bounds over time through compromise and negotiations. This is important to ensure that policy implementation is not stunted due to conflicts and schisms that characterize hierarchical control.

Secondly, the model provides a framework for top-down oriented implementing agencies regarding how they should secure effective implementation. Sabatier et. al. (1979: 489-92) have justified this approach from first, a liberal democratic point of view that policy should be made by the elected representatives of the people and implemented in a subordinate manner by public officials. Their second argument is that rationality in public policy involves goal setting and this is followed by activities designed to achieve those goals. They conclude their argument by adding that these activities must be systematically monitored.

b. Flaws in the Model

The arguments so far have shown that the model concentrates on identifying the legal and political mechanisms needed to affect preferences and constrain the behaviour of implementing officials and target groups in the initial policy decision and subsequently over time (Sabatier et. al, 1980; Sabatier, 1986). However, these arguments provide insufficient grounds for effective implementation. Hence, Hjern et. al. (1982), Barret et. al. (1981) and Elmore (1979) have criticised the top-down model for concentrating on central decision-makers and discounting other actors in the policy process. Their second criticism is that the top-down model is difficult to use in circumstance where there is an absence of a dominant policy or implementing agency but a number of government directives and implementing actors with none of them being prominent.

Sabatier (1986) has argued that the distinction between policy formulation and policy implementation in this model is misleading and useless as it account in most part for the incessant conflict that characterize most policy implementation processes. The distinction also ignores the fact that some institutions are involved in both stages of the policy process like the MoF or NDPC and the Ghana-Vision 2020. Ham et. al. (1984) have stressed on the importance of seeing policy formulation and implementation as one process because it breeds clarity in the policy process and helps to successfully negotiate

conflict before and during the implementation stage. Elmore (1979) criticises the model for its implicit and unquestioned assumption that policy makers control the organisational, political and technological processes that affect implementation. The flaws in the model make it unsuitable to be used for analysing the current research.

3.5.2 Bottom-Up Model

Elmore (1981:1) has described the *bottom-up model* of implementation as *backward mapping*. He sees this model as backward reasoning from individual and organizational choices that are the hub of the problems to which policy is addressed. The model begins by identifying the network of actors involved in the policy implementation who are consequently asked about their goals, strategies, activities and contacts (Elmore, 1978; Hjern et. al., 1981; Sabatier, 1986; Ayee, 1991). Sabatier (1986) has added that the model uses contacts as the fulcrum for developing a network technique to identify the local, regional and national actors involved in the planning, financing and executing the programmes (see Davies et. al., 1982).

The fundamental principle of this model sees implementation as the most important activity in policy analysis that happens at the bottom of institutional hierarchy rather than at the top, or by bargaining between members of institutions and their clients. This shows that the people at the bottom must be involved in all stages of policy analysis. This is important because the model assume that people at the bottom will eventually mould policy to suit their aspirations (Lipsky, 1971; Elmore, 1979) and therefore the role of those at the top of the system is residual. That is, they provide the resources that implementers need to work, but they should not exert direct control over the factors that determine the success or failure of this activity (Elmore, 1978; Sabatier, 1986). Hill (1997:214) have consequently argued that on methodological grounds implementation studies must concentrate on the efforts of those at the bottom because this will provide an

explanatory framework for inputs from the top. This argument is supported by the *classical statist* position on democracy that it is better to negotiate policy at the bottom¹⁷.

Elmore (1979) says that the model does not begin with a statement of intent but with a statement of specific behaviour at the bottom of the implementation process that generates the need for policy. The process specifies the policy objective only when the required behaviour has been outlined. According to Elmore's perspective, the objectives are first stated as a set of organisational operations and then later as a set of outcomes that is produced from these operations when the precise target has been established. The implementation process is then filtered through the structure of implementing agencies to affect the behaviour that is the target of the policy. This process will require the needed resources to be available in order to have that effect. That is in the final stage of the process, policy makers prescribe a policy that provide resources to those agencies that are likely to have the greatest effect of implementing the policy.

The rationale that underpins the model is the dissatisfaction of policy implementers about the assumption of the top-down model that the bottom-up model is incapable of making independent judgments and decisions for which reason the behaviour of policy implementers must be programmed by someone else (Elmore, 1978). It is however difficult for implementing officials who perceive themselves as competent, self-sufficient adults to be committed to policies that put them in a category of passive actors. This has become even more critical in this era where manpower requirements emphasise professionalism of the workforce. As a result there is an increasing demand for autonomy, participation and discretion in the policy implementation process. Crosby (1994) has also said that the continuous improvement in the performance of implementing agencies is most likely to occur when workers groups and individuals are

¹⁷ The bottom here refers to those who are responsible for the policy implementation and those affected by the policy.

not only provided with knowledge, skills and motivation but also with authority to make decisions.

The bottom-up model therefore examines the implementation process from the purview of a multitude of actors and their interaction at the operational level of specific policies. It discounts other stages in the policy process, namely; policy formulation, and re-formulation (Elmore, 1980). The model focuses on the strategies pursued by various implementing agencies in the pursuit of their self-interests because the model sees these agencies disregarding the central objective of the policy to seek their own interests (Barret et. al., 1981; Hjern et. al., 1982, Elmore, 1980; Sabatier, 1986). The model underpins the formal division of administrative labour but makes no a priori suggestions about the role of a formally mandated organisation or the relative importance of any particular public or private actor involved in the policy process.

Elmore (1979) has observed that although the bottom-up model takes the policy makers' position on the implementation process, it does not assume that policy is the only or even the major influence on the behaviour of people engaged in the process. The model also does not rely on compliance with the policy makers' intent as the standard for success or failure. It bases success on the limited ability of implementing agencies at one level of the implementation process to influence the behaviour of actors at other levels, and on the limited ability of public institutions as a whole to influence private behaviour.

Thirdly, the model assumes that the closer one is to the source of the problem, the greater is one's ability to influence it. It also assumes that the problem-solving ability of complex institutions depends not on hierarchical control but on maximising discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate. That is, the model stresses diffused control and concentrates on factors that can only be indirectly influenced by policy makers. Examples of these factors are knowledge and problem-solving ability of lower-

level administrators, incentive structures, bargaining relationships among agencies, and the strategic use of funds to affect discretionary choices.

a. Strengths of the Model

The key strengths of this model is that, it is first and foremost a methodology for reconstructing the decision process in policy implementation and implies no normative preference for any particular agency in that process. It rather draws central actors into the reconstructed implementation process in terms of their practical roles in that process. However, if they are the determinant agencies in the implementation process, the method will eventually reveal them as such (Hanf, 1982). Thus, the model provides a neutral mapping of who participates in the implementation process and to what effect. Secondly, the lack of assumptions about which the relevant agencies are, makes a representation of a variety of interests in the inter-agency network and organisation rather than a particular one, like the top's. This is an important strategy to improve the performance in public policy implementation.

b. Flaws in the Model

The model is however associated with three fundamental problems. The first problem relates to defining what should be done in terms of what can be done by existing institutions with minimal disruption and conflicts. Elmore's (1980) statement that policy making should be understood in terms of the organisational processes of implementing agencies and the effects that these processes have on the target groups is very significant in expatiating this problem. Secondly, Hanf (1982) has observed that the model does not necessarily lead to the evaluation of performance in terms of preferences, interests and objectives of locals who may implement a policy in ways not intended or desired by the top. Neither does the model suggest an evaluative benchmark for analysis. It leaves room to apply the top's objectives as the evaluative benchmark or to apply those of any other actor.


These two fundamental problems makes the bottom-up model also unsuitable to be used for analysing the findings of the current research. However, it is important to note that the crucial difference between the top-down and bottom-up models lies in whether one chooses to rely on formal devices of command and control that centralises authority or on informal devices of delegation and discretion that disperse authority (see Elmore, 1980).

3.5.3 The Interactive Model

Debates between the proponents of the two models above regarding which of the two offer a viable framework for policy implementation has led to the conception of the interactive model as a third alternative. The interactive model is basically a synthesis of the strengths of the two previous models. The thrust of the interactive model is that a policy initiative may be changed and even reversed at any level in the implementation process by pressures and reactions of those who are opposed to it. The model perceives policy as a process in which stakeholders and other interested groups can influence its outcome through implementation. That is, whereas some stakeholders may be capable of influencing high-level officials in government, others will be effective at affecting the managers of the implementation process, and others at those who control the resources needed for implementation.

The interactive model provide tools for: anticipating reactions to change; considering the prospects for sustaining the policy through the implementation process; and assessing whether the required resources for implementation are available or need to be augmented.

Figure 3-3
An Interactive Model of Policy Implementation



Source: Grindle et. al. (1991:127)

This model is presented graphically in figure 3-3 above. With this model the demands to put policy issues on the policy agenda comes from many sources, including development-minded policy elite. Some items on the agenda are acted upon while others are not based on preferences, perceptions, actions of policy elite, and their ability to appreciate the economic and political environment they face. Thus, in the interactive implementation process, the agenda always contains many issues than are usually acted on as well as issues that are acted on but not implemented. In the process, policy makers accord some

issues with active consideration, but the point of actual decision is hard to determine precisely. The process of authorisation may go through one or more stages of the bureaucracy and may have to be confirmed at some level of political decision-making. Once an affirmative decision is made, it may be reversed at a higher level at some point in the implementation process, and the issues may be returned to the agenda. The model therefore see the policy process as a series of formal and informal stages with numerous actors who have distinct interests and concerns (see Grindle et. al., 1991).

Thus, although policy makers see some policies as controversial, unpopular and fraught with risks, most of them do not pay particular attention to planned strategies for implementing them. This happens because they conform to the linear model that enjoins policy makers to decide on a policy but distance themselves from its implementation. They leave the implementation process to lower rank bureaucrats whose capabilities they are normally unsure. But the model recognises that much as implementation requires good analysis and a plan, the chances of success are high if policy makers are involved in the entire policy process including the implementation stages. Grindle et. al. (1991) have therefore advised that policy makers must not assume that policy formulation is the most important stage in the policy process and what follows is just a mechanical process which may be executed by others if briefed.

The interactive model emphasizes coordination, control and compliance but through negotiations and not sanctions. According to this perspective, the process involves people at the bottom who are already performing complex tasks (see Elmore, 1978 and 1980; Hjern et. a., 1981; Hjern et. al., 1982; Barret et. al., 1981). Secondly, the model draws on the assumptions that policy makers have strong interests in affecting the implementation process and therefore policy makers must play an effective role in the implementation stage. Thus under the model, Hanf (1982) recognises that the process is not the concern of a single, hierarchically integrated organisation but it depends on the

collaboration of a number of independent institutions. The implementation process therefore needs to establish patterns of interaction and interrelationships among those actors through which information is communicated, cooperation established, and conflicts resolved. Thus, the interactive model draws eclectically on the participation of a variety of different actors from the two previous models to provide an understanding of the multi-actor system of implementation. For example, increasing number of development and capacity building programmes are carried out in multi-institutional settings in which these implementing agencies simultaneously advance local, national and international objectives as well as public, private and international interests. Under such circumstances these implementers will be confronted with the task of mobilising and coordinating the resources controlled by the various actors to enable them put a programme into effect.

Even though Jordan (1982) has argued that the interactive model of implementation points to ad hoc, trial-and-error searches for a feasible solution to implementation problems, it is the only model that looks at policy implementation from the perspective of both actors at the top and bottom of the policy process. Hence, the model is popular in private sector models of management. The model provides a suitable framework for analysing the complexity that associate the multi-actor system of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP implementation processes. Hence this model is used to analyze the findings of the current research.

3.6 Interactive Policy Implementation and Systems Analysis

Systems analysis provides a useful framework for analysing the complexities that associate policy implementation. The systems' model that has relevance for the interactive policy implementation is parallel to Easton's (1965) use of systems to analyse political life where inputs go into a decision system and yields outputs. Easton's model

has been modified in the discussion to show the urgency of interaction for successful implementation.

3.6.1 Systems Analysis of a Complex Interactive Implementation


Systems analysis is generally seen as a continuous problem-solving framework through four broad stages. A UN Report (1981) describes these stages as: objectives setting after problem definition; exploration of alternative approaches to arrive at acceptable decision; the assessment and ranking of these alternatives; and the choice of one single alternative as the most appropriate policy for achieving the desired objective. The report argues that systems analysis had been used as a scientific tool for increasing the degree of rationality in policy analysis, where such rationality is based on the canons of efficiency (United Nations: 1981: 9-10).

As discussed previously, the interactive implementation system comprises of a set of interrelated entities and their interrelationships. This system has boundaries that distinguish it from the operating environment. It is in a sense a net of communication and coordination process which permits the flow of information that leads to a self-adjusting process. The interactive implementation system has inputs and outputs that emanates from actors at the bottom and the top. The output may re-enter the system as an input or what is termed feedback by Dougherty et. al. (1981:135). Thus, the interactive policy implementation system has the following three core elements:

- i. a set of component parts (i.e. actors in the policy process including implementing agencies) which when put together perform some purposeful activity.
- ii. functional interrelationship of these parts, and
- iii. an ongoing interrelationship between this set of component parts and the environment (see Lovell, 1970: 27, 32).

These three core elements underpin the interactive model and they emphasise that, sometimes the goals of the implementation systems get muddled up due to the differing interests. The second element suggest that the component parts work together, and if some are absent or malfunctions, the system will fail to work to capacity or might even break down as shown in figure 3-4. This is further illustrated in Emile Durkheim's (1933) valuable contribution to the sociology of policy implementation. This grand theorist, see in division of labour an axiom of structural differentiation which is the emotive force for managing policy implementation in modern societies. The third element expresses an idea that the interactive implementation system monitors the environment, respond to it and influences it.

Figure 3-4
Effects of Actors Performance on Policy Implementation



Source: The Author

In Figure 3-4 above, institutions and agencies like the MDA’s constitute the actors in the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP policy processes. Each of these sector-institutions and agencies have a purposefully defined role to play in the policy process which is represented by lines a, b, c, and d. Secondly, the performance of these roles combine

together to achieve the policy objective. Whenever there is inefficiency in the performance of any one sector or even in a sector institution or agency's performance as in 'd', the entire implementation process will not perform optimally and sometimes the attainment of the policy objectives will even be problematic as shown with the impact of line 'd' on the attainment of policy objectives. A defect in the performance of any one actor becomes a setback for the entire process if it is not swiftly and adequately corrected. Thirdly, these actors are sensitive to the environment in the sense that planning and implementation affect the environment and vice-versa. This idea of comparing the interactive implementation process to a system is an abstraction and an intellectual construct that seeks to explain the complexity of interactive policy implementation. Some of the fundamental principles include:


Inputs: An input to the interactive implementation system takes the form of resources like information, money, demands or needs that are injected into the implementation system. The system serves as the memory of the implementation process with facilities, faculties and mechanism to store and recall information to aid the implementation process. All inputs are processed here in the memory.

Outputs: After the system has processed the inputs, it is translated into action which is returned from the system into the environment as an output through a specific or series of programmes. This is where the goals and objectives of the policy are either realised or failed.

Feedback: The feedback is a new information or resource that is the result of the previously unleashed action from the system. This provides the basis upon which the input goes through the entire cycle again. This makes the interactive implementation system a dynamic process. The feedback provides the mechanism for revising the previous action or unleashing new action as a follow up to the previous one. By this process, the system is able to accommodate new and unforeseen challenges that emerge during the policy implementation process. This is illustrated in figure 3-5, which elaborates this input-output variety of the interactive implementation system.

Figure 3-5

Input-Output Processes of Interactive Policy Implementation System



Source: The Author

One attraction of this kind of systems analysis in explaining the interactive implementation process is its movie effect. The processes it applies to are ongoing and to some extent recurring so there is a sense which makes one think about systems analysis of interactive implementation in a way that seems to capture the dynamics of existence. The processes are serial where one step is a lead to another and they become cumulative through the memory such that what happens is a reflection of what happened before. Systems also do contain sub-systems and this happens by systems nesting inside themselves. This captures the interactive implementation process in motion and the parts (i.e. sector-institutions, agencies and policy makers) in a framework of interdependence. Another dimension of the nesting process reflects the segmentation of the interactive implementation process into a series of differential tasks with the parts being responsible for different tasks. Each task can therefore be stopped analytically for a closer examination. The current research will use this perspective to analyse the remits of the individual sub-programmes of the NIRP and the design of coordination processes for achieving the overall objectives of the NIRP.

3.6.2 Input-Output Processes in the Interactive Policy Implementation

One way of analysing the complexity of interactive implementation with systems is to compare variations in inputs to variations in outputs, and hope to find that regularities in the changes in the former will invariably lead to regularities in variations in the latter. For example, when inputs such as funding and technical information are filtered through the system (memory) for a predetermined policy outcome (output), they will each produce different output because the inputs vary. In the same way, an increase in one of these inputs will produce an increased output. To illustrate the argument, the explanation for increased speed of a car (output) which oscillates from 60 m.p.h. to 80 m.p.h. is the increase in the pressure on the accelerator (variation in input).

It can be observed from figure 3-5 (above) that inputs undergo some form of processing in the memory before it is unleashed as an output. The processing is responsible for the causal relationship that exist between changes in inputs and outputs. But figure 3-5 does not explain why. Besides, not all changes in inputs are of equal importance for changes in the outputs. This therefore requires a new and elaborate version of the model that will fragment the inputs into parts, and show the various actors in the policy process and their interactions for role accomplishment. The inputs must therefore be categorised into parts, and as a first step, local inputs will be distinguished from external inputs. The local inputs consist of cluster of things such as government policy, resources, information, national culture and its dominant elements, social structure and aspirations of nationals. The external inputs include cluster of things that presses on the system from the international community. Examples are donor policy interventions, aid, loans, and the various forms of technical assistance packages.

These inputs have to be transmitted, and this is done by policy makers through communication. Communication may be uneven, imperfect and irregular hence, systems

vary in terms of their communication processes¹⁸. There is also the sticky issue of perception. Perception in this context may be understood from two perspectives. These are the manner in which input is communicated and understood by actors and secondly, the visibility of the input. For example, what if quality personnel is misconstrued for quantity of personnel, and what if Ghana thinks it will have enough resources to complete the implementation of its Vision 2020 and the NIRP by a set date but does not? Perception is therefore selective and it is influenced by such variables as ideology, culture, human cognitive processes, experience and training, and psychological characteristics. Thus inputs are immersed in an intricate mesh of communication and perception processes and these have important effect on the quality of output.


The discussions so far are bereft of the principles of the output processes. The hypothesis here is that outputs vary according to variations in inputs as mediated by actors in the policy process as well as the process of communication and perception. This means that the policy output also goes through the processes of communication and perception that are largely defined by information and data. It is also important to distinguish policy from implementation, and both policy and implementation from action although it must be emphasised that these constitute one chain in the policy process¹⁹. The essence of this division is to explain for instance why in the policy implementation process decisions are made sometimes to perform a particular activity, but what is actually done resembles partially, what should have been done, or sometimes a particular activity is engaged in that was not previously decided. These processes are illustrated by figure 3-6 below.

¹⁸ *Communication is one of the critical factors that determine the output of policy. This may be lateral or vertical.*

¹⁹ *Policy has been attached to implementation in Action 1 (in figure 3-6) to show that in this process, the outcome is commensurate with the policy objectives.*

Figure 3-6

Systems Analysis for Interactive Policy Implementation Process



Source: The Author

N/B: Policy Actors include policy makers, Implementing Agencies and the Environment.

In this figure, ‘actions’ have been categorised to explain why and when certain action takes place in the implementation process instead of others and to distinguish between the types of action that the output is concerned with. For example in the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP implementation, action may be various. Sometimes it is the result of policies and implementation mediated by communication and perception (that is information and data), sometimes the result of implementation without reference to or even in spite of policy, and sometimes without recourse to either policy nor implementation. It is important to stress that the input and output processes as mediated by communication and perception, and the filtration through the memory is to a very large extent impacted by institutional factors such as procedures, quality of human resource (that is skills and expertise) and governance systems. The output processes are effectively executed if institutional networks are effective and the intermediary processes like communication and perception are adequate.

One way of understanding systems analysis of interactive implementation is to design it in the manner captured in figure 3-6. In order to explain this model, it has been assumed that institutions perform these functions optimally. The figure also reflects the complexity of networking and communication processes that take place among institutions concerned with the policy process as for example, Ghana's PSIs in the case of the current research. These institutions' performances have impeded Ghana's development due to their structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skilled personnel. These institutions however have high stakes in the implementation of Ghana-Vision 2020 and consequently, the NIRP. The interactive policy implementation system is therefore used as the conceptual framework for analysing the implementation of these two policies in chapters five and six.

Thus, the question that *"Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national development?"* is best explored using the interactive implementation theory as the framework for analysis. The theory provides the opportunity to explore and examine the processes and dynamics involved in achieving the outcomes of the policies that underpin the research question – that is the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the National Institutional Renewal Programme (see chapter 4). Thus, the theory will enable the research to analyze the problems and opportunities involved in securing the outcomes of these two policies and consequently, the answers to the research questions stated in 4.2.

PART III

Methodology

Methods and Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research methods used for the current study. The chapter also describes how the enquiry process was organized and it is divided into five sections. Section one is the introduction and it describes how the chapter is organised. Section two states the research question and also lists eleven sub-questions as elements of the broad research question. Section three discusses the approach to the enquiry process. Methods of data collection are also discussed in section four. Sections five and six respectively discuss the steps used for interpreting and reporting the data, and theory of the methodology. This last section provides a theoretical explanation for the design of methodology – that is an *a priori* link between methods and the broad research question. Essentially, this shows that the research design is a product of the issues under investigation.

4.2 Elements of the Research Question

The pith of the research question as discussed in the previous chapters relates to PSIs structural and human resource requirements for managing development and how these impact the delivery of Ghana's development. The research question is re-stated as; *"Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national development?"*

In order to find answers to this broad research question, the under-listed questions (derived from the literature review and theory chapters above) were used as benchmarks for data collection.

- i. PSIs play an important role in managing the development process. How have these institutions performed this role, and within the framework of the NIRP, how are they required to function in the overall development environment?
- ii. Institutional value systems such as openness, transparency, accountability, cooperation and networking, and the legal and institutional framework for policy analysis need to be addressed in the capacity building process. In what way is the NIRP designed to address these imperatives seeing that the lack of these have affected public sector performance at managing Ghana's development?
- iii. Participatory institutional structures and effective coordination of sectional interest are necessary for Ghana's development management. In what way will the NIRP ensure the move from single centers of decision-making to multiple channels of communication and participation, and therefore create an enabling development environment for collective efforts in the development process?
- iv. The human resource crisis in Ghana has had a negative impact on building institutional capacity for development. In what way is the NIRP seeking to address this crisis that has incapacitated institutional performance?
- v. Managerial performance in Ghana's PSIs has had a retrogressive impact on institutional efficiency, especially as PSIs have been unable to mobilize and harness Ghana's human resource endowment for development. How is the NIRP addressing these managerial pitfalls?
- vi. Ineptitude such as over-regulation, lack of accountability, over-centralization, limited administrative capabilities and authoritarian practices in PSIs have distorted Ghana's development management process. In what way is the NIRP seeking to correct these distortions to enhance national development?

- vii. Gender and tribal bias have impeded Ghana's development process and institutions have done very little to provide solutions. What strategy is the NIRP devising to correct these cultural problems?
- viii. There have been mix reactions regarding international donor involvement in Ghana's development. Whereas one school of thought see this involvement as a progressive partnership that leads to skill development and programme funding, another sees it as a process that distorts the development process. How will the NIRP eliminate these distortions that associate donor involvement in Ghana's development?

4.3 Approach to the Enquiry Process

This section describes the framework within which the study was carried out. It covers such research activities as subject selection, case studies used, negotiating access and the topic guide used.

a. Case Studies

Two national policies – the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP were selected as case studies (for detailed description of these two policies, refer respectively to chapters five and six). The Ghana-Vision 2020 is an integrated programme of economic and social policies that provide a perspective framework for accelerated growth and sustainable development. The programme seeks to turn Ghana into becoming a vibrant and dynamic middle-income country by the year 2020. The programme envisages that by this time, Ghana would have attained the status and standard of living of an upper middle-income country. The *vision* therefore calls for a comprehensive transformation of the economy and society in order to effect significant improvement in the quality of life of all Ghanaians. The NIRP on the other hand is a public sector performance improvement programme that aims at promoting national capacity building by means of a programme of institutional renewal, covering every sector of national life, and using the discipline of good governance

to improve the quality of institutional performance. The programme is comprehensive and it embraces Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in Ghana's public sector. NIRP therefore intends to turn Ghana's public service into a productive and motivated establishment capable of contributing towards the attainment of the Ghana-Vision 2020 objectives through good governance.

The Ghana-Vision 2020 was selected because it is the most current development policy in Ghana. Since the research is about Ghana's development, a critical examination of this policy will be useful in revealing the strengths, weaknesses and gaps in the implementation process. These problems that associate the implementation of the Vision 2020 provides the *raison de etre* for building public sector capacity to manage the development process. This is why the NIRP has been selected as the second case study – to examine how Ghana is addressing the policy gaps associated with its development policies. The justification for selecting these two case studies is that they will be useful in providing answers to the broad research question. That is, an analysis of the implementation process of Ghana-Vision 2020 will help to determine the actual causes of Ghana's under-development whereas the NIRP will provide an understanding as to how Ghana is seeking to eliminate these problems.

The case studies approach was used because according to Stake (1995: 77) it is useful for intrinsic research. In accordance with Stake's perspective, this study is concerned with developing a general understanding of how policy developments in the capacity building programme will drive and sustain Ghana's development. These two processes belong naturally together as the former is designed to complement the latter.

b. Subject Selection

Purposive sampling was used to select five PSIs, and two international donor agencies. The basis for sampling these institutions and agencies are their involvement with the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP, as well as their specialised area of operation. Thus by adopting purposive sampling, the researcher used his prior knowledge and judgment (see Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 202; Sedlack and Stanley, 1992: 144-5). The five PSIs sampled are the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHSC), the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare (MESW), and the Management Development and Productivity Institute (MDPI). The NDPC and the MoF were selected because they are the two lead institutions in Ghana's development management process. Thus, whereas the NDPC is responsible for development policy and planning, the MoF takes care of the financial aspects of the process. The MoF has an added responsibility of overseeing the Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP) which is a component programme of the NIRP. The OHCS was also selected because it is responsible for managing the Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP) which is one of the NIRP component programmes. Another reason for selecting the MoF and the OHCS is that it is useful to know how the capacity building exercise is being modeled in these two institutions because of their leadership roles. The assumption is that if the lead institutions are unable to build their own capacity to manage national development, it will raise doubts as to how they can help the other MDAs to build the required capacity. The MESW is the lead institution in national welfare policies and that is also important to development. The MDPI provides management training for public sector officials. It is therefore significant to explore how development management and capacity building issues are modeled in these institutions as well. The selection of these five subjects is based on balance in terms of policy inputs, their varied roles in the development process and consequently their involvement with the NIRP, as well as an opportunity for other PSIs to learn based on the lessons provided by these lead institutions (see Stake, 1995: 6).

The World Bank and the DFID were sampled from international donor agencies because of their deep association with the development and the capacity building processes in Ghana. That is, these two donor agencies are the major financiers of the capacity building programmes in Ghana. The World Bank makes substantial input to the entire NIRP process in terms of funding and technical advice, whereas the DFID is associated specifically with CSPIP and also in terms of funding and technical inputs including expertise. There is for example, a DFID technical adviser physically located at the OHCS working with his Ghanaian counterparts on the programme. Apart from these activities, they have also committed huge sums of money in terms of loans and grants to finance the Ghana-Vision 2020. Hence it is useful to examine the full extent of their input in terms of technical advice and funding to the two policies.

4.3.1 Site and Subjects Characteristics

The fieldwork was conducted in Accra, Capital City of Ghana because this is where the headquarters of Ghana's PSIs as well as the Secretariats for the NIRP and its component programmes are located. Accra is also the seat of government and almost every national policy in Ghana is made here even though under the Ghana-Vision 2020, the policy process is being decentralized. All the subjects for the study are therefore located in this city. Significantly, these characteristics model the pattern and trend of Ghana's development as these place emphasis on urban development. As the title suggests, the study covers the post-revolutionary Ghana, and this will be defined as the period from 1992 – 2000.

4.3.2 Negotiating Access

In order to gain access to these institutions, the researcher engaged in a series of negotiations with the authorities of the above-mentioned institutions (see Gilbert 1993). The researcher communicated with these authorities through letters. Whereas the process was successful with the sampled PSIs and the secretariats of the ID programme, it was not

the case with the World Bank although it is one main donor agencies selected for the study. The World Bank's resident mission in Ghana denied any direct involvement with the NIRP and the Ghana-Vision 2020. Hence they referred the researcher to the NDPC and the MoF instead for information required on the Bank's role in the two programmes. The data obtained on the World Bank for this research was therefore received through the NDPC and the PUFMARP Secretariat at the MoF. The World Bank's recent announcement of disengaging itself from the policies of the developing countries may be the explanation for this action. Access to the DFID, the second donor agency sampled for the study was gained through the Head of Civil Service (HSC) in Ghana. As mentioned already, the OHCS works closely with the DFID to implement the CSPIP which is a component of NIRP.

4.3.3 Topic Guide

The topics listed below served as benchmarks for data collection during the fieldwork. Thus these topics guided the processes for collecting the documentary, interview and observation data. These guides were derived from the elements of research question. These are:

- i. Institutions and the development management process.**
 - a. identify the role of PSIs in national development management.
 - b. enquire about the institutional regulatory processes that associate the development management process.
 - c. identify aspects of Ghanaian culture and their impact on the development management process.
 - d. identify institutions' capacity to rise up to the challenges posed by the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy.

- e. explore the Vision 2020 policy formulation process and its implications for the policy implementation.

2. Governance Framework.

- a. identify the extent to which institutional value systems such as openness, transparency, accountability, monitoring and legal system impact the development policy process
- b. explore how cooperation, consultative and networking processes are managed through the existing institutional arrangements for policy implementation.
- c. identify the processes for inclusion in the development policy process and how this is being changed or upheld by PSIs.
- d. explore the infrastructural support mechanisms available to aid development policy implementation.

3. Management and Delivery Systems.

- a. identify the managerial impact on the development management process.
- b. explore any possible connection between managerial ineptitude and Ghana's under-development.
- c. identify Ghana's manpower potentials and its impact on national development.
- d. identify the processes and potential of building capacity for development through the NIRP and how this will impact the nation's development and the processes thereof.

4. Human Resource in Capacity Building.

- a. establish a link between Ghana's manpower crisis and under-development in Ghana
- b. identify the methods used by donor agencies to impart skills and expertise to local managers and donor commitment to this course.

- c. identify opportunities for increased participation of local experts in the development policy process.

4.4 Methods of Data Collection

The researcher adopted the triangulation approach to data collection in this study. This is a multi-method or an intersecting set of different research methods within a single project (see Denzin, 1970 and Gilbert, 1993). Three main forms of research methods were used in the triangulation and therefore for collecting data. The rationale for this research design is that answers to the research question can best be secured by using a combination of methods. Thus, the use of any one method would not have been sufficient to generate the required data in terms of reliability and validity.

The multi-method approach provided the formula for testing the reliability and validity of the data collected. The case for this multiple data sources is made very necessary especially in Ghana where politically sensitive data are often subject to substantial error if they were collected by any one method (see Bulmer and Warwick, 1993). This data collection design is justified by the problems encountered during the fieldwork. That is, political exigencies in Ghana did not permit officials to provide information freely without fear of intimidation and reprisals. In such situations, any data gathered for research purposes especially from public institutions may be subject to some margin of errors and distortions. PSIs constitute the subjects of this research, and these institutions are a major part of the government machinery for national development policy analysis and development management. However, in view of the closed system of governance in Ghana, it became evident during the fieldwork that people deliberately censored the information given at interviews. This is very typical of the outcome of qualitative

interviews. In certain cases, they completely withheld the information and others offered to give information off the record. The multi-method approach therefore was to ensure that information withheld in the use of one method might be obtained through the use of another method. The methods used are:

a. Documentary Evidence

The study made extensive use of documentary data. These were mainly obtained from the above-listed subjects. The utility of this method is the availability of data once the document gets to the researcher. It is very much unlike interviews where officials can withhold information. This becomes the case in documentary data only when the entire document or a part of it is made unavailable to the researcher. The research made use of both primary and secondary documents. The data so generated accounted for both past and current trends in the development management and capacity building processes in Ghana. The inadvertent type of primary documents was used because these are generated from the day-to-day schedule of the sampled institutions and ID programmes and therefore has a high measure of reliability. The types of documents used were focused on those:

- a. with a broad strategic policy making, and planning undertones
- b. debating the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP
- c. addressing major issues of policy implementation, and
- d. aimed specifically at stakeholders of Ghana's development.

The secondary documents used include government and official publications on the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP, as well as articles and writings of practitioners in the field. These documents were obtained from the five PSIs, the DFID and the Secretariats of the NIRP, PUFMARF AND CSPIP.

The current researcher acknowledged Scott's (1990) caution to pay attention to issues of authenticity, credibility, mis-representation and meaning when written documents are used as data. The researcher therefore screened the documentary data collected by finding out first what kind of document it is and also ascertaining what it says, who produced it, and finally established if the documents are complete, altered and or edited in any way (see Bell, 1993). The researcher also checked for the author's social background, political views, aims and past experiences. Other factors checked included:

- a. the author's experience and whether he/she experienced what has been documented,
- b. the author's expertise,
- c. whether the author told the truth, exaggerated, distorted or omitted anything (see Bell, 1993).

The study incorporated this design to ensure that individual biases do not distort the data. The data from the documentary materials are given references that indicate the source and year of the publication. Where these are official publications, each word of the title begins with a capital letter in the bibliography. Articles are referenced differently. The first words of the titles of articles begin with a capital letter but all the remaining words begin with small letters. Besides, all quotations that exceed three lines on a page are put in single-spaced and small (10pt) lettered quotations.

b. Interview

In-depth interviews were used as the second method of data collection. This took the form of a loosely structured interview in which the researcher sat face to face with the

respondents and asked questions. In view of the fact that the subject of enquiry is sensitive to the Ghanaian political system, the questions for the interview were designed in such a manner to ensure maximum objectivity and without bias for any political views or political party. However this objective was not achieved as some of the respondents declined to answer certain questions and or did not want their response to some of the interview questions to be quoted or referenced. The interviews were useful in obtaining data that could not be accessed by the documentary method of enquiry. This is especially significant because record keeping in Ghana's PSIs has generally not been good. It is therefore very easy to lose vital data if one concentrates only on documentary sources. The interviews served as a follow up technique to seek detailed information or further explanation to the documentary data. The interview also enabled the researcher to follow up ideas, probe responses and investigate motives and biases of the interviewees (see Bell, 1993). The interview helped in securing data on different perspectives of the various issues and provided more in-depth information. It also afforded the researcher with the opportunity to explore into great details, the respondents' views, experiences and perceptions.

Some respondents to the interview requested anonymity whereas some information was given off the record. In order therefore to comply with the ethics of research, the identity of the respondents in the interviews are not disclosed. The profiles of the respondents are given in appendix H (and unbound sheet) which is marked "For University of Bristol Use Only". This has therefore affected the method used for quoting from the interviews. That is, the researcher when quoting from the interviews refers to the institution from which the

interview was given rather than the individual respondents. An example of this type of reference is “the interview from the NDPC” or “the interview at the CSPIP Secretariat”.

The data from the interviews are normally given in quotes in the analysis chapters. Where these quotes exceed three lines in length, they are put in single-spaced and small (10pt) lettered quotes. There are also instances where the interviews are paraphrased to illustrate an argument (see Appendix G for a sample of the interview questions).

i. Selection of Respondents

The respondents for the interview were selected from the above-named subjects. The selection was based on the positions or responsibilities of the respondents in their respective institutions. These included senior, middle and junior management officials, and experts or consultants who have had close association with the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP. These are also officials who have responsibilities towards national development management and also connected to the capacity building programme. Another criterion for the selection was their knowledge in the subject area.

The researcher relied on contact persons in the various institutions during the process of selecting individual respondents. This was necessary to ensure that only people with the requisite technical knowledge were interviewed. This was intended to ensure and satisfy the researcher that a particular choice would produce the needed data. In most cases, the researcher officially informed the management of the institution about the interview and choice of respondents. The decision regarding this was left entirely to the individual

respondent, but the purpose was to ensure that the respondent is absolved from any recrimination that may result from the interview.

A total of eleven interviews were given from seven institutions and programmes. The plan originally was to obtain two interviews from each institution or programme but this was not possible because as stated already, people were reluctant to offer interviews. The composition of the interviews therefore is:

- a. NDPC - 1
- b. MESW - 3
- c. MoF - 1
- d. MDPI - 1
- e. NIRP - 2
- f. PUFMARP - 1
- g. CSPIP - 2

(see Appendix H (unbound for profile of respondents))

ii. The Interview Process and Data Collection

The interview took the form described by Grebenik and Moser (1962:16) as a loose structure even though the interview process was guided. This form of interview also enabled the researcher to cover all topics that are crucial to the subject of the interview and also allowed the respondents wide latitude to talk. The researcher only interrupted when it was necessary to probe a statement (see Bell, 1993). By this loosely structured interview, the researcher was able to establish a good framework for recording the data. The researcher used a combination of note taking and tape recording except where the respondent either did not want the session to be tape-recorded or wanted to make a

statement off the record. The tape recording was useful when the researcher needed to verify the accuracy of the notes taken at the interview. The researcher used interview guides to record responses under prepared headings. This was a means to properly organise the data in a structured way.

The researcher also took the issues of confidentiality seriously especially due to the recriminating nature of the Ghanaian political system. Indeed some respondents requested anonymity and specifically stated that, part of the information given should not be referenced. Such situations have had implications on the way that such data were used in the report. That is such data are not referenced and in some cases, instructions are given not to quote some parts of the report until the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government in Ghana leaves office.

c. Observation

Observation was used as the third method of data source. This enabled the researcher to discover valuable information that could not be obtained by using the two methods above (see Bell 1993), and also to establish whether people's statements in the interviews reflected their behaviour (see Nisbet and Watt, 1980). The researcher adopted the non-participant observation method in order to be objective in interpreting what was seen. This observation involved identifying trends of behaviours and strategies for policy implementation in the development management and the capacity building programmes. The data on these two phenomena were gathered from workshops on the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP. The researcher also observed how capacity building was modeled in the named PSIs.

The observations made by the researcher are used in the analysis to assess the validity or reliability of the data obtained either from the interview or the documentary data. These are not normally mentioned in the analysis because they cluster with the other sources. In

other instances, the observation is used to reinforce the beliefs and opinion of the researcher. Hence they reflect on the researcher's arguments.

Although structured observation is criticised to be subjective and biased (Bell 1993), the researcher adopted this approach because it enable him to focus precisely on the information needed. In order to achieve this, the researcher identified and listed the key themes of the research and took notes under these themes. That is, this exercise provided a framework for recording what was observed.

4.5 Interpreting and Reporting Findings

This is the stage in the research where the data collected from the field was translated into readable records, analysed and interpreted afterwards. The process involved placing the data into categories that have been devised on the basis of significant issues that emerged during the fieldwork. Thereafter, the researcher established similarities (or links) and differences for the groupings, patterns and items of significance.


The researcher made an extensive use of the traditional method of data analysis - the file cards system. The data was entered unto index cards. These cards were arranged in different piles corresponding to the links between emerging empirical phenomena. This was a helpful way of establishing connections between disparate events and categories (see Allan and Skinner, 1991). The data was thereafter edited and composed into a report. This gave a final product for analysing the data and producing the final report.

The processes involved in the method of enquiry described so far in this chapter are presented graphically in figure 4-1 below. The figure explains the investigation process from the bottom where the three methods of enquiry are listed. The process started with the preparation of entry sheets. Thereafter, the three research methods were

operationalized to generate the required data. The data was analyzed afterwards and translated into the current report.

Figure 4-1

A Methodological Framework for the Enquiry Process



Source: The Author

Interpretative Framework

As discussed earlier in chapter three, the study uses implementation theory as the interpretative framework. The choice of this interpretative framework is based on the fact that the core subject of the study relates to policy – that is the Ghana-Vision 2020

and the NIRP. Since the logical conclusion and for that matter the outcome of policy is achieved through implementation, the concept provides a useful tool for analysing the processes that will produce the specific outcomes for the two policies. The concept will also be helpful in determining the causes of the problems and solutions that led to these achieved outcomes. The concept will as a result be very instrumental in finding answers to the research question.

System of Referencing

The report uses the Harvard system of referencing. Books and official publications are referenced differently from articles and journals. Books and official publications have each word in the title beginning with a capital letter. Journals and articles on the other hand have the first word of the title starting with a capital letter and the remaining words beginning with small letters. The researcher uses also the works of researchers and other scholars to support the main arguments made in this report.

4.6 Theory of the Methodology

The rationale for this research design is that the combination of these three research methods will provide information that is not available from any one method and consequently find the required answers to the research question. For example valuable information that may be obtained from documentary evidence will be lost if the research was confined solely to interviews. This is because in the interviews, respondents thought processes based on their perception and cognition usually impact on the information given, and therefore information obtained from interviews are normally subjective. According to Bulmer and Warwick (1983), one important advantage of multiple data sources is that they permit the collection of critical data on a single topic that are not available if just one source was used for the study. This approach is necessary to improve accuracy in measuring any single phenomenon. The assumption is that

consistent findings from two or three methods are more likely to represent all the possible findings that might ever be obtained than findings from any single method (Bulmer and Warwick, 1983). Besides, the observation and documentary data also provided greater depth and meaning to the data obtained from the interview. That is, they gave high levels of precision and factual significance to aspects of the data that would otherwise have been difficult to interpret within an *a priori* framework. Such data were subject to the belief systems, political affiliations and perceptions of individual respondents.

Thus, this design was used to test the reliability and validity of the data generated. This test was based on the four assessment methods suggested by Bulmer and Warwick (1983).

These assessment methods emphasize:

- a. separate information with little overlap,
- b. convergent overlap,
- c. divergent overlap and
- d. inconclusive overlap.

These assessment methods also showed the manner by which the data generated by the three different methods clustered around a given topic. These were useful for interpreting and assigning value to the data. The clustered data are indicated in the analysis with the use of phrases as “the data indicates concurrently that ...” or “the data repeatedly...”.

PART IV

Policy Intervention and the Development Management Process

Institutions and Development Policy Implementation in Ghana

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the case study of Ghana's recent development policy - Ghana-Vision 2020. It analyses the implementation processes of the policy and shows that Ghana's ID programme (discussed in chapter six) has been necessitated by the problems envisaged in the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. The chapter is an attempt to answer the research question which is re-stated as *"Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national development?"* The chapter addresses the first facet of the research question that seeks to explore the causes of Ghana's under-development i.e. the question that Ghana's under-development is caused by public sector structural problems and the mis-match of skills for development management, and whether there are more causes to the problem.

This chapter has been divided into five sections. Section one introduces the chapter and section two examines the processes for development policy analysis in Ghana that consequently led to the formulation of the Ghana-Vision 2020, and the problems associated with the process. This is intended to establish whether at all there is a causal link between the processes for policy formulation and policy implementation. Section three discusses the dynamics of the development policy implementation process, and sections four and five

deals respectively with the governance processes for implementing the policy and the challenges that face Ghana’s PSIs in the policy implementation process.

5.2 The Development Management Process in Ghana

This section describes the development process and establishes the role of PSIs in the process as indicated by item one on the list of sub-research questions (see 4.2). The interview at the NDPC gave a chronology of development policy events in Ghana that show that the development management process has been characteristic of ad hoc and short term planning, especially in the post Nkrumah years²⁰. These development policy events are presented in table 5-1 below:

Table 5-1
Chronology of Development Policy Events in Ghana (1951 – 1995)

YEAR	DEVELOPMENT POLICY
1951	First Five-Year Development Plan
1959	Second Five-Year Development Plan
1964	Seven-Year Development Plan*
1968	Two-Year Development Plan
1970	One-Year Development Plan
1977	Five-Year Development Plan
1983	Economic Recovery Programme–Structural Adjustment Programme
1995	Ghana-Vision 2020

❖ The seven-year development plan was abolished soon after President Nkrumah’s overthrow

Source: Author

²⁰ *Nkrumah (the first president of Ghana) enacted a comprehensive seven-year plan that was abrogated with his overthrow in 1966.*

During this time, Ghana's ad hoc development planning system displayed characteristics of centralization, ad hoc management and lack of co-ordination in the policy-making process. The documentary sources reveals that the cost that this system unleashed on Ghana's development may be seen in terms of the "breakdown in programmed development, and was accompanied by substantial waste of the limited resources" (Laryea-Adjei, 1996). These lapses constitute some of the problems that have impeded effective policy formulation, implementation and monitoring in Ghana. Perera (1968: 57) has appropriately argued that inaction and apathy cause problems like these as in Ghana. For example, the high centralization of the policy process has made the development process the exclusive preserve of the central government with very little or in certain circumstances no participation from the citizens in whose interest the policies are being formulated and implemented. According to this interview therefore, "the ordinary Ghanaian could not identify with the development plans and as a result development programmes lacked popular participation and ownership, and were removed from the aspirations of Ghanaians". As a result, the implementation processes of these plans according to Erbynn (1995: 8) have been chequered. AAPAM (1984:130) has argued that such over-centralization leads to goal displacement that arises out of too strict adherence to directives without regard for the reason behind their adoption. This perspective adds that this will consequently result in wastefulness, because in such situations information does not flow easily and this slows down the decision and action processes. According to the interview at the NDPC, the "lack of participation from Ghanaians and the consequent lack of political commitment to the policies have resulted in a practice where the policies are easily discarded when there is a change in government". This idea is supported by an argument made by Grindle and Thomas (1991) that political resources are very important to sustain the policy implementation process (see also Ayee, 1992).

According to the interview, "these short-term ad hoc policies also concentrated on economic development and occasionally on spatial development". This means that the

“system did not integrate these aspects of development with social and environmental development”. This development management system was therefore devoid of proper framework for co-ordinating and monitoring development policies. According to this interview, “the coordinating and monitoring problem resulted from Ghana’s inadequate manpower base” as this had a poor impact on the implementation of most of these development policies. The entire development management system was therefore seriously flawed. Erbynn (1995: 9) has admits that “after nearly a decade of economic decline, the country’s capacity to undertake long-term development planning had been largely eroded”.

The New Development Management System

The interview at the NDPC show that in the post revolutionary Ghana, “the development management process has taken on, a more comprehensive approach”²¹. “The government has made development planning one of its main agenda by leading the process that culminated in the formulation of the Ghana-Vision 2020” which is a twenty-five year development policy that visions Ghana as a middle level income country by the year 2020. This new development management approach has been given a legal backing through two sets of legislation namely, the National Development Planning Commission Act of 1994 (Act 479) and the National Development Planning (System) Act of 1994 (Act 480). Through these legislative instruments, the interview reveals that, “government intends to bring various PSIs, the entire Ghanaian society, and resources together to successfully implement the Ghana-Vision 2020”. But the dynamics of the Ghanaian development management process (see 5.3 and 5.4) reveals that although the legal instruments are necessary to guide the development policy process, it is not a sufficient basis to achieve successful implementation due to variables such as conflicts, sectional or institutional

²¹ *This is the period after 1992.*

interests and culture. The interview shows further that the “comprehensive approach has incorporated a clearly defined strategy in the new development management process”. The process uses the bottom-up model of policy implementation where “local communities formulate goals and objectives of the development policy at the local level” (see 5.3.1 for a detailed discussion on this). Thereafter,

“these are translated into programmes to be implemented in order to achieve the objectives. The programme approach to development is currently being piloted at the Ministry of Health. If successful, this new strategy of programme approach to development will be replicated in all government institutions and may be turned into a national policy for development management”.

Grindle and Thomas (1991) have emphasised this idea by saying that “strategizing” for policy implementation involves deep and careful planning which is necessary for implementation success.

The documentary sources (see Erbynn, 1995) show that the new approach seeks to make certain fundamental changes in the development policy process. These changes reflect the “GoG’s philosophy that national development cannot be left entirely to market forces”. These changes are therefore anchored on a framework that require:

- a. a partnership between private and public sectors in the development process. That is “the private sector will be responsible for most investments and productive activities and will therefore become the *engine of growth* in the Ghanaian economy”. The public sector on the other hand will be responsible for the provision of an enabling environment (which includes government commitment to legal, political and administrative reforms in favour of private-sector initiatives).
- b. the public administrator to be turned into a technician and a facilitator. Public sector administrators in the MDAs and in the regions and districts will have to undergo a complete change in attitude towards the private sector especially small-scale operators. This will require public-sector reforms which aims at effecting changes in institutional structures, roles and procedures of public administrative

system in order to achieve increased efficiency in the delivery of public services (see chapter 6).

- c. a democratization of the policy-making process. This will change the decision-making machinery such that “the public administrator and the planner will no longer dictate what the private-sector interest must be or what the *collective choice* of a community should be”. Individuals and communities will participate in determining the collective choice and therefore contribute to effective participatory decision-making process (Erbynn, 1995).

(See Appendix B for a graphical presentation of the new system).

This emphasizes the important role of the state in development management. That is, although the state is providing the blueprint for development, the private sector and the civil society act as the main lever for bringing about development change in Ghana under the new system. This strategy is endorsed by Griffin et. al., (1987:185); Wuyts et. al., (1992); and United Nations, (1981: 12). The new system therefore captures the state, the private sector, and the civil society as partners in the development process. The interview at the NDPC indicated that

“the departure from the old development management system where government was the main actor was caused by three important factors. These are the government realization that it lacks adequate resources to implement national development policies, the lack of popular participation in the development process, and organised opposition that sabotaged most development policies”.

This change in Ghana’s development strategy provides an alternative to the *counter-revolution theory* which supports the notion that development should be led by the private sector as it will better promote development (Hettne, 1995).

5.2.1 Policy Analysis in the New Development Management System

The documentary sources and the interview at the NDPC show that in order to obtain a national development policy under the new development management system, “the NDPC

is required to come out with a broad national development goal”. This is formulated through a consultative process between the NDPC and all stakeholders in a series of workshops and seminars²². Thereafter, “each MDA is required to prepare a plan based on the overall national development goal to ensure that there is uniformity in direction”. For example, “if the broad national goal is to increase average income to about ten times in the next ten or fifteen years, the MDAs would have to devise a specific plan to achieve this goal”. These plans are then submitted to the NDPC.

The above sources also reveal that units named the Cross-Sectoral Planning Groups (CSPGs) have been built into the new development management process for each broad sector of the economy. “These groups are required to provide a forum for broad based and in-depth discussion and analysis of the sector development plans, and to co-ordinate development planning and implementation activities”. Each group is made up of personnel from the NDPC and the relevant MDAs, other public sector institutions, academic and research institutions, private sector organisations and traditional rulers. The interview at the NDPC revealed that “currently, there are four of such groups dealing with human development, economic development, spatial organisation and environment, and science and technology”. The NDPC is required to work together with the CSPGs to put the plans together and ensure that they conform to national goals before they are implemented. The CSPGs is thereafter required to categorize the sector development plans into medium term, long term and rolling plans in line with the overall national goals²³. Consequently, the sector ministries and the district planning authorities are responsible for seeing the implementation process through.

²² *Stakeholders include the public sector, private sector and the civil society as previously discussed.*

²³ *A “roll over” scheme has been built into the methodology of the new development planning system where a project is rolled over to the following year if it is not accomplished in the preceding year.*

The South Commission (1990: 35) has commented that, no genuine development can be sustained without the participation of the people who are both the means and the end of development. That is, this approach to policy analysis in the new development management system reflects the new democratic philosophy of *participatory decision-making* which Nunnenkamp (1995: 10) defines as a process by which people lend an active and influential hand in shaping decisions that affect their lives. Juran (1989) has also observed that most of the knowledge to improve performance rests with those directly involved in the tasks. The interview reveals that, “communities, local authorities, sector ministries and the private sector have now become an integral part of the new participatory and accountable development policy process”. The policy process has therefore become interactive in view of the involvement of variety of skills, groups and individuals in the process, especially at the implementation stages. The interview accordingly reveals that

“the new system ensures that solutions to development problems are made within a multi-disciplinary environment and it takes into consideration the social, economic, political, scientific, technological, environmental and spatial implications”.

The current writer believes that this change in focus towards participatory development has been caused by the awareness by government that the greatest resource to a development process is the people, and secondly the realization by policy analysts that the ready consumption of development is dependent on actual demand. A third factor may be the inability of centralized development policy process to accommodate the varied local socio-cultural demands and to mobilize local resources as past development policy failures have shown (see Mathur, 1986: 14-5). Thus, by inference it may be assumed that policy makers are now aware that without the co-operation of the people, there is every likelihood of their policies not proceeding along their planned course (see Cornea, 1983).

The interview at the NDPC also emphasised that “there are procedures for monitoring performance and strategies so when the objectives are not being met it is possible to correct the anomalies”. Furthermore, “the monitoring and evaluation systems are made effective by a feedback loop that informs the process”. Thus the progress made by the NDPC on the

policy implementation process is captured in systems analysis (discussed in chapter 3) where information or data resulting from a previous implementation activity is sent to the system. The system reacts to the information and a new activity is embarked upon to either reinforce or correct the previous action. The interview shows that “this monitoring and evaluation system had been incorporated to keep the development process on track and to meet its planned targets, to reduce excesses and the level of resource waste”. Tinbergen (1958: 3) has argued that a system like this will create favourable conditions on which development will thrive.

One major development policy that Ghana has adopted since the inception of the new approach to policy analysis is the Ghana-Vision 2020. To a very large extent the efficacy of this new approach to development management and therefore to policy analysis will determine how successful the implementation of Ghana-Vision 2020 will be and how this will enhance Ghana’s development.

5.2.2 Ghana’s Development Policy: 1996-2020

The documentary evidence (see Erbynn, 1995; Ghana, 1995b, and 1997) shows that the Ghana-Vision 2020 is a comprehensive development policy with a twenty-five year duration (1996 -2020). The policy seeks to turn Ghana into an open and liberal market economy (founded on competition and private enterprise, initiative and creativity) that optimizes the rate of economic development and ensures the maximum welfare and material well being of all Ghanaians. This data reveals that

“this evolution will involve transformation of the economy from one based mainly on smallholder agriculture to a purposefully diversified and productive economy that is capable of responding effectively to the challenges posed by the world economy”.

Secondly, the economy will be transformed from one that is dominated by the public sector to one that benefits from enterprise and dynamic potential of the private sector, supported by an efficient system of public administration (that the NIRP is seeking to build) under

this policy. The policy is an “integrated programme of economic and social policies that provide a perspective framework for accelerated growth and sustainable development”. The interview at the NDPC shows that “the *vision* in Ghana-Vision 2020 is for the country to become a buoyant and dynamic middle-income country within the first decade of the 21st Century”. That is by the year 2020 Ghana would have attained the status and standard of living of an upper middle-income country, with gross national product (GNP) *per capita* of about ₵10,400.000 or just above US \$4000. The interview further reveals that the philosophy of Ghana-Vision 2020 is based on the premise that “the overriding aim of development is the satisfaction of human needs and the improvement and realization of the potential of all members of the society”. According to the data, this “national development goal has been determined by considerations of history, current strengths and the potential for further development, following an environmental scan or SWOT analysis”. In sum, this *vision* calls for a comprehensive transformation of the economy and society in order to effect significant improvement in the quality of life of all Ghanaians. This assumption is underpinned by the GoG’s idea that “the ultimate aim of the development effort in Ghana is the satisfaction of human needs and the development of the potential of every citizen” (see Ghana 1994c).

a. Long-Term Objectives of the Policy (2000 - 2020)

The documentary sources indicate that the long-term objective of the development policy is to “promote Ghana’s competitiveness in the rapidly changing world economy and elevate the country from low to middle-income status”. The policy seeks to achieve this objective through “human, economic, rural, and urban development programmes, as well as the creation of an enabling environment for private sector operators”. The long-term objectives also emphasise:

- a. national self-reliance and independence of thought in all spheres of human endeavour,

- b. creativity and innovation in all social and economic activities,
- c. good governance at all political and administrative levels,
- d. accelerated and sustainable economic growth, with due regard to the protection of the environment,
- e. equitable social and spatial development, and
- f. the promotion of the positive cultural ethos of Ghanaian values, beliefs and norms.

b. Medium Term Objectives (1996-2000)

The medium-term objectives of the policy according to the documentary sources include to:

- a. consolidate the foundations for accelerated economic and social development in the long term,
- b. create development opportunities through political reforms like democratization and decentralization, the provision of adequate domestic resources for exports and tourism, and encourage private foreign investment and donor support,
- c. eliminating the constraints on development that have slowed down the rate of recovery²⁴.
- d. create adequate wage and self-employment opportunities to ensure the productive absorption of the unemployed into the labour market,
- e. raise the levels of productivity in economic sectors and arrest the process of deformation of employment to make way for skill and technology upgrading in enterprises with potential for growth and expansion,

²⁴ *The policy see these constraints as high rate of population growth, bad child care practices, lack of effective system of plan co-ordination, continuing low levels of domestic savings and financial intermediation, generally low levels of productivity, constraints on energy supply, especially electricity, low status of science and technology and environmental awareness, and lastly, the biases of the international economic order.*

- f. improve significantly employment conditions and ensure good labour-management relations, adequate skill development and training, safe and healthy working environment, and
- g. ensure that women and the disadvantaged make themselves available to productive employment opportunities.

The interview reveals that the government is using the under-mentioned strategies to achieve the medium term goals. These strategies include

“poverty alleviation, human resource development, strengthening social infrastructure and services, increasing employment and leisure activities, education and training; and accelerating economic growth with a target of raising Gross Domestic Product to 8% and income per head to a little over US\$500 in year 2000”.

The interview stressed also that “in order to achieve the long-term objective, the medium term strategy is to strengthen institutions for planning, policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation” (see chapter six).

From the documentary sources and observations made, Ghana has embarked on a rural and urban development programmes as well as political and institutional reforms in this phase of the plan. It is also “creating an enabling environment for the private sector through deepening the restructuring exercise of the PAS in order to increase its effectiveness to foster a dynamic and co-operative approach, and to promote private sector initiatives by changing attitudes within the public service”. Within this period also, all laws and regulations that inhibit development and private sector operations are being reviewed. However, the present writer believes that the socio-economic conditions in Ghana for example, unemployment, increased poverty and corruption are evidence that the medium term goals of the policy are very far from being achieved.

c. Short-Term Objectives (1995-1996)

The interviews reveal that “the short term spanned a period of two years and as a result, only brief prioritized programmes were feasible”. Within the framework of the long and

medium term strategies for achieving respective objectives, the short-term objectives were to:

- a. strengthen the capacity of PPMEDs of PSIs to operate efficiently through recruitment of adequate professionally competent manpower and payment of competitive remuneration and fringe benefits,
- b. link PPMEDs with the NDPC to facilitate the blending of sectoral development plans,
- c. enhance the capacity of the PPMED personnel in policy and planning through training, provision of logistic support including physical facilities.

It will be revealed subsequently in this chapter that these goals were not completely achieved in the short-term either. The interview revealed that, “this problem has been created by government policies that have alienated a lot of skilled personnel, as well as unattractive salaries in the public sector”. This shows that the government has hitherto been unable to pay the “competitive remuneration ” and fringe benefits to the skilled personnel it sought to recruit under the short-term objectives of the policy.

5.3 Vision 2020 Implementation and the New Development Management System

This section relates to the second element of the research question that seeks to explore the impact of public sector governance on the development management process. It was argued in chapter three that for any policy implementation to be successful, the process will require certain basic characteristics to operate. These characteristics include a structure of implementing agencies, resources, institutional linkages, and a good managerial framework. These characteristics are discussed in this section to explore the dynamics of the Vision 2020-policy implementation process. Grindle and Thomas (1991) have argued that the implementation phase of any policy determines the nature and successes of the policy.

5.3.1 The Ghana-Vision 2020 Implementation Structure

Wittrock et. al. (1982) has said that an implementation structure consists of clusters of parts of institutions and these determine the shape and operations of policies. The interview at the NDPC which is also supported by the documentary sources (see Ghana, 1995; and 1997) reveal that “in order to ensure effective implementation of Ghana-Vision 2020 under the new development management system, the national policy process has been decentralized”. This decentralization process has created four distinct planning and implementing agencies. These are the District Assemblies (DAs) at the district level, Regional Co-ordinating Councils (RCCs) at the regional level, and the sector MDAs, and NDPC at the national level. “The NDPC acts as the national co-ordinating body in the development policy process”. That is,

“the role of institutions in the new development management system is identified on two levels. These are the national level where the NDPC and MDAs are the main actors, and the local government level that is constituted by the RCCs and the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies” (MMDAs)²⁵.

This provides enormous stake for efficient public sector performance. Lisk (1996: 54) has commented that on the macro level, PSIs are required to manage the development process through mobilising, allocating and utilizing human and material resources in an efficient and productive manner. He stresses that at the micro level, these institutions are needed to develop human and institutional capacity to manage development policy and projects.

Elmore (1978) has argued that, where more than one agency is involved in the implementation of a policy, the lines of authority are usually blurred. This may create problems in the implementation process. Elmore’s observation therefore provides a useful lesson for the policy implementation process because strategically, it requires establishing a

²⁵ See Appendix B for a graphical presentation of the structure of the new system.

framework for networking and cross-institutional linkages. Elmore's argument is reinforced by the idea that the ability of implementation structures to respond to problems depends on the specification of clear lines of authority and responsibility in the implementation process.

a. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)

The documentary sources and the interview reveal that under the new development management system, "the planning system law (Act 480) has made the NDPC the national co-ordinating and regulatory body of the development management system". This Act enjoins the Commission to "regulate the development policy process through legislative instruments and guidelines". Thus

"the NDPC is responsible for co-ordinating the policy implementation process in the districts, and integrating economic, spatial and sectoral plans of MDAs and ensure that these plans and programmes are compatible with national development policy objectives and are in conformity with sound environmental principles. The NDPC approve plans and programmes of the districts, ministries and sector agencies, and also monitors the implementation of these approved plans and programmes".

The interview stressed that "this role will enable the commission to revise (where necessary) national development policies in the light of changing domestic and international economic, social and political conditions". This data also indicates that, "the NDPC is obligated to monitor the annual development budget of the MoF to ensure that sectoral and geographical budgetary allocations are compatible with national development objectives".

The documentary data and the interview show that the NDPC's responsibilities include:

- a. the provision of a long and medium term framework for formulating development policy,
- b. the provision of policy guidelines for the preparation of local and sectoral development plans by sectoral agencies and District Assemblies, and
- c. advising the President of the Republic of Ghana on development strategies.

“The NDPC is therefore at the apex of the new development management machinery. The Commission led the policy dialogue that culminated in the formulation of the Ghana-Vision 2020”.

b. The Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs)

The interviews and the documentary materials further reveal that within the framework of the new development management system, the respective roles of the MDAs are described by law (see Act 480). In this context and

“under the framework of the Ghana-Vision 2020 sector MDAs have been transformed into planning and policy formulation units from their previous administrative roles. The demands of the Vision 2020 policy as well as the development management system require each ministry to create a Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Division (PPMED) which is suppose to co-ordinate policy and operationalize planning within the ministry as well as with agencies under the ministry”²⁶.

The role of the PPMED include organizing the various Heads of Department and Directors to formulate sectoral development policies and programmes in line with the national development goals and in accordance with the NDPC’s sectoral development planning guidelines, and to oversee their implementation²⁷.

“The PPMEDs are the NDPC’s direct link to the MDA especially as they are responsible for submitting the sector development policies together with proposals for implementation to the NDPC for evaluation and approval”.

The MDAs are also required to monitor the implementation of the NDPC-approved sectoral development plans and to submit monitoring report to the NDPC.

²⁶ Some ministries have specialised agencies for example the Ministry of Justice has the Law Reforms Commission under it as a specialised agency.

²⁷ the PPMED was established under the Civil Service Law of 1993 (PNDC Law 327). This law states that among other things, the NDPC shall advise the Minister responsible for each ministry about the structure, functions and the number and qualification of the planning personnel of the PPMED.

c. The Regional Co-ordinating Councils (RCCs)

The interview at the NDPC further showed that “the local government Act (462) of 1993 and the National Development Planning (System) Act 480 of 1994 makes the RCCs the planning and implementing authorities at the regional level”. It is the responsibility of all RCCs to co-ordinate the development plans and programmes of all District Assemblies in their region and to harmonise these with the national development objectives and priorities. The RCCs also monitor and evaluate the implementation of approved development plans and programmes of the District Assemblies and of such national programmes and projects in the region as the NDPC may direct.

d. The Municipal, Metropolitan and District Authorities (MMDAs)

The documentary sources (see Ghana, 1995; and 1997) and the interview at the NDPC show that “local development policies are formulated and implemented by MMDAs with the RCCs acting as link institutions between the district and the ministry”. That is under the new system, “sector ministries plan and formulate national policies, but where local authorities have a stake in the implementation of the policy, the sector ministry will co-ordinate the implementation of the policy”. The interview at the NDPC illustrates the point with the example that,

“if the Ministry of Education (MoE) is required to implement a national programme like the Free Compulsory Universal Education, local authorities in the various districts may also have a stake in the implementation phase of the policy²⁸. The local authorities will receive funds for this purpose based on a common fund. But the MoE will be required to co-ordinate the implementation of this policy across DAs in the country and to also monitor the implementation process through the RCCs”.

Sector ministries therefore have an additional co-ordinating and monitoring role regarding the implementation of their sectors’ development policies.

²⁸ *The Free Compulsory Universal Education is a programme that aims at providing free basic education compulsorily for all Ghanaians. It is a part of the plan for Ghana Vision-2020.*

This interview shows that “MMDAs play a critical developmental role in view of their close proximity to the people”. Besides their conventional administrative functions, MMDAs are required to:

- a. act as change agents for the transformation of society and economy,
- b. identify and promote development opportunities,
- c. mobilise human and physical resources,
- d. co-ordinate all development activities within the district
- e. protect vulnerable groups, particularly women, children and the aged, and
- f. disseminate information on all matters relevant to development.

The Local Government Act 462 of 1993 designates each MMDA as the district planning authority for its area of jurisdiction.

The interview at the NDPC and documentary materials (see Ghana, 1995; 1997) show further that the “district level also represents the *plan-formulation stage* of the new decentralized development management system”. The planning functions of the District Planning Authority are to:

- a. initiate discussions on policy proposals on district-wide and sub-district development plans, local action development plans and settlement plans,
- b. co-ordinate these plans into district development plans which are compatible with national development objectives and priorities,
- c. monitor and evaluate the implementation of approved development plans in the district.

The District Planning Authority are required to hold open, democratically conducted *public hearing* on any proposed district development plan or components of the plan, including individual projects. The Planning Authority also takes into account the views expressed at the public hearing and where necessary modify these to reflect the public expectation before the adoption of the proposed district development plan (see Erbynn, 1995). The sub-district agencies like Urban, Town, Area and Zonal Councils represent the

management stage of the development planning process, while the Unit Committees at the community level constitute the *implementation level* of the new decentralized development planning system. This structure of implementing agencies is described graphically in Appendix B.

From the above report, it may be inferred that membership to the structure cuts across the various sectors of the economy for example economic, social, urban, district and employment sectors. This shows a comprehensive participation in the implementation of the Vision 2020 policy. The membership structure also epitomises the notion that no single institution can effectively implement the development policy by itself. It is evidence that the nature of the policy to be implemented must offer a framework to define the combination of institutions required to carry out the programme. Thus, the implementation structure discussed above is underpinned by the GoG's (1997: 31) view that development policies and programmes must be comprehensive and co-ordinated if they are to achieve the long-term goal of an improvement in all aspects of the quality of life. Such policies and programmes cannot therefore be formulated in narrow sectoral compartments because every aspect of development has implications for all others.

5.3.2 Resource Requirements for Implementation

The resources required for policy implementation is shown in the form of inputs in the interactive implementation model (discussed in chapter 3). The documentary sources identify three major types of resources that are associated with the Vision 2020 policy implementation. These are:

a. Human Resource

This section describes the parameters of the human resource crisis in Ghana's PSIs as identified by item four on the list of research questions in 4.2. The section also shows that the human resource crisis has affected the development process in Ghana as argued by the

research question. The documentary sources (see Ghana, 1995b; and Boateng, 1994) have identified two major problems that associate the human resource requirements for Ghana's development process that have persisted since the mid-sixties. These problems are:

- a. the lack of skilled personnel in certain critical areas of the Ghanaian economy. The interview at the MESW and the MDPI show that this problem has been caused mainly by "the lack of funds to provide training locally, and poor wage and incentive structures, particularly in the public sector" (see i below for detailed discussion of this problem); and
- b. the surplus in certain categories of skills which according to the data is also caused by "overemphasis on general education and shrinkage of employment opportunities in the formal sector due to its inadequate growth".

Tinbergen (1958: 5) has accordingly argued that training and education at all levels are very important conditions for development. The current writer believes that it is important for all levels of education and training to be commensurate with the absorptive capacity and requirements of the economy. This is important to avert unemployment problems and waste that has currently besieged the development process in Ghana (see Ghana, 1994c: 49). The GoG has argued that improved human capabilities do not only contribute to a better quality of life for all but also reinforce the nation's capacity to achieve accelerated development (Ghana, 1994c: 1). Thus, the quality of human resources available to a country at any particular time is the cornerstone to the country's development. It is hardly possible for a nation to forge ahead in development without making these resources available and dynamic. This failing, the country would have to depend on skills and expertise from foreign countries, and as such the country cannot be said to own its development. The development process itself will be denied of a strong foundation and hence sustainability. As discussed in chapter three, such a situation will set the development clock back.

According to the documentary data (see Ghana, 1995b; and Boateng, 1994), Ghana's human resource problems emanated from the fact that few programmes in manpower planning were undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s, and as the economy failed to develop as planned, these programmes were abandoned. The "traditional manpower planning approach used during this time was excessively quantitative which emphasised more on enrollments in and numbers of formal institutions than the quality of skills". Secondly, "projected educational outputs were determined by short-term trends in economy-wide employment elasticity and sectoral distribution of gross domestic product". Long-term implications of such projections were ignored, and this has over the time led to skill shortages in some sectors and surpluses in others. These have contributed to "the serious shortages of skill that are crucial to the development management process and also to policy implementation at the professional, managerial, sub-professional, middle-level financial and accounting management, and policy analysis and budgeting"²⁹. Mathur (1986: 96) expresses the serious impact that inadequate skills have on the development management process. His argument is that institutions that saddle officials who lack basic managerial skills with responsibilities for development in very senior administrative positions cannot cope with the demands for the provision of administrative skills of the kind needed to plan and implement the highly complex policies. Berg (1993) has also observed that the large increase in the size and character of the tasks imposed on Ghana's weak administrative system has not simply meant a marginal decline of the capacity to perform. It has also created forces that have eroded the whole decision making machinery and also destroyed the capacity to execute and control.

Secondly, the interviews at the MESW and the MDPI reveal that:

²⁹ *Policy Analysis is defined here as policy formulation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.*

“the absence of consultative and co-ordination processes between PSIs and the HRD sector has resulted in a situation in which the skills produced hardly matched the requirements of some segment of the economy”.

Examples are the planning and policy analysis sectors. These sectors grew during the 1980s in a significantly different environment. This situation is evidence that Ghana has failed to evolve an adequate HRD strategy in such a way that skills are produced to closely match the needs of the economy. The above interviews indicates that “two decades of Economic Recovery, Structural Adjustment and Accelerated Economic Growth have emphatically shown the importance of human resource development in Ghana” as public institution’s within the context of these policies performed poorly in the policy process. Baster (1972: 26) has observed that, “it is not just the incidence of human resource that makes for development but also the improvements in the quality of this resource which account for substantial part (50% - 70%) of economic growth of nations”. She stresses that this has been demonstrated more recently by the experience of South East Asian economies. Bologun (1997:70-1) has also shown that human capacity is the major lever in development. For this reason whether a society will progress from one stage of existence to a preferred alternative, stand still, and or revert to barbaric, stone age conditions depends to a significant extent on the will and capacity of the people to manage and generally add value to other available resources. These observations present a formidable challenge in the light of the human resource problems discussed above to the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy implementation. The implementation of this policy will require the development and utilization of a growing body of creative and highly skilled human resources. The lesson is for Ghana to continuously update and improve upon its human resources to enhance the development process.

i. Causes of the Human Resource Problems

The documentary sources (Boateng, 1994; Kwapong et. al., 1990; MESW, 1996) reveals that these skill inadequacies are also products of the lack of economic and physical infrastructure. Low salary scales, limited fringe benefits, and rigid promotion schemes

inhibit recruitment of capable personnel into the public sector. The data illustrate that in 1990 for example, the ratio of private sector average monthly earnings per employee to that in the public sector was 1:14 for all sectors. This ratio however differed across sectors as shown in table 5.2 below.

Table 5-2
Ratio of Private Sector: Public Sector Average Monthly Earnings per
Employee in 1990

Sector	Private ₵	Public ₵	Ratio
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	23094	20798	1: 11
Mining, Quarry	27340	38827	0:70
Manufacturing	51482	22266	2:31
Construction	18766	19406	0:97
Commerce	28485	23605	1:21
Transport, Storage, Communication	36121	32211	1:12
Finance, Insurance, etc.	63985	30484	2:10
All Other Sectors	39566	28037	1:14

Source: Kwabia Boateng (1994)

Within the public sector, differential emoluments affect recruitment and retention of staff in particular areas. The data show that in the teaching field a Senior University Lecturer receives 25% of emoluments of a managing director of a public corporation who has similar qualifications, years of experience and equivalent responsibilities as the senior lecturer. Table 5.3 below is a typical example of the public sector differential emoluments.

Table 5-3

Comparison of Some Allowances in Selected Public Institutions

Institution	Launch ₤	Transport ₤	Clothing	Risk
Financial Institutions	66-105000	180-388000	30 - 35%	N/A
G. B. C.	39600	39600	N/A	42%
Civil Service	121442	13359	N/A	N/A
Universities	13464	39600	N/A	N/A

Note: Percentages are calculated on basic salary.

Source: Salary Review Commission (Gyampoh Report) 1993.

From this table one may infer that the poor wage and incentive structure is likely to be a contributing factor to the “brain drain” problem in Ghana. This is clearly one of the most visible and severe manifestations of the capacity and human resource crisis. This evidence suggests that poor wage and incentive structures have a direct correlation with poor policy implementation and consequently, with lack of development because personnel responsible for implementing the development policies get demoralised and discouraged by the reward system. The interview at the MDPI shows that these personnel as a result “embark on other income earning activities to supplement their income”. Thus “in institutions of this country, it is common to see people leave their offices when they are suppose to be on duty to attend to private businesses”. In the process, they fail to make any serious commitment to the policy process and this impedes development.

Secondly, the interviews at the MESW and MDPI reveals that, “inflexible public policies with respect to recruitment and placement” as well as

“socio-cultural and institutional factors also account for human resource inadequacies in the public sector. The inflexible policies coupled with poor infrastructural development in the rural areas, and the lack of incentive package to attract public servants to rural areas have caused an acute shortage of skilled personnel in the public service especially in the rural areas. Socio-cultural factors such as poor work ethics and attitude to work, in-discipline, rejection of transfers, and gender discrimination”

have also contributed to the human resource problems in Ghana's public sector. The interview from the NDPC shows that the institutional factors are that "development management in Ghana had hitherto been highly centralized with its hitherto deeply centralized form of administration". As a result, "many trained people do not want to be posted to the regions or rural areas where communication with the headquarters is poor or almost non-existent". Berg (1993: 58-9) sees problems such as these as constituting a gap in policy analysis in particular and development management in general. In Berg's perspective these are critical mass of top-flight policy analysts and managers who can help pilot the Ghanaian economy through the storm and turbulence that it faces daily.

These human resource problems constitute a serious threat to the success of vision 2020 policy implementation and to the entire development process. This situation may force Ghana to trade up its competitiveness in development by importing skilled labour from other countries, and already there are signs of this happening with the presence of an array of technical experts from donor countries. Practices such as these will distort the entire development process as the expatriate experts have mind-sets and values that are not Ghanaian, and for that matter may not be able to appreciate the indigenous Ghanaian culture and social structures. Kamoche (1997) has accordingly argued that developing expertise from a nation's human resource endowment plays an indisputable role in the development process. Nancy Baster (1972: 2) has also emphasised that, the growth of national independence is an important aspect of development that requires indigenous personnel to be in key positions. She argues that it does not mean independence when a nation depends on other nations for the supply of its human resource needs.

b. Financial Resources

Ham and Hill (1984) have advised that policy making must accompany the provision of adequate resources in order to make implementation possible. However, the interviews at the NDPC, MoF, and PUFMARF repeatedly identify that, "local revenue sources are

mostly under-developed and inadequate. In areas where they are developed, collection systems are ineffective and this causes district assemblies to depend on centrally generated revenues". There is also "insufficient dialogue between central and local government institutions to ensure that resource allocated from the centre matches the local effort to mobilise local resources". Moreover, "sector ministries are unable to make comprehensive overview of how available funds at any given period can best be utilised across the sector". The problem is rooted in "unrealistic, hard budget constraints that distort the financial resource requirement for policy implementation". The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) reveal that development policy implementation is often impeded by systemic problems in:

i. Budget Preparation

The documentary materials (see PUFMARP, 1997) show that current process of budget preparation in public institutions has several weaknesses. According to this data the problems include the:

- a. preparation of recurrent budget on an incremental basis³⁰,
- b. absence of a medium-term outlook, and a lack of forward planning of the recurrent budget such that forward estimates of the recurrent costs of policies and programmes are not developed,
- c. lack of critical review of the government priorities in the preparation of development budget, the inability to estimate recurrent cost implications to establish whether sufficient funds will be available to cover these recurrent costs, and
- d. lack of adequate budget guidance to the ministries, including the lack of hard expenditure ceilings in the budget guidelines reflecting the Government's expenditure priorities.

³⁰ That is by adding a certain percentage (based on for example inflation) to the previous years estimates of expenditures, without reviewing whether the particular activities are in line with government priorities or whether they are being implemented in the most cost-effective manner.

The interviews from the NDPC reveal that “these weaknesses have generally undermined the utility of the budget as an instrument for implementing development policies and for managing the financial resources of the nation for development”.

ii. Budget Implementation

The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) reveal the problem in this area as “deficient expenditure monitoring and control systems in the policy implementation process”. According to the above source,

“the lack of timely, accurate, and current information on budget allocations, commitments and actual expenditures seriously undermine the Government’s capacity for fiscal management, leading to inefficient allocation of resources and obscuring public accountability”.

Besides, “the principles of financial reporting, monitoring and control as set out in the 1979 FAD and the corresponding FAR are not adhered to”³¹. The interview at the PUFMARP Secretariat shows for example that

“donor commitments are irregularly recorded and reported by public sector institutions and in the absence of proper records, expenditure monitoring is done on the basis of cheques cleared by the BoG or cheques issued by the CAGD. And because of the delays in each step of payment processing, the Ministry of Finance is only able to monitor these expenditures with considerable time lags that undermine monitoring and control. This problem makes it necessary to impose across-the-board cuts towards the end of the year to maintain aggregate fiscal discipline irrespective of whether funds are needed for policy implementation. These undue delays in reporting makes it difficult to promptly close and prepare the financial accounts of the Government”.

iii. Cash Management

The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) further show that “*organised* cash management does not exist in Ghana”. The evidence of this is

“the absence of cash flow plan that readily identifies and matches the flow of revenues with those of disbursement, and provides forward estimates so as to form the basis for planning the government’s borrowing requirements”.

³¹ The FAD and FAR are executive instruments that stipulates and procedures and processes involved in reporting, monitoring, and controlling public finance.

Hence, “the BoG open market sales of treasury bills do not accurately reflect the liquidity position of the government”. Secondly, “there is no adequate system to guide the prompt reporting of transactions and balances of the Consolidated Fund”. There is also “a large float of revenues constantly in the system reflecting the lags in the transfer to the BoG of revenues collected by the local offices of the revenue agencies and deposited with the local commercial banks”. While these are cash assets of the Government, they are not represented as such because they are captured “only when the revenues are transferred into the consolidated fund at the BoG”. Finally, there is no “integration between the preparation and execution of the budget, and the determination of the cash requirements of the Government” (see PUFMARF, 1997; Bank, 1996).

iv. Audit

Audit requirements in Ghana are covered by the 1972 Audit Service Decree, the 1979 FAD, and to a certain degree by the 1992 Constitution. In October 1995, Coopers & Lybrand (Accra) did a diagnostic study of the Ghana Audit Service. The study identified several problems including weak technical skills and professional development, deficiencies in the professional mix of staff, lack of use of computer technology, and inadequacy of logistics and supplies (see Coopers and Lybrand, 1995). According to the documentary source (see PUFMARF, 1997) Internal audit also remains weak. The interview at the PUFMARF Secretariat reveals that

“the FAD empowers the Auditor-General to make arrangements for carrying out internal audits but concerns over potential conflict of interest prompted the Auditor-General to assign the internal audit function to the Controller and Accountant General Department (CAGD) in 1987”.

But this is also an unsatisfactory arrangement as the Accountants are now internal auditors also.

iv. Aid and Debt Management

The documentary sources (see PUFMARF, 1997) reveal that the problem with respect to Ghana's debt management (both external and domestic) is "the absence of a single set of accounts on the country's debt". The Aid and Debt Management Unit (ADMU) of the MoF is responsible in principle for recording, monitoring and projecting data on external debt, and authorising disbursements. Through the World Bank's assistance under SAI and EMS, the ADMU operationalized the CS-DRMS. The source indicates that "the data coverage of this system is still incomplete particularly, information on Government guarantees on external debt of para-statal and private agencies are not captured". As a result, "knowledge of the GoG's external current and potential indebtedness is incomplete as no database exist which captures government liabilities"³². This is a serious problem in terms of the timely payment of Ghana's external debt obligations. A second problem is that the recording and management of domestic debt remains a BoG operation with no linkage with the ADMU.

These problems have made the government unable to efficiently plan local resource and allocate the required size to the development policy implementation. The documentary evidence (see Ghana, 1997) reveals however that in order to facilitate the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy implementation, the government have had to embark on a medium-term resource mobilisation and management framework to finance Vision 2020 policy goal and targets. This framework require:

³² *The same is true on the asset side of the government's balance sheet (that is net lending by the government). This is however being addressed under a separate Bank project, the Privatization and Public Enterprise Development Technical Assistance Project II, which is helping the development of a database to capture information on Government assets, that is loans to para-statal and private organisations.*

- a. “the government to agree with the IMF and World Bank on the medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal ceilings and targets”,
- b. “the MoF to collaborate with the NDPC to develop a medium-term resource management and financial strategy”,
- c. “the government to project its Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) to manage and optimise public sector reform goals and targets”, and
- d. “the design and execution of a tight-loose public financial management programme”.

The government hopes that these strategies will release funds for policy implementation.

Furthermore, the interview at the NDPC reveals that,

“the development management system makes provision for a budget hearing meetings which deals specifically with resource allocation for policy implementation but the framework for allocating these resources is not well defined. Because of this, resources are distributed arbitrarily”.

Moreover, “the NDPC is developing a more systematic way of allocating resources but until development priorities are clearly set out, it will be difficult to devise this systematic method to allocate resources effectively”. This is necessary to eliminate the financial resource allocation problem and thereby enhance the policy implementation in the development process. It is important for the NDPC to complete this process to avoid implementation delays because Hogwood et. al. (1984) have warned that money is not a resource in itself but only a ticket with which to purchase real resources and the process of converting money into real resources is subject to delays.

c. Donor Funding for Policy Implementation

Donor funding for Ghana’s development policy is captured in item eight on the list of research questions. The thrust of this question identifies donor involvement in Ghana’s development either as progressive partnership or a process that distorts the development

process. The section explores which of these two characteristics is applicable in Ghana's case. This donor involvement also helps in identifying what the causes of Ghana's under-development are.

The documentary sources (see World Bank, 1996) show that Ghana's development is heavily dependent on external aid for both capital investment and funding for policy implementation in the context of the domestic financial situation discussed above. Total aid given by donor agencies has "since the 1980s averaged over 8% of GDP where half of this is capital investment, about one-third for programme aid and the balance for technical assistance and food aid". For example, between 1984-1993, Ghana attracted a considerable volume of external aid. Much of this has been in support of the ERP and SAP implementation. "Total aid disbursement over the period have risen from US\$498.85 million in 1984 to US\$824.2 million in 1993 or 13.6% of GDP. The annual average has been US\$498.85 million, which is equivalent to 8.2% of average GDP". These statistics show the dependency relationship between international donor agencies and the new development management system in view of the difficulties that associate the mobilisation of local sources of revenue for Ghana's development (discussed above).

The documentary sources (see Ghana, 1995b; GoG and UNDP, 1993) reveal further that these agencies offer official development assistance (ODA) which may be divided into aid from bilateral donors on one hand, and international and regional agencies on the other hand. The latter group is dominated by the World Bank primarily in the form of credits from its International Development Associations (IDA). "In 1993, IDA credits together with smaller amounts from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) totaled \$308.7 million, that is 72% of multilateral disbursements to Ghana and 37% of total disbursements". Among the bilateral agencies, the principal donors in 1993 were Japan and France who together contributed 36% of bilateral aid. Other major donors were Canada, Germany, UK and USA each of whom provided more than \$40 million (Ghana,

1995b: 29). The ODA is conventionally divided between capital investment on concessionary terms (capital aid) and technical assistance (TA)³³. But some bilateral donors now provide capital aid in grant form and some have retrospectively converted outstanding loans into grants. Other multilateral agencies on the other hand unconventionally provide aid in the form of loans even for technical assistance, though the terms are usually very soft³⁴. The total aid in 1992 amounted to US\$481.1 million or 7% of GDP and was allocated as shown in table 5-1 below with technical assistance equivalent to about one percent of GDP.

TABLE 5-4
Types of Aid in 1992.

Type of Aid	US\$ millions	% of Total
Total Technical Assistance	68.9	14.3
Free standing	(43.9)	(9.1)
Investment related	(25.3)	(5.2)
Investment Aid	238.9	49.7
Programme/Project Aid	155.5	32.3
Food Aid	17.7	3.7
TOTAL AID	481.1	100

Source: Government of Ghana and UNDP (November 1993) “Development Co-operation: Ghana 1992”.

Most of these loans and aid are offered to finance development policy. The interviews at the NDPC and the NIRP concurrently emphasized that under the new development

³³ The distinction between the two forms of aid is blurred as capital aid usually includes some element of training and other forms of Technical Assistance, and TA programmes almost invariably include allocations for equipment to enable development programmes operate effectively. As a general rule, capital aid is provided in the form of soft loans and technical assistance as an outright grant.

³⁴ For example, no interest is payable on IDA credits, though there is a variable service charge, currently at the rate of 0.75% per annum. Repayments are spread over 40 years, including a 10-year moratorium.

management system and “to implement Ghana-Vision 2020, Ghana will still depend on these sources of funding due to the acute shortage of local funding”. However,

“the international agencies are required to put their funds in a common pool of financial resources for the sector they intend to support. The respective sectors will determine how to use these funds, namely; to support development programmes in the sector and on the basis of national need. Until this time, donor funding has been geared towards development projects, and they almost always made public relations out of it. This has led to a spiral of rivalry among donors as each want to be seen as a leader in an area or sector . Hence some of them tend to flagship projects and announce their presence in their area of operation. The programme approach to funding development is intended among other things to end this practice and it seeks to enhance the attainment of the overall objectives of the particular development programme without making development sporadic. The programme approach to funding development seek to turn development finance into a single comprehensive framework and it is creating confidence in the new development management system”.

This shift in donor direction has been caused by the criticism of designing and carrying out technical assistance programmes which does not only fail to solve development problems but also end up undermining capacity building in the recipient country (Lisk, 1996; Jaycox, 1993a). Jaycox rejects the donor practice of designing a programme and then soon find a big mismatch between the programme design and the local capacity of the people to carry it out. In order to alleviate this problem according to Jaycox, lots of money and technical assistance are invested in the programme on assumption that the gap will be bridged.

Bologun (1997: 71-8) has also criticised donor technical assistance agencies as being liable for exporting foreign ideas on development to developing countries. He shows that the ultimate goal of these agencies is to equip the average developing country with the capacity to produce and consume as developed countries. He contends that development is not a commodity to be exported from outside or a formula to be copied without regard to the conditions prevailing inside a country. He also reiterate that development is not a computerised air terminal in a country where the level of numeracy and literacy is low, and neither is it a turn-key project financed entirely from external resources and managed, maintained and rehabilitated with external technical assistance. Bologun indicates that development is rather a process in which a society identifies its important problems and

provides an atmosphere that is congenial to articulate ideas for resolving these problems (or the bulk of it) locally. To Bologun, development is in effect the sum total of indigenous resources (or capacities) that are deployed to achieve specific ends, while battling with environmental constraints and foreign competition. These assumptions throw up some skepticism about the utility of donor intervention in Ghana's development process. This skepticism questions whether this involvement will lead to sustainable development?

Bologun links this skepticism to the cultural elements that underpin development. He argues that most definitions of development that embraces modernization, westernization, technological progress, or improvement in the material conditions of the people discount the cultural barriers that underpin development and the communality of vision on the essence and techniques of development. These assumptions suggest that any external agency that participates in the development process of another country is likely to misconstrue a lot of stakes in the process (see Toye, 1987: 10-1). The World Bank (1991: 7) has also added that the stopgap measures where expatriate advisers are called upon to substitute for the lack of capacity in Africa cannot provide a lasting solution. The World Bank's view show that in the immediate future, donors will need to continue to help bridge the gap in African expertise through technical assistance and other forms of support. In the long run however, there is no substitute for Africa having its own indigenous capacity. As a further criticism to donor intervention, the World Bank (1991: 12) has added that too often donor agencies have substituted the capacity of core PSIs by setting up their own project management units. This suggests that donor effort lacks an overall, consistent and coherent strategy for capacity building in Africa and these have also inadvertently contributed to Africa's current capacity shortfalls.

The evidence has shown so far that a third of development funding in Ghana as well as critical technical expertise are provided by donor agencies (see World Bank, 1982). This

level of dependency for policy implementation raises fundamental and serious questions regarding the sustainability of the development process. That is, in circumstances where there is a policy disagreement between the state and a donor agency, the latter may threaten to withdraw its support should they fail to comply with the agency's prescriptions. Instances such as this will contribute to the distortions in the implementation process of the Vision 2020. The present writer argues therefore that, this level of dependency poses a threat to the sustainability of Ghana's development.

d. Infrastructural Provisions for Policy Implementation

The interviews at the MDPI, MESW and the CSPIP Secretariat show that "most PSIs in Ghana are without adequate infrastructure. These institutions lack very basic office equipment such as computers, telephones, copiers, stationery and inappropriate office accommodation throughout the country". This has been the result of "inadequate central government funding and other budgeting constraints, and it has affected PSIs capacity for policy implementation". There are a few exceptions to this problem as

"most public financial institutions such as the MoF, the Controller and Accountant General's Department and the Internal Revenue Service have these infrastructure even though these cannot be considered adequate. These have enhanced the performance of financial institutions compared to their counterparts in the non-financial sectors".

Secondly, the interview at the NDPC, the MoF, MESW and MDPI produced a consensus that,

"the few infrastructure available to these institutions for example vehicles that are urgently needed to aid communication and networking are used for private ends by top management personnel....These vehicles are normally parked in the homes of these top personnel".

Secondly, this data show that "under the recommendations of PARDIC and the newly enacted Civil Service Law 1993, sector ministries and agencies are to set up four divisions to enhance policy implementation". These divisions include,

"a General Administration and Financial Management, PPMED, Training and HRD, and Statistics, Research and Information Management. As at the last year of the Vision 2020 medium term, only a handful of MDAs has been able to establish these divisions due to shortage of skills. This problem has affected institutional performance in a number of ways. Each Ministry has its own development area in the various sectors, and therefore the

respective ministries are required to prepare their own development budgets. This has however not been possible in all ministries due to their failure to set up these divisions especially, the PPMEDs and the Financial Management Divisions. Even those who have established these divisions have other problems like the lack of qualified staff, as most of them are not even headed by directors. This has created problems for co-ordinating information for the budget preparation. Some MDAs are headed and managed by administrators who are unable to appreciate the technical content of the institution's remit in the policy process. But where there is a technical person as the head, as for example if the Ministry of Agriculture has a director who is an Agricultural Economist, s/he will know what technical issues are required in the policy process. But the case is different when an administrator has risen through the ranks to become Chief Director as pertained in most PSIs in Ghana".

The interview at the NDPC also shows that for example,

"during budget preparation, the heads of the various PSIs are asked to submit budget for their respective departments and agencies. But the submitted budget always turns out to be details of budget for staff salaries and expenditure on Accra-based activities of the MDAs rather than on their development programmes" ³⁵.

e. Procurement Practices

The documentary source (see Bank, 1996) shows a lack of adequate framework for procurement practices in the policy process. These practices have been diagnosed by a World Bank report that has identified two key deficiencies. The data show that the only formal rules and regulations on procurement in Ghana's public sector are incorporated in Ghana Supplies Commission (GSC) Law that conducts no more than a quarter of all public procurement in the country. The diagnosis shows that other procurement agencies use Bank and other donor procurement guidelines. The data show that "although this serves the immediate needs of all concerned it exposes the country to potential problems when the country is required to depend on its own laws for remedying procurement disputes and issues". Secondly, this practice "leaves bare the area of local procurement and prevents the country from using *national competitive bidding* (NCB) procedures in Bank-financed contracts". Thirdly, "the process of reporting public procurement to the CAGD is slow due to the manual processing of all purchases and payment".

³⁵ Accra is the capital city of Ghana, which incidentally also houses the headquarters' of almost all PSIs.

The above data suggest that resources available to the development process are problematic and that securing these resources and identifying the combination of the resources required alone are not enough to make policy implementation smooth. Additionally however, the quality of the secured resources is also very crucial for a successful implementation. In Ghana's circumstances, the fluid nature of the resources may create serious implementation problems that may range from perception to mismanagement as explained in systems analysis in 3.7.2, and thereby impede the development process. Ayee (1992) has warned that part of the causes of implementation failure in developing countries is the lack of resources for the process. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xii) have also observed that some policies languish because funds cannot be secured to see the implementation through. Grindle and Thomas (1991: 148) have argued that the mobilisation of essential resources is a key element in the policy implementation process. They emphasise that although resources are by definition limited, they are not fixed and therefore effective managers can mobilise resources through conscious and concerted efforts.

5.3.3 Management Framework for Policy Implementation

This section is captured by the part of the research question that states that *managerial performance in Ghana's PSIs have had a retrogressive impact on institutional efficiency for managing development, especially as PSI have been unable to mobilize and harness the country's human resource endowment for development*. The section examines the validity or otherwise of this argument.

The interviews at the NDPC, MESW, MDPI and the MoF reveal that policy implementation by PSIs in Ghana are centrally controlled, directed, and supervised. That is, the ethos and structure of management in PSIs is essentially "top-down". "Information flows are restricted and management is directive rather than consultative and promotional". The data show that, "public sector managers do not delegate authority and are reluctant to

assign responsibilities to junior staff". This management approach to policy implementation leads to the exclusion of staff who otherwise could have been useful due to their expertise in development process especially in the implementation process. "This happens regardless of the fact that the development management process requires the participation of technical experts and the mass of the people for a successful policy implementation". This top-down management approach has affected institutional efficiency at policy implementation. The interview at the MDPI provides the evidence for this claim. This data reveal that

"at MDPI-organised management courses, participants complain about managerial practices at their respective institutions that make it impossible to introduce the systems they learn on these courses. Secondly, most of these managers betray their inadequacies when they attend management courses at the institute and indicate that after so many years of being managers, the courses have exposed them for the first time to the basics of managerial systems that they had had no previous knowledge of".

The interviews at the MESW and the MDPI acknowledge that some personnel have proper and efficient managerial skills. However, the data points out that the performance of these personnel is normally impeded by government practices in managerial appointments.

"The Government of Ghana normally appoints people to managerial positions without any proper plan for transition. Usually, the post becomes vacant before a new person is appointed. In such situations, the new manager comes with his/her own values that destabilizes the existing managerial practices.... Policy implementation management in most public sector institutions is too bureaucratic as members of staff are obliged to abide strictly by regulations and some managers get too impersonal in the process".

This stifles initiative and performance, and has led to delays in past implementation processes. This has consequently contributed to public sector inefficiency in the policy process. The interview from the MESW shows also that

"management in PSIs also lack creativity and initiative. They take less responsibility for their units' performance and are not accountable for their decisions and action they take. For example when PSIs failed to successfully implement SAP-ERP related policies in the 1980s and early 1990s, no one took responsibility for these failures although it was very clear that the management approach to these policies was characterised by ad hoc decisions and red-tapism".

The interviews from the MDPI and MESW indicate further that, "management in PSIs are far removed from the needs and aspirations of staff lower down the hierarchy. This has

caused disillusion in public sector staff and has had a serious impact on staff motivation for productivity”. It may be inferred from the data that managerial capabilities determine enormously the effectiveness or otherwise of PSIs in the development management process. So poor managerial performance will inevitably lead to lack of institutional capacity to manage the development process. Consequently however, Grindle and Thomas (1991) have argued that a successful policy implementation requires a substantial investment in managerial capability. They suggest that training will afford management with the skills to determine priorities and influence the process.

5.3.4 Cross Institutional Linkages and the Policy Implementation Process

The element of the research question in 4.2 (iii) states partly that *participatory institutional structures as well as effective coordination of sectional interest are necessary for Ghana's development management*. The documentary sources (see Koranteng, 1997) and the interviews at the NDPC, MDPI, and MESW concurrently emphasised that “the public service in Ghana is fragmented and seems to have no structure to link all its units into a coherent whole”. According to Koranteng (1997: 26) this has resulted in overlaps and duplication of functions and systems that has led to inaction, non-performance, waste and in-discipline. The interviews acknowledge some exceptions to this problem and show that “some forms of consultation exist among and within institutions but this does not in general terms reflect in the policy implementation process. At the micro-level, management of PSIs do not consult due to the culture of seniority”. This practice normally stymies the efforts of middle and lower level management to move the policy process forward. “Chief Executives for example take unilateral decisions on the assumption that they are accountable for their institutions’ performance”. The data shows further that “on the macro-level coordinating and networking processes are deficient in institutional practices as most institutions are busy with their sectoral programmes”. The data show that “even among

institutions in the same sector co-ordinating and networking processes are inadequate and this has been one of the causes of the series of policy failures". Ham and Hill (1984) have emphasised that a successful implementation depends on effective linkages between different organisations and departments that have a stake in the process. Gunn (1978) adds that there should be perfect communication and coordination among these agencies, and Nixon (1980) emphasizes clarity and consistency in communication for the policy implementation process.

The interview from the NDPC shows that,

"currently under the Vision 2020, only a few strong ministries are able to determine the direction of policy implementation in their own sectors because of this weak co-ordination among agencies in the same ministry. At the district level, the problem is the same even though some are managing under the circumstances to implement their plans".

Powelson (1972: 143) does not however see this as an absolute setback to the development process because he accepts some measure of ideological disagreement to be an ingredient of development once enough consensus can be sustained to keep institutions effective. His argument is that "those outside the consensus may provide the needle-pricks for change". The present writer argues that this view must be considered with caution in a developing country like Ghana where ideological disagreements may easily slip into anarchy.

The interview at the NDPC shows that,

"Ghanaian institutions are best at co-ordination when they need to borrow funds to implement a policy or a programme. For example, when funds had to be borrowed for the Gateway 2000 programme a lot of PSIs that are responsible for implementing the various components of the programme were seen co-ordinating their activities³⁶. Through a medium such as this, institutions co-ordinate better but in the normal schedule of policy implementation, co-ordination is quite weak as may be seen for example in infrastructure development of this country. After about a month of an expensive road construction, another agency will come and dig across the road to lay major pipelines for water or telecommunication. This is waste of resources because it will mean re-investing in the road".

The interview at the NDPC further reveals that,

³⁶ *The Gateway 2000 programme is part of the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy. The programme seeks to attract foreign investment in Ghana that will in turn serve as the growth engine for the entire West African sub-region.*

“the NDPC has tried to use the national budget, especially the development budget as an instrument for co-ordination but the process has been fraught with difficulties. The Commission thought that this would be one way of getting sector agencies to start talking to one another about the common objective of achieving the development goal for the country. But this has so far not been successful due to the rivalry between the MoF and the NDPC”.

According to this interview, the rivalry between the two lead institutions in the development process originated from a government decision in the early 1990s to remove the planning function of national development from the Ministry of Finance that has hitherto been called the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. “The NDPC was then set up with development planning as its remit”. The rationale for the government decision to split the planning and finance functions was to ensure specificity and specialization of functions. “The government assumed that this would make the development management process efficient. But the MoF has until this day not been able to live up to the reality of this separation, and has resorted to covert action to undermine the work of the NDPC”. The respondent cited the continuous refusal of the MoF to provide the NDPC with valuable data for planning purpose although this is required by law:

“for example, before we agree on the broad goals, we are suppose to have indicators about the trends in the economy. In practice it has been difficult working out the broad financial parameters and to be informed about the economic trends mainly due to this problem between the Ministry of Finance and us. Some of the top personnel involved in planing at the time of the separation did not want to be seen as pushing their way. There is a lot of fear (and it is a genuine fear) in the public sector that planning was centralized and not seen as a ‘public policy’. So those leading the planing process were also over careful. Another problem that has resulted from the lack of co-operation between the NDPC and the MoF is that after analysing the problems and setting goals for the Ghana-Vision 2020, our priorities were to increase spending according to proportion in the education and health sectors. The Vision 2020 document has a section of that, but this plan has not been used because we did not agree on the issue with the Ministry of Finance. From that stage on, the sector ministries prepared their plans and assumed that heaven will come down and manna will fall and everybody will have bread to eat. But of course it does not work and did not work that way. Many of them have therefore not followed their plan. Like I mentioned, because of weak co-ordination between or among agencies in the same ministry, you will find a few departments doing well. Only a few strong ministries are able to determine the direction of developments in their own sectors. At the local level, the same thing happens. But there are some implementing their plans from the information we have”.

Another problem emanating from this rivalry is that “although the NDPC is responsible for monitoring the development budget, this function is still being performed by the MoF”. The evidence shows that it has been difficult to implement specific activities of the Ghana-Vision 2020 such as developing the education and health by increasing spending in these sectors. The reason is that the MoF would not concede to the NDPC's leadership in the policy process, and there is no one to check these excesses emanating from the MoF. So between these two lead institutions for example, the levels of co-ordination and consultation have been minimal, and this rivalry is undermining policy implementation and the entire development management system. Ham and Hill (1984) have warned that it is easier to achieve implementation success when conflict of interest is minimal than when disagreement on this scale exists between institutions and in this case the two lead institutions.

The MoF-NDPC rivalry indicates that sectional or institutional interests have enormous impact on institutional co-operation. This underpins the need for consensus building processes to be incorporated as one of the major pillars in the development management process. Secondly, it may also be argued that power consideration and interests to gain or avoid influence and control have been the cause of the rivalry between the MoF and the NDPC. These therefore capture the development management process as a political process in which groups and individuals vie for leadership. Once the leadership status is established, it is difficult to relinquish it as has been demonstrated by the MoF. This incident shows also that, institutional status considerations have negative effect on the development policy implementation process. This occurs through the non co-operative and the conflicting attitude it generates. But in order to reduce this level of conflict, the NDPC and MoF must engage in negotiations. Kaul (1996: 134) has advised that in such situations, enhanced clarity of roles and tighter lines of accountability should be made to re-define relationships in the policy process. This will ensure the needed co-operation in the policy implementation process. Ham and Hill (1984) have advised that the policy

implementation process must be based on negotiations and compromise. Barret and Fudge (1981: 89) have also added that a successful policy implementation is an issue of compromise among key interests in the policy process.

The interview at the NDPC show that the weak processes for co-ordination has persisted due to the slow implementation of national policy on the institutional framework for policy co-ordination. At the national level, the NDPC is responsible for overseeing the processes for policy co-ordination among institutions. But the NDPC has been unable to do this due to poor staffing levels. Most importantly and secondly, a disagreement of who should be the chairman of the NDPC has been the main factor of the commission's weakness to perform this role. The interview revealed that,

“according to the country's constitution, the Chairman of the NDPC must be the vice-president of Ghana. During the first term of office of the NDC government, moves were made to make P. V. Obeng (a former cabinet Minister and a Presidential Adviser on Governmental Affairs), the Chairman of the Commission. The government took this decision because the vice-president disagreed with the President on a number of policy issues which also led to strained relationship between the President and his Vice. This move to make P. V. Obeng Chairman of the NDPC was fiercely contested by the then vice-president, which was part of the reasons why the vice-president was sidelined by the party and led to his resignation at a latter date. The move to make P. V. Obeng (who has been made to resign from his cabinet post for corruption) the Chairman of the Commission had been successfully orchestrated however as the then new vice-president seemed to have understood the arrangement. This has caused a lot of outrage in many quarters and has led to the refusal of Chief Executives of some institutions and other stakeholders to co-operate with the NDPC. They have refused to attend the Policy Hearing meetings as well as other planning and review meetings of the NDPC. P. V. Obeng himself is unable to control and bring together the various Ministers and Directors for effective co-ordination. Hence the low capacity for policy co-ordination”³⁷.

This interview also revealed another cause of co-ordination problem as the ERP implementation. “During the initial years of the ERP, the government paid a lot of attention to short-term *crisis management* measures to stabilize the economy. This led to the compartmentalization of departmental responsibilities”, and this has impeded inter-sectoral and institutional co-ordination.

³⁷ The information contained in this paragraph is a classified information that was said off record and as such it cannot be referenced.

The above data provide evidence that unconstitutional behaviour of government impede the development process in the sense that it leads to the non co-operative, non-participation and partisan attitude from individuals and groups who oppose such behaviours. It also authenticates Hargrove's (1975: 69) argument that policy implementation is a political process in which consensus building is problematic as the various groups of actors engage in isolated maneuvers to enhance their interests (see also Ayee, 1992). These policy co-ordination problems may undermine the development process if action is not taken to arrest it, especially because co-ordination is the essence of cohesiveness among the members of the implementation structure. Without cohesion and co-operation, the development policy implementation process will become static and targets will become difficult to achieve. This experience contradicts the systems approach to policy implementation (see chapter 3). Systems analysis stresses on attaining good levels of cooperation in the implementation process by focusing on the importance of team work for successful implementation (see Parsons, 1995). Elmore (1978) has observed that "regardless of how well organised an agency might be, its ability to implement a programme successfully depends...on its ability to influence other agencies" and this is an important lesson for the successful implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. This also has implications for donor activities in the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation process as well.

Donor Agencies and Policy Co-ordination

The interview at the NDPC reveals that,

"as a matter of policy, there is a bi-monthly meeting involving Heads of Donor Agencies who are major financial contributors to the Vision 2020 implementation. These meetings are called *Decentralization Lunch of Donor Agencies*. Even though these meetings occur, there are no fast and hard rules about co-ordination of programmes and this suggests that Donor Agencies do not co-ordinate enough".

Secondly, the data show that "donor agencies normally introduce a programme to a government agency and decides to fund it without recourse to the overall national plan". These donor activities are therefore a serious source of distortions to the development

process. Given Elmore's argument for co-operation and given the critical nature of the Ghana-Vision 2020 to Ghana's development, it is important to bring donor activities under a properly coordinated policy framework.

5.3.5 Inclusion

This section addresses the diversity problems that have been identified by research question (vii) in 4.2. These diversity problems have resulted in exclusion problems in the development process. The interview at the NDPC, MDPI and MESW emphasised concurrently that "one of the features of Ghana's PAS is the magnitude of exclusion of certain categories of staff and groups from the policy process". That is,

"participation in the policy process is limited due to non-transparent management practices. Policy decisions are handed down from the top to staff at the bottom, and management discourages initiative. Some PSIs have also not been too accommodating to the views of clients and other stakeholders in the development process and this problem is persistent".

Thus, according to the NIRP (1997: 3) the failure to exercise decentralized authorities and to delegate work has been persistent due to Ghana's inappropriate legal framework. The exclusion problem borders to a great extent on diversity issues.

a. National Diversity Issues

Two major diversity problems constitute a great setback to participation in the development process. These setbacks are expatiated by Bhatnager et. al., (1992: 158) setting out the idea that, any initiative that seeks to empower women and disadvantaged groups must incorporate plans for substantial training and promotion of management skills. This is needed to scale up grass-roots movements. These problems are:

i. Gender Exclusion:

The interviews at the MDPI and MESW show that, "women empowerment has not been addressed holistically in Ghana" although the GoG has claimed that Ghana has an open

policy which gives men and women equal access and benefits to public goods and services, provided they have the appropriate qualification (see Aryeetey, 1992: 353). The data show that, “the greater percentage of women in employment occupies lower positions with lower salaries and does not have opportunity to participate in decision-making”. The evidence can be seen in Ghana’s employment statistics in which Female unemployment is about 50% higher than that of male, and while about 49.8% of females have never attended school only about 3% attain secondary or higher education compared to 29.1% and 9% respectively for males. Adult literacy is lower among females at 42% than among males at 64% (see Ghana. 1997). Beneria et. al. (1982:161) illustrates the point by arguing that the problem of Third World women does not arise from a lack of integration into the development process. On the contrary, they are integrated into the process but at the bottom of a hierarchical and contradictory structure of production and accumulation. And Aryeetey (1992: 367) agree that to a large extent, the constraints that confronts Ghanaian women are concealed rather than obvious, because of the apparent independence that women enjoy in the production and management of their own activities. This scenario is a serious impediment to the development process in any country and the South Commission (1990: 131) has reiterated that, “a gender-sensitive approach to development is not just a political imperative, but a basic condition for sustained economic and social progress”.

As part of the Vision 2020 policy therefore, the documentary evidence reveal that the Ghana Government has embarked on measures to increase female participation in the policy process (see Ghana, 1997). The strategies being used include:

- a. “promoting equality of access for females to all streams of education and vocational training for all types of occupations including those which have been traditionally accessible only to males”,
- b. “providing women with vocational guidance and counseling services on the same broad range of technical and vocational education and training, and employment opportunities as males”,

- c. “encouraging women to take full advantage of such opportunities and creating the conditions required for them to do so”, and
- d. “promoting further training for women to ensure their personal development and advancement to skill employment and posts of responsibility, and urging employers to provide them with the same opportunities for extending their work experience as offered to male workers with the same education, training and qualifications”.

The government has announced the creation of a special Ministry for women’s affairs to promote these goals. Thus, the Vision 2020 seeks to integrate gender interests in the development process by seeking to improve the quality of participation of women through direct access to decision-making and resources. Aryeetey (1992: 349-51) see this as a very important step forward in the development process.

ii. Tribal Exclusions

The interviews at the MESW and MDPI show that

“Ghana is constituted by the amalgamation of tribes, which impedes co-operation, consultation and networking processes in the development management process and leads to exclusions in the PAS. Tribal affiliations and preferences play a great part in institutional practices and procedures including personnel recruitment in PSIs in Ghana and this has led to the domination of certain tribes in a number of sectors and where other tribes are marginalised. The Ewe tribe (which incidentally happen to be the smallest tribe in Ghana) for example dominates institutions like the MoF and most other PSIs”.

That is a selective recruitment process operates to maintain a conservative, non-development-oriented character of PSIs. This system is a disincentive to co-operation and networking processes which are vital to the successful functioning of the development management system in general and policy implementation in particular (see 5.3.4). The South Commission (1990: 45) has warned that any development that discount cultural factors show itself as liable to breed indifference, alienation and social discord. It is therefore important to factor the cultural differences and the effective management of these in the development process in order to secure consensus that is a vital ingredient for an enabling development environment. Thus culture which may be described as the sum total

of values, beliefs, attributes, customs and patterns of behaviour in a given society is a vital pillar for development. According to the South Commission's argument, capital formation and technical progress are essential elements of development but the broad environment for their effectiveness is a society's culture. Hence, it is through the affirmation and enrichment of cultural identities via mass participation that development can be given strong roots and made a sustainable process.

Furthermore, the concept of diversity at the workplace recognises the fact that the workforce usually consists of a diverse population. Harnessing these differences will create a productive environment in which everybody feels valued as their talents are being fully utilized to realise development goals (see McDougall, 1996: 64). Secondly, and as discussed before, there occur groups of classes with varying interests which lead to conflict in the development process but the state's ability to co-ordinate these interests in a manner to achieve the development objectives is vital to the development process. Tinbergen (1958: 4) has said that this process must be designed to facilitate and stimulate private activity. Hence PSIs need to manage these diversity issues to the advantage of the development process. If it is left in the current state, these diversity issues will cause apathy among groups and individuals associated with the policy implementation process. This will consequently impede the nation's development as already this was the case in the old development management system and it may persist in the new system as well.

The interview from the NDPC and MESW show that "with the inception of the new development management system, local groups are getting more organised at the national level so it is important and easy for PSIs to consult with them at the national level". That is,

"the views of groups and individuals are now sought in the development policy process. For example, during policy formulation, there is a consultation process with stakeholders and beneficiaries about the policies at the initial stages, particularly when these stakeholders have a stake in the implementation".

The evidence is seen for example, “in the labour front where units like the Trade Unions Congress (TUC), Employers Association, etc. are engaged in the policy process with the MESW”. That is, “in the new system, government is no longer the big player in the policy process, not even in terms of funding programmes. Under this system, stakeholders are consulted in securing funding for development programme implementation”.

Another example of Ghana’s drive towards inclusion is the introduction of the District Assemblies even though this is not complete³⁸. Thus, the new development management system in Ghana seeks to empower individual groups, communities and organisations through these innovations. Numenkamp (1995: 10) has emphasised that empowerment process such as this is essential for influencing public policy, providing a check on government discretion as well as enhancing the effectiveness and sustainability of development programmes. Bhatnager et. al. (1992: 161) have noted that participation is critically important to good governance and therefore to the development process. However he cautions that a serious commitment to participation will inevitably lead to difficult issues of governance especially regarding accountability issues arising out of empowerment (Bhatnager et. al., 1992: 120).

5.3.6 Conflict Resolution in the Policy Implementation Process

The new national development planning system law (Act 480) makes provision for conflict resolution in the development management process. According to the interviews at the NDPC,

“conflicts may occur at two levels. A matter relating to the exercise of the planning functions of the District Assembly during plan formulation stage or the implementation stage of the district development plans, programmes or projects may aggrieve an individual or a community or an Area Council”.

³⁸ *The problem with the District Assembly concept has to do with the shortage of skilled personnel required to fill the vacancies in the assemblies.*

In such cases, the interview showed that the NDPC's published grievance procedure (which is a Legislative Instrument) would be the means by which the aggrieved party may seek redress. Secondly,

“a District Planning Authority may disagree with the recommendations made by the RCC in the course of co-ordinating and harmonising district plans at the regional level. If such a conflict cannot be amicably settled, the RCC is required to submit to the NDPC, the district development plan or programme as proposed by the District Planning Authority, along with the RCCs report. The NDPC will consider the case and make a decision in line with national goals and priorities that will be final”.

This conflict resolution process underpins the notion that policy implementation is not always associated with rationality and for which reason conflicts are always eminent. The data discussed so far (in 5.3.4 and 5.3.5) show that the conflict resolution apparatus in the new development management system has not been effective. The NDPC will therefore have to build its capacity to negotiate consensus before the numerous conflicts and grievances throw the Vision 2020 process off balance. Secondly, the NDPC will need to build a capacity to anticipate the differing forms of reactions and responses that may occur, and from where these will occur in the development process (see Grindle et al., 1991). Fact that these conflicts are persistent indicates the NDPC's inability to manage conflicts. It may therefore be argued that the policy formulation phase of Ghana-Vision 2020 lacked *implementation estimates* that are necessary prerequisites for policy implementation. This position is elaborated by Elmore's (1980: 611) idea that unless the initiators of a policy can galvanise the energy, attention and skills of people affected by the policy and bring these resources together to negotiate the policy, the effects will be nothing than weak and diffused policy outcomes. In order to reduce or eliminate these reactions to the implementation process, Hogwood et al.'s (1984) plan may be useful (see 3.7.3) else such reactions may reverse or change the Vision 2020 policy objectives. These emphasise the canons of interactive policy implementation – that co-ordination, control and compliance through negotiations are necessary inputs from people at the bottom.

5.4 The Governance Framework for Vision 2020 Implementation

This section explores the extent to which the governance problems identified by items (ii) and (iv) on the list of research questions in 4.2 impacts Ghana's development process. The data has shown that PSIs have a high stake in the new development management system and for that matter the implementation of Ghana-Vision 2020. This responsibility of Ghana's PSIs in the policy implementation process will be realized through good governance practices which the World Bank (1989: 60) see as the "exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs" (see also Brautigam, 1991: 1). But the governance situation in Ghana is a source of threat to the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. The documentary sources (see Erbynn, 1995) show that since the inception of the SAP and ERP, the GoG policy has stressed on the role of PSIs as facilitators of and partners in private sector growth and development. PSIs have however been sluggish at responding to this new role and effectively implementing public policies. The interviews at the MESW show that "this problem points to the weakness in the policy process that has resulted from the practice of centralized and top-down decision-making and one way communication processes". Secondly, "leadership under Ghana's circumstances seeks to accomplish co-ordination through command and control, but the practice leaves the co-ordination process more fragile than before". These weaknesses have contributed to policy implementation problems in the PAS.

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995) show that in 1995/96, the NIRP Secretariat served 150 PSIs with a Self-Appraisal Instrument (SAI). The analysis of this survey illustrates the problems undermining PSIs' performance at policy implementation in the new development management system³⁹. The result of the SAI shows that:

³⁹ *The SAI is a diagnostic and reconnaissance tool that assisted in the development and implementation of appropriate methodologies, processes and programmes for addressing institutional performance and capacity improvement issues (see chapter 6 for a detailed discussion on the SAI).*

- a. “most institutions are unaware of key national development policy goals outlined in the Vision 2020”. Moreover, “not many institutions are able to describe their overall policy goals nor are able to explain how these impact on their mission statement” and thirdly, “institutions’ policy goals do not highlight the issue of resource constraints”.
- b. “there is a general absence of corporate vision and mission statements”. Secondly “missions statements are not communicated to all staff or fully owned by stakeholders and mechanisms for doing this are not in place in many cases”. For example it was revealed in the interview at the CSPIP Secretariat that,

“a beneficiary survey conducted by the CSPIP in which officials from the Passport Office were asked in one of the workshops about who their clients were. The respondent said it was the government without knowing that the ordinary Ghanaian is also a client. These are the impressions created across the various PSIs. Traditionally, public servants have often tended to regard the government as their main customer or client and consequently have often tended to downplay their vital responsibility to the general public and to the business community”.
- c. “institutions do not clearly define programmes, projects and services as linked to their missions”. Secondly, “service delivery is not sufficiently client-focused and is often “supply driven” rather than “demand led” and services are duplicated by different public service institutions”. This stems from a fragmented overall public sector management framework.
- d. “with the exception of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) corporate planning systems for policy implementation are absent in public institutions”. There are also “no systems for setting targets and measuring performance, and information on services and performance is not transparent where clients and stakeholders are concerned. Internal and external audit, and accounting systems are not adequate”. The results also show that “skills for contract management are weak and this slows down the pace of contracting out services and the process also hinder private sector involvement in the delivery of public service”.
- e. “budget allocations are untimely and cut backs at short notices are also frequent”. This is one of the setbacks to corporate planning and policy implementation.

Secondly, “that disproportionate amount of funds is spent on staff cost to the detriment of operating expenditures and capital investment”. Moreover, “in the absence of effective system for managing financial and human resources, inputs are not optimised”.

This data show that a lot of problems are associated with the Vision 2020 implementation and in order to successfully implement the policy, it is very imperative to find solutions to them.

The interview at the NDPC shows that,

“the structure of PSIs under which departments and agencies have been created under ministries for policy implementation constitute a problem to the development management process. Usually these departments and agencies are excluded from policy formulation and are only informed about the policy during the implementation stage”.

This is a top down approach to policy implementation that has contributed to the numerous policy implementation failures in the country. Aside these problems in the PAS, there are a number of other structural and value problems that may impede effective governance and for that matter the efficient implementation of the Vision 2020 policy. These problems are discussed below.

5.4.1 Regulatory Processes for Implementing the Policy

The interview at the NDPC shows that ,

“the development management system and the role of institutions are given a legal backing by the Constitution of the (Fourth) Republic of Ghana (1992), the National Development and Planning Commission Act, 1994 (Act 479), the National Development Planning (System) Act, 1994 (Act 480), the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) and the Civil Service Law, 1993 (PNDC Law 327)”.

These legal instruments also seek to regulate the new development management system, define the procedures and processes for implementing development policies as well as the functional relationships between the various institutions operating in the system. Thus these legal instruments give meaning to the vertical and horizontal relationships in the

development management system and for that matter policy implementation (see Appendix

B). The interview at the NDPC shows that,

“the legal instruments seek to boost PSIs capacity for policy implementation in the new development management system. However, the processes for ensuring this are problematic. For example, there is the yearly policy hearing which is supposed to be organised jointly by the NDPC and MoF and which is participated by all PSIs. This policy hearing is organised to co-ordinate sector ministries development plans and to ensure that these plans conform to the national goals and plans as envisaged in the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy⁴⁰. However, the processes for ensuring these are quite porous since most MDAs are able to lobby their plans at the hearings. So when gaps in sector MDAs plans emerge, they are able to find support among the other participants. Hence many of the MDAs avoid scrutiny and get away with their incoherent plans”.

This shows that the regulatory system for policy implementation have some flaws which makes it possible for the various Chief Directors not to conform to the laid down rules. This problem underpins Grindle et. al's. (1991) argument that situations occur in the policy implementation process that alliances between groups and individuals in the policy process may lead to piecemeal sabotage of the policy to be implemented. According to the interview,

“this situation has also persisted partly because national priorities have not been *clearly articulated*. That is even though there is a national policy, it is still short of plan prioritization in any meaningful way and therefore it is very difficult to monitor the performance of the ministries and sector agencies on this basis”.

In view of these problems, the present writer argues that it is important in the development management process to make sure that programmes and projects that are designated to be implemented in a particular phase are done according to schedule. This is especially very pertinent in Ghana's circumstance where many programmes have been scheduled in the context of limited resources. In such situations it is important to determine which one of the programmes should come first and what the other priorities are.

⁴⁰ This policy hearing was organised in the past by the Ministry of Finance.

This interview further indicated that, “the viability of the legal instruments to regulate and monitor policy implementation is diminished by the political, and administrative barriers to private sector initiative and investment”. These barriers, coupled with the rent-seeking behaviour of PSIs (particularly the financial institutions) and individual public officials, constitute constraints on the creation of an enabling environment for private sector contribution towards Ghana Vision 2020. Some other identifiable constraints on the private sector regarding the Vision 2020 implementation include “the persistence of outmoded legislation such as exchange control regulations and the lack of comprehensive and reliable information and statistical data on aspects of economic and social development”. From the point of view of systems analysis, “such information is essential for corporate planning by the private sector, as well as for development planning and policy implementation”.

Values of Openness and Transparency

The interviews at the MESW and MDPI further revealed institutional value systems as another category of governance problems in Ghana’s PSIs. This relates to

“openness, transparency and accountability processes that are absent in institutional practices in Ghana. Although these values are clearly stipulated in institutional statutes and ordinances, they are not enforced due to personal and group interests in the public service. For example the lack of openness and transparency has led to red tapism in the allocation of funds which could take weeks into months after the scheduled date for a programme implementation”.

Another example is that,

“over-centralization in the MoF, causes over-centralization of budget allocation that in turn makes MDAs inefficient in their policy implementation. In low accountability circumstances such as Ghana’s, public officials misappropriate national funds earmarked for policy implementation”.

The existing governance situation is therefore creating serious problems for public sector performance at implementing the Ghana-Vision 2020. Sandhu et. al. (1989) have said that systemic in-discipline impede institutional efficiency and the progress of the environment it serves. Systemic in-discipline was a feature of the old development management system

that also contributed to the failures of past policies. The data has identified this phenomenon lurking in the new system and it is urgent, based on past experiences to eliminate these before it derails the Vision 2020 implementation.

5.4.2 The Impact of Culture on Implementing the Policy

Apart from cultural problems being a governance issue, it is also captured as a diversity issue in the elements of the research question (see 4.2 (vii)). The section explores the extent to which bad cultural practices impede the development process. Aryeetey (1992: 58) has argued that development policy, as a concept is a cultural fact. He states that the manner in which individuals or groups respond to a plan (either positively or negatively) are all factors of culture which are also important to the development policy process. The interview at the MESW and the MDPI show that

“Ghanaian cultural practices have in many ways impacted negatively on policy implementation. Ghanaians do not have a sense of time and that affects the way time is managed in implementation schedules. A lot of incidence abound where staff report late to work but also leave the office before mid-day to attend to private matters, and there is absolutely no mechanism to check these excesses. The problem of time management has therefore affected the practice of long term planning for policy implementation”.

That is, short term and ad hoc planning has characterised the policy implementation process as well as the policy process as a whole in Ghana. Secondly, the interviews show that,

“the extended family system in Ghana has been a great setback to the efficient performance of PSIs. The extended family system play essential role in job recruitment in Ghana and this phenomenon has led to compromises in a lot of institutional decision. So people are often appointed to certain positions through prescriptive arrangements such as family ties even though the person may not be necessarily qualified for the position. And when one has to be disciplined for incompetence or misconduct at the work place, family delegates are sent to negotiate. These practices have had crippling effects on institutional effectiveness. Thirdly, Ghanaians lack the culture of maintenance and as a result this is not built into the way institutions operate. Office accommodation and equipment are rarely serviced and in the end a lot of time and money are wasted to get replacements sometimes before a programme can be implemented”.

The interviews further revealed that, “Ghanaian perception about matters regarding *government* also impedes policy implementation”. That is,

“partly due to the non-transparent relationship between government and the people, Ghanaians see the government as a wealthy entity that does not feel the impact of resource waste. Hence Ghanaians do not pay serious attention to *government work*⁴¹. This attitude has affected immensely the way in which development policies are implemented in the public sector”.

Other most manifest forms of Ghanaian culture that have contributed to the difficulties in policy implementation include,

“overt and covert resistance to change, at both the individual and institutional levels and preferences for silence and acquiescence for fear of treading on influential and *sensitive toes*. Another is the obsession of hierarchy which is a significant aspect of the Ghanaian culture that has had negative consequences on policy implementation. Somebody is a Chief Director or a Permanent Secretary in an institution and it is not very easy to get close to him because he has gone through a system and it has taken him all these years so he must be respected and recognised”.

This practice militates against team building and consultative processes that are necessary pre-requisites for policy implementation. These Ghanaian cultural practices have debilitating impact on Ghana’s development process because culture is a major determinant of a nation’s values, which also determines to a large extent institutional efficiency. This suggests that there is a strong correlation between culture and policy implementation and consequently the development process. These cultural problems need to be eliminated in order to make institutions efficient.

5.5 Challenges of the Vision 2020 Implementation

The data have shown that the successful implementation of Ghana-Vision 2020 is a serious challenge to Ghana’s public sector. According to the documentary data, (see GoG, 1997), the process requires efficiency and professionalism in the performance of PSIs at:

- a. maintaining macroeconomic stability and accelerated growth,
- b. making the policy process effective,

⁴¹ *Ghanaians normally refer to public sector jobs as “government work”.*


- c. maximising the use of available resources for effective implementation of the various Vision 2020 programmes, and
- d. creating a conducive environment for the active participation of the private sector and the entire citizenry of Ghana in the development process.

These challenges call for improvements in the performance of the PAS to enable it to better manage the policy process. These needed improvements will require radical departure from previous methods and attitudes that underpinned the formulation and implementation of past development policies. To a great extent, a close co-ordination among the various agencies, a working partnership between the public and private sectors, the full co-operation and active participation of the people, and effective mobilisation of all available resources will all be necessary conditions for the successful implementation of the policy.

As the data have shown, PSIs in Ghana are faced with a catalogue of structural, human resource, and governance problems. These include poor management, lack of resource, inadequate consultative processes among institutions which is more profound between the two front-line institutions in the development management system - the NDPC and the MoF. Hence the PAS is weak and there is widespread lack of clear objectives at agency levels and weak leadership at management level.

Moreover, poor conditions of service including low remuneration and inadequate office facilities have created low morale and disincentives in the PAS that have resulted in the loss of managerial and professional expertise to the private sector and foreign countries.

Figure 5-1
Linking Vision 2020 Administration Reform to the NIRP



Source: Government of Ghana (1994b)

On the other hand, those who have remained in the PAS have been forced by the frustrations created by these conditions to engage in certain bureaucratic acts which are generally unresponsive to the policy process and especially to the requirements for implementing the Vision 2020. For the new development management system to be effective and efficient, there must be radical changes to the institutional structures and the human resource requirements for the development policy process. This is made urgent by Powelson's (1972: 196) observation that the lack of greater administrative efficiency is a recipe for under-development.

These challenges discussed above provide the rationale for NIRP which is seeking to re-structure the administrative machinery for policy analysis in public institutions in Ghana (see figure 5.1 above for a graphical presentation of the linkage between the Vision 2020 and the NIRP).

Implementation of the Institutional Development Programme

6.1. Introduction

Chapter 5 has shown that Ghana's PAS has low policy implementation capacity to sustain the country's development. The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat revealed that

“some improvements were made in policy implementation performance in 1983 when the ERP began but the 1990s saw general erosion in implementation performance. Attempts were made in the early 1990s to strengthen performance capacity through various reform programmes such as the CSRP but these were mainly ad hoc and non-comprehensive in nature. Consequently, these attempts did not achieve the desired results of a significant build-up of implementation capacity in the public service”.

But it is significant to point out that the challenge of carrying out the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation activities in the context of weak institutions will be complex and very frustrating (see Winkler, 1996: 3). Consequently, Baum and Tolbert (1984: 499) have argued that under such conditions, it is important to develop strong institutions as a major tool for efficient policy implementation. They add that, it is important to safeguard the hard-won national resources that are committed to the process. Hence, the GoG has embarked on the NIRP to reform PSIs and to build a significant policy implementation capacity to achieve the objectives of Ghana-Vision 2020. This constitutes the subject of this chapter and it addresses the second part of the research question regarding the utility of policy intervention measures to the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation. This is restated as, *"Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national development?"*

The chapter is divided into six sections that cover the dynamics of the NIRP. Section one is the introduction while section two discusses the changes sought under the NIRP. Section three examines the NIRP component programmes whereas section four looks at the NIRP's intended outcomes. Section five examines the dynamics of the NIRP implementation process, and section six is a summary of the discussions made in the chapter. Thus, the chapter analyses the NIRP implementation process and attempts to measure the extent to which the reform policy will build public sector capacity to achieve the objectives of Ghana-Vision 2020.

6.2 Change and the ID Policy

This section explores the changes being sought under the NIRP to remove the constraints to Ghana's development as the research question argues above. The documentary sources (see Ghana, 1994a) revealed that the GoG recognizes the public sector responsibility to formulate and implement sound development policies to achieve accelerated growth and equitable social development. The GoG is therefore seeking to "restructure PSIs to build their policy analysis capacity and to function effectively through maximizing the use of available resources for policy implementation" in the development management process.

This expectation of Ghana's PAS constitute the essence of the NIRP which is a public sector performance improvement programme. The programme is comprehensive and it involves institutions, agencies and departments in the public sector. The interview at the NIRP Secretariat and the documentary sources (see Ghana, 1994a) show that the programme is seeking to, "build a proactive and motivated public service that is capable of contributing to the attainment of Ghana's development objectives". The programme thus seeks to

"build a public service that is result oriented and sensitive to the private sector as a customer and partner in development. This is a strategic mission for the public service and it emphasizes the role of public sector as a facilitator of equitable development".

The interview revealed that this mission would “establish a balance between the private and public sectors to provide the needed catalyst to achieve the objectives of the development challenges and opportunities envisaged in Ghana-Vision 2020”. Thus, “the NIRP involves change in the microstructure of institutional life”. This kind of change is described by Parsons (1995) as involving change in the way institutions conduct their affairs and interact with one another, and change in their motivation for acting the way they do, which is often influenced by power and interests to gain or avoid influence and control. This kind of change underpins Hargrove’s (1975:69) argument that “implementation is a political process in which individuals and groups vie for control or defense against programmes”

6.2.1 Goal Setting for the NIRP

Pressman et. al. (1973: xv) have said that implementation is the “process of interaction between the setting of goals and the actions geared to achieving them”. This means that the implementation process involves goal setting towards which implementation is directed. This perspective argues further that in the implementation process, there is a starting point that is where action begins, and an endpoint that is the stage where goals are judged to determine success or failure. The documentary source (see NIRP, 1995a; 1995b; and 1995c) and the interview at the NIRP Secretariat reveal that the goals of the NIRP are to:

- a. “develop the practice of formulating and distinguishing between short-, medium- and long-term planning and policy goals in public institutions”,
- b. “develop strategies for harnessing public sector support to accelerate private sector development and growth”,
- c. “formulate better public sector good governance and management framework to make the public sector more strategically focused, business-like and accountable”,

- d. “develop a human resource management framework and manpower strategy for enhancing public sector performance in achieving current national policy goals”,
- e. “strengthen the government decisions-making and implementation mechanism”,
- f. “formulate an appropriate public sector fiscal framework that does not crowd out private savings and investments”, and
- g. “establish an appropriate framework for technical cooperation policy and programme to support public sector restructuring and capacity development”.

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; 1995b; and 1995c) show that under these goals, NIRP has developed strategies to address such public sector management issues as:

- a. “the vision, mandate, division of work and linkages between public and private sectors”,
- b. “the policy formulation and decision making process”,
- c. “the public budgeting and financial management system, institutional arrangements for ensuring macro economic stability and effective and efficient public resource allocation”,
- d. “public sector human resource management. The programme puts emphasis on the capacity to motivate and enhance public sector performance in policy analysis”, and
- e. “viability of the existing constitutional framework for ensuring accountability and good governance in the public sector”.

These strategies are designed to facilitate the achievement of the objectives and targets of Ghana Vision 2020, and these have been translated into four major projects. These projects are:

a. Structural Transformation

This section addresses the part of the research question that assigns part of the causes of Ghana’s development problems to *structural inefficiencies* (see 4.2). The interviews at the NIRP Secretariat and documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1998) indicate that under the structural transformation project, “the NIRP has determined that some PSIs will either be

closed down, merged and streamlined, constituted into the core civil service, or wholly commercialized". The programme has marked some other PSIs to be "wholly subsidized and given subvented agency status, franchised or contracted out. Thirdly, the project will

"re-classify and rationalize some subvented institutions to determine the advantages and disadvantages of transforming the residual Civil Service Departments and the subvented institutions into a single category of Executive Agency or Implementing Agency".

These transformed institutions "will enjoy the same levels of managerial freedom to enable them optimize implementation performance".

These documentary sources further reveal that, the NIRP is "reviewing the mandate of the civil service to determine the overall size and cost of the core civil service". The NIRP is also "reviewing the supporting structures, systems, processes, staff capacity, capacity development plans and the governance framework of public sector institutions". Other areas also being reviewed are "the current missions, mandates and institutional arrangements in the core public sector management agencies as well as the linkages among core agencies to make them strategically focused and performance oriented"⁴². The goal of this review exercise is to

"identify ways in which the roles and functions of these agencies will have to change in order to accommodate and respond to the development challenges of the country especially those presented by the Vision 2020".

The programme is also seeking to "build effective back-up management systems and services to enhance the implementation of development policies", and a corollary capacity to monitor and evaluate policy implementation. This aspect of NIRP's structural transformation is emphasised by the idea that ID programmes need to include making and enforcing rules and regulations that unambiguously delineate the responsibilities and functions for government bodies (see The South Commission, 1990: 117). The documentary source also points out for example that under the programme, "civil service

⁴² *These core agencies include the office of the Head of Civil Service, the Civil Service Council, the Public Services Commission, the Controller and Accountant-General's Department, and the Ministry of Finance.*

codes and regulations are being revised to ensure that public servants are aware of their duties and rights and also help to foster ethics that emphasize service to the citizenry and respect for the rule of law”.

The interview at the NIRP Secretariat reveals that a more vivid evidence of the restructuring exercise is found in “the re-allocation of public sector staff in the productive sectors of the economy”. NIRP has adopted a complimentary strategy to

“create jobs in the private and informal sectors. The National Board of Small Scale Industries (NBSSI), NGOs, Donor Agencies and the Metropolitan and District Assemblies have been requested by NIRP to assist in the re-allocation and employment generation process”.

The present writer believes that this strategy is a safety net to reduce or eliminate opposition from the affected public sector workers to the NIRP implementation. Without this project, the programme may prove difficult to implement due to this staff re-location and redundancies. These affected workers and their sympathizers will engage in manoeuvres to resist the implementation of this project. However, the decision to provide them with alternative employment will remove a lot of fears and anxiety in the affected workers. This will consequently reduce any threats of sabotage (see 3.3.4 especially Hogwood et. al. (1985) prescription for reducing the threats of resistance to policy implementation). Secondly, this public sector restructuring is important to the development process in the sense that it is designed to cut down on the sector’s recurrent expenditure and to re-channel the savings made to fund development policy implementation. Thirdly, the structural transformation process will enable PSIs to focus down on the role they are required to play in Ghana’s development process.

b. Transformation of the Governance Framework

The second element of the research question seek to explore the strategies being used by the NIRP to address the governance problems in PSIs in view of the fact that the existing governance framework has impacted negatively on Ghana’s development management

process. The current section addresses this question and states the strategy being used by NIRP to eliminate this problem.

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; 1996a) reveal that the NIRP is seeking “to build a strategically focused public sector policy making and implementation machinery linked to an efficient, responsible and accountable public sector management framework”.

To achieve this NIRP has

“undertaken an examination of existing structures, systems, processes and other existing institutional arrangements such as the adequacy of inter- and intra-institutional communication, work organisation, work flow patterns, office lay-out and administrative, operational and strategic rules and procedures”.

The goal of this exercise is to “remove the constraints on public service performance and to ensure timely implementation of policies and programmes”. The documentary sources reveal further that

“the NIRP is evolving a finance process to support policy implementation. The process outlines procedures for adequate costing of each component of the policy to be implemented, a realistic projection of available budgetary inputs in the short, medium and long-term and systems to eliminate waste, laxity and the lack of accountability”.

These value systems are necessary to sustain institutional effectiveness and Powelson (1972: 189) has shown that values are the foundations of institutions and for that matter institutions cannot survive without value support.

The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat shows that,

“under the new Civil Service Law (PNDCL 327) the role of ministries in the development management process is to formulate policies and monitor overall sector performance. The law also specifies that the role of the implementing agencies is to carry out the executive functions within the policy framework agreed with the respective ministry. That is, the ministries should focus on policy work and the agencies should focus on implementation of public policies. Section 13c of the Civil Service Law explicitly states that the functions of the Ministries are to monitor and evaluate performance of their sector. The NIRP process is therefore reviewing the existing arrangements to enable ministries fulfill their key function of managing and monitoring sector performance. The review therefore seeks to clarify the precise interpretation of section 13c of the Civil Service Law as presently it is unclear whether this applies only to implementing departments and agencies within the Civil Service or whether it covers subvented institutions because they also have implementation functions. The review exercise will also clarify the existing methods and systems by which Ministries monitor and evaluate the performance of departments and agencies. The process

will determine methods and systems for strengthening the existing monitoring arrangements by setting targets and measuring performance of implementing agencies against these targets and thirdly, the review will extend the monitoring process to cover the budget process and the training and skill mobilisation needs for these”.

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; and 1996a) further show that the NIRP is seeking to accomplish this public sector governance transformation along three distinct lines, but simultaneously for complementarity. The first is

“a system-wide enabling reforms in the provision of assets, authorities, staff and financial resources by the central public sector core management agencies particularly, the Public Services Commission, Office of the Head of Civil Service, the Ministry of Finance, and the Controller and Accountant General’s Department”.

The reform will ensure that “resources for policy implementation are provided to the implementing agencies who will be made accountable for them” but the terms for such provisions will have to be such that it “gives them adequate freedom and flexibility to use these resources efficiently”. Secondly, the interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that “the NIRP is undertaking a performance contracting and market testing types of reforms at the level of individual MDAs”. Under these types of reforms, “each ministry or agency has to be explicit about its mission regarding the development process, its proposed outputs, the resources needed to achieve these, accountability procedures, regulatory and monitoring systems”. Kaul (1997: 22) has observed three main benefits of market testing reforms. These include:

- i. obtaining quality service from a decision to either contract out a project or internally organise it,
- ii. cash savings and value for money services if won by an in-house bid and thus the process of competition that was created will lead to greater effectiveness, and
- iii. raising standards and better monitoring and evaluation processes.

Thirdly, the reforms will “develop procedures within each ministry and agency for the management and use of the key resources, namely assets, finances and staff”. This facet of the reforms will “set guidelines, rules and norms with which MDAs will have to comply”. For example the interview shows that, “the procedures for hiring or promoting staff, or

setting pay and incentive levels will be determined by centrally mandated rules and norms”. The application of these procedures will be worked out in detail by each MDA.

The interview with the NIRP Secretariat also reveals that the programme is establishing a framework for consensus building which will be the building blocks for achieving the above objectives. This will establish an effective and transparent policy process that is both responsive and sensitive to opposing views. This framework also reflects NIRP’s effort at building national consensus for sustainable development and growth. According to the interview at the NIRP Secretariat, this framework

“serves as a forum for policy dialogue as well as quick and effective consensus building process that is essential for successful policy implementation. It is also designed to harmonize the roles of politicians and technocrats in the management of Ghana’s development, strengthen overall public sector leadership and accountability, promote group cohesion and to focus on development policy implementation. The consensus building process will also provide the opportunity to develop appropriate structures by eliminating parts of the existing institutional processes that have become redundant as a result of the recent development policy focus, and open more channels of communication”⁴³.

The consensus-building framework will furthermore

“aid the search for adequate and equitable incentive packages and remuneration to attract and retain quality personnel in the public service....The framework will also define the role and mandates of decentralized agencies in policy implementation”.

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; and 1996a) show further that the NIRP is introducing new public sector budgeting and financial management practices. This exercise is intended to “provide understanding of the existing institutional arrangements for public financial management and find ways to make them more strategically focused, rational, transparent, accountable, cost effective and result oriented”. The programme also seeks to “revise the public sector decision making process. The reform in this area reinforces the fact that efficient functioning of the decision making process of the country

⁴³ *Currently, there are very little lines of communication between lower and top management, as well as poor linkages among institutions at the micro level and the central public sector management core agencies like the MoF, NDPC, PSC and the Office of the President. Effective communication systems and processes need to be developed to build consensus around a common vision and to increase participation and ownership.*

is an essential aspect of improving policy management”. This aspect of NIRP activities seeks “to analyse the way policy decisions are made in Ghana’s PSIs, their implementation and monitoring processes, and identifying opportunities for improvements”. The NIRP is making

“an assessment of the existing cabinet system for public sector decision making together with the role of the cabinet office and cabinet committees, other alternative channels of decision making, the extent to which the implementation of policy decisions are monitored”.

The documentary data show that the, “NIRP has embarked on a project to build public sector capacity to reinforce efficiency and effectiveness in implementation”. The methods adopted under the project to achieve this objective include “assessing the existing framework of checks and balances within the public sector for ensuring efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability in resource allocation and service delivery”. That is, as part of a framework for public sector good governance, “NIRP is erecting public sector management systems and efficient scrutiny processes to make possible the effective and accountable mobilisation and use of scarce national resources at the macro and micro levels of PAS”. Consequently, the data emphasise that “efficiency, transparency and accountability are three key tenets of the NIRP process and are undoubtedly important for public sector management and governance”⁴⁴.

The transformation of the public sector governance framework stresses the principles of division of labour. The exercise therefore has the potential of helping PSIs to focus down on their required role as well as eliminating the problems of participation, consultation and networking processes as discussed in chapter 5. Furthermore the exercise will “develop

⁴⁴ This statement was made by Professor J. E. A. Mills, vice-president of Ghana (in the former NDC government) in a keynote address at a Ministerial workshop on Public Financial Management Reforms on 29 August, 1997 at Accra and published in the September edition of PUFMARF News.

accountability systems and increase performance if successfully implemented". The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that

"public sector managers who are still perpetrating their old habits and are opposed to change because they feel threatened that the exercise will erode their power base may engage in various behaviours to sabotage the implementation of this exercise. Public sector managers are therefore a big threat to the implementation of the NIRP".

This threat is elucidated by the observation that when governance is associated with political conditionality, it is irresponsible and unacceptable (Lopez, 1994: 26). Bologun (1997: 79) has also stressed the need for a good governance approach to capacity building (see also Dia, 1993). This will require a radical overhaul of the machinery of government with special emphasis on measures to promote the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and towards the rehabilitation of executive, legislative and judicial institutions. Lisk (1996: 54) has also argued that building good governance capacity ensures stability.

c. Human Resource Development

The fourth elements of the research question states that human resource problems in Ghana have produced poor public sector capacity to manage development. The question therefore seeks to know how the NIRP intends to develop Ghana's human resource base to enhance the development process. The answers to this question are explored in this section.

The interview at the NIRP Secretariat reveals that "the NIRP has crafted a HRD plan for Ghana" which Mathur (1986: 103) see as important to the development process because variables such as funds, equipment and advanced technologies can seldom substitute skilled personnel (see also World Bank, 1980: 76). The HRD plan has identified the training needs of public sector workers. Paul (1983: 7) sees this as an important instrument of HRD and strategies for skills mobilisation.

“This project is intended to bridge the human resource capacity gap that has hampered the implementation and delivery of development policies. The plan includes an attitudinal programming that encompasses cultural re-shaping, communication abilities, cooperation and networking culture, team building and interactive leadership. It is also designed to instill in the public sector environment, the practice of developing shared vision among workers”.

The import of this HRD programme is emphasised by the World Bank’s (1995: 36) statement that, increasing the skills and capabilities of workers is key to economic success in an increasingly integrated and competitive global economy. This perspective sees the HRD programme as investing in people and this has an additional benefit of boosting the living standards of household by expanding opportunities, raising productivity, attracting capital investment and increasing the earning power of people.

The Human Resource Planning Project

According to the documentary data (see Kwabia Boateng, 1994), “the project is targeted at evolving the culture of human resource planning in PSIs”. The objective is “to provide capacity for public sector management to anticipate the human resource needs of their institutions”. Secondly, “the project seeks to promote qualitative and cost-effective use of human talents for higher productivity in PSIs”. The justification for the project is that PSIs need to perform efficiently in managing national development and this capability depends on the collective effort of all employees. Under the project, PSIs “will develop the capacity to hire specific and needed skills, provide these with good incentives, and to be able to respond appropriately to changing political environment”. The project is intended to “effectively utilize the country’s human talents to manage the development process, reduce waste and enhance policy implementation”. This project is underpinned by Boateng’s (1994: 6) remarks that human resources is an important and valuable asset to Ghana and that its value will depend largely upon proper education, training and effective utilization

and management of these. Winkler (1996: 5) has explained that the human resource programme is important to achieve sustainable development.

The data show that under the project, “Management Development Institutes (MDIs) are required to plan new HRD programmes by integrating human resource planning into existing management programmes”. MDIs are also required to “offer courses and programmes at regular intervals and to follow it up with consultancy work at individual institutional level”. The project is expected to “produce trained Managers and Chief Executives and will consequently result in efficient institutional performance”. The expected impact will include “well-structured cost-effective institutions, increased productivity, growth and expansion leading to more effective development management practices”. The interview at the MESW shows that “most PSIs are taking advantage of the project to correct the human resource lapses by training and re-training personnel in educational institutions abroad and in Ghana”.

Thus NIRP has acknowledge the human resource lapses in PSIs which has impeded development policy implementation in the past (as discussed in chapter 5), and the data has given evidence that the NIRP is determined to deal with the problem. However the present writer believes that as much as existing staff are being trained to acquire the necessary skills under the HRD scheme, it is equally important to revise the country’s educational curricular to reflect the human resource needs of the country. This will ensure that new entrants into the labour market already have the skills required by the nation to aid its development process. Boateng (1994: 1) has noted that HRD is critical for economic, social and political development of a country. He recognises also that a substantial part (about 50 - 70%) of economic growth of nations is due to improvement in the quality of human resources. The GoG (see Ghana, 1997: 62) has added to Boateng’s view by arguing that “development is essentially a human activity and in the final analysis, development is dependent on the quality of available human resources”. And Bologun (1997: 78) has

observed also that of all resources, that is, material, financial etc., the most crucial, which also moulds other resources is the human resource. Hence, the selection, development, deployment, motivation and management of this resource constitute vital components in the design and implementation of capacity building programmes.

e. Attitudinal Changes towards the Private Sector and Society

This section attempts to provide answers to the third research question that seeks to know the sort of enabling development environment that the NIRP seeks to establish for grass-root participation. The section reinforces Hogwood and Gunn's (1984) argument that to enhance policy implementation, human behaviour and attitudes must be influenced to conform to laid down procedures.

The interview with the NIRP reveals that, "the NIRP is mandated to build a public-private sector partnerships to facilitate national development". The programme is "drawing on best practice examples from other parts of the world like Malaysia, Singapore and Korea to assess potential and develop options for greater private sector participation in the hitherto solely publicly provided services". NIRP is seeking to achieve this through the "maintenance of a stable fiscal framework to promote national capacity development and utilization through boosting individual and private sector confidence, and creating opportunities for savings and investment". Secondly, and in line with the aim of promoting public-private sector linkage,

"NIRP has de-regulated current public sector management and operating culture, and has formulated two schemes to first exchange personnel between the two sectors and second, to involve the private sector in public sector manpower training and development".

In order to improve and sustain the confidence of the general public in the public sector,

"NIRP had developed good governance and client charters. The process clearly identifies key stakeholders and clients and it is seeking to institutionalize a two-way communication process to ensure their participation in key decisions and regular reporting of staff and management performance against the set key targets. The governance charters also covers inter- and intra-institutional relationships".

Kaul (1996: 135) has noted that the success of ID programmes is built on a foundation of attention to both the organisational and attitudinal dimension of public sector reforms. Kaul adds that, this must be linked to human resource management that consequently aims at encouraging and rewarding both team and individual performance. The data so far have shown that the magnitude of change sought under the NIRP is very extensive, but Nixon (1980) has warned that, “the greater the degree of change required in order to introduce a new policy, the greater the problems of implementation”. This view provides a useful guide for implementing agencies to strategically work hard at the ‘implementation estimates’ in order to avoid these ‘greater potential problems’. Consequently, Hargrove (1975: 4) has observed that if it is realised that it will be difficult to accomplish a policy, it is important to implement less of it. In such a circumstance, Hargrove advises that an estimate about implementation difficulties becomes necessary to shape the policy.

The NIRP objective is explained by the idea that without transforming PSIs, the development management process will experience policy failures, ineffective programmes and a deepening public disillusionment with the government (see Grindle and Thomas, 1991). It is important to also stress that the pace, scope and depths of the changes taking place in Ghana’s PSIs will require fundamental rethinking of the conceptual models or paradigms upon which public bureaucracies have been built in the past (see Thomas, 1996). Thomas takes a less optimistic perspective and argues that the changes sought under current ID efforts are products of:

- a. politics than management. These are popular models of organisational change derived from the experiences of small samples of private firms rather than the complications involved in managing change in the public sector, and
- b. the false notion that the fundamental organisational change is inherently uncertain, risky, and likely to create conflict (Thomas, 1996: 6).

Thomas is very skeptical about the real motives of current capacity building programmes.

6.3 The NIRP Component Programmes

This section explores the strategies being used by the NIRP to address the changes being sought after by the programme (discussed in 6.2) and in the way envisaged by the research question. Thus, the section explores the strategies being used by the NIRP to mitigate the lapses that have caused Ghana's under-development. The NIRP is divided into six sub-programmes to ensure public sector efficiency in policy implementation. Thus, these six component programmes have direct relevance for the Ghana-Vision 2020 administrative reforms. This composition of the NIRP reflects Lisk's (1996: 54) observation that the policy context for institutional capacity building should be multi-sectoral and flexible, but coherent in relation to the desired objectives of development. These six component programmes are:

6.3.1 The Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP)

The Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS) manages this sub-programme. The documentary sources (see Dodoo, 1997; 1998a) reveals that, "CSPIP has among other things been set up to diagnose MDAs' capacity for development management". The diagnostic process was intended "to provide support for the policy process in all MDAs". That is, the sub-programme seeks to "improve MDAs performance at policy formulation and implementation, service delivery, and strategic planning by eliminating all constraints and problems that impinges service delivery capacity".

According to these documentary sources, the CSPIP is targeted at all the constituent parts of the Civil Service namely, MDAs, Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs), and the District Assemblies (DAs). It is also targeted at those subvented organisations that come under the direct supervision of the sector ministries. CSPIP is seeking "to promote a new performance management culture that focuses on getting more outputs from the same

volume of inputs” (see 6.4 for a discussion on CSPIP’s outcomes). The documentary sources (see Dodoo, 1998a) and interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat reveal that the methods being used to achieve these objectives are:

- i. “training and manpower development especially in the area of core developmental and commercial management skills. CSPIP seeks to improve human resource management in the civil service through the introduction of performance appraisal schemes; development of good training policy; use and maintenance of the new personnel database; introduction of schemes for better management of existing and future (senior) staff; and improvement of the incentive structures”,
and
- ii. “the provision of attractive remuneration in the civil service. This will enable the civil service to retain and develop critical expertise in order to play its part in national development management. The remuneration policy has been linked to the size and productivity levels of the civil service⁴⁵. CSPIP will therefore seek to implement the Integrated Personnel Payroll Database (IPPD) project to remove all distortions on the payroll”.

These methods are underpinned by the idea that capacity building should be seen against the urgent need to staff the civil service with well-qualified personnel who can perform the tasks of the rank at which they are serving at any given moment in time (Mentz, 1997: 1). These emphasise the centrality of human beings in the capacity building process. The data shows that “in order to promote efficiency in the civil service, CSPIP is seeking to introduce a Records Management and Improvement Programme, and Public Complaint and Public Relations Units”. It will also revitalize the Research Unit and establish the Civil Service Reform Coordinating Unit. The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat and the documentary sources reveal that

“CSPIP is designing standards of service delivery in the civil service and it is hoped that these structures will sustain the standards. These standards will be described in client charters that will be published and used to monitor standards of services delivered to users”.

Consequently,

“CSPIP will ensure that all civil service institutions that deal directly with general public will produce brochures defining their standards of service delivery. These will also set out the procedures that the public should follow when using the services. This exercise will formalize service delivery standards and explain the client’s entitlement”.

⁴⁵ *The project on salary rationalization was contracted to Price Waterhouse Associates who produced the project report in February 2000. The public sector workers have since rejected the report for being inadequate and not reflecting the realities of the Ghanaian economy.*

Thus,

“civil service institutions will make full and accurate information readily available to all users. This must be in plain language regarding how services are run, what they cost, how well they perform and who is in charge. This exercise will improve communication between the civil service and the public. It will also build trust by explaining the procedures and time scale relating to delivery of services. The client charter will ensure that the public sector provides choice wherever practicable and there will be regular and systematic consultation with users of services. Their views about services, and their preferences for improving them will reflect the standards”.

Under the scheme,

“public servants will be expected to give courteous and helpful service. They will be expected to wear name badges. Services will be expected to be made available equally to all those who are entitled to them and provided in a way to suit their convenience....CSPIP hopes that this exercise will cause bureaucrats to re-examine their roles, work habits and attitudes”.

This has not been part of the management culture of the civil service before CSPIP (see also CSPIP, 1998; Dodoo, 1998). Secondly, the interviews show that

“CSPIP seeks to introduce well publicized and easy to use complaint procedures with an independent review process. The new civil service law has given a legal backing to this exercise. The Law requires a Public Complaint unit to be established to deal with complaints and improve communication and trust between the public and the civil service”.

The central unit of the Public Complaint Unit is in the OHCS and it is being developed into a proactive focal point for strengthening customer service throughout the Civil Service. According to the documentary sources (see Dodoo, 1998a), “CSPIP is consolidating and strengthening the OHCS through a re-structuring exercise”. The sub-programme is re-structuring the Policy Planning Management Division and the Management Services Division. CSPIP has also separated the Government Secretarial School from the OHCS and it is currently consolidating the outcome of the CSRP regarding salary administration⁴⁶.

The documentary sources further reveal that the programme seeks to “create a series of

⁴⁶ *The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) which spanned from 1987 to 1993 was undertaken as a component of the World Bank led Ghana's economic reforms. The objective of the programme was to improve resource management in the public sector. The CSRP made some significant successes at reforming the civil service but also created a lot of major problems for development policy implementation as the programme concentrated on strengthening the core civil service institutions and neglected the implementing agencies.*

small policy focused ministries through the PPMEDs, and to hive off from the Civil Service policy-implementing agencies”. “The hived off implementing agencies will be converted into centralized and decentralized subvented agencies under their ministries”.

The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat shows that as

“part of the NIRP re-structuring exercise, CSPIP has introduced performance indicators for chief directors in the civil service. The process seeks to make the chief directors individually accountable for the performance of their institutions. Chief directors will be empowered to appoint staff on the basis of merit, remunerate in accordance with the need to recruit and retain quality staff, promote discipline and dismiss in accordance with fair procedures. The President in consultation with the PSC and OHCS will make and confirm the appointment of the Chief Director. On appointment, the Chief Director is expected to draft a medium-term sector and annual business plan and budget within Cabinet approved sector MTEF for discussion and approval by the Minister. He will also develop an organisational structure and fill up senior management positions. He will be obliged to progressively advertise all remaining positions in the new organisational structure to enable all existing staff have an equal opportunity to apply. However, any staff who is unsuccessful in securing a position will be assisted to find alternative employment, to be retrained or to pay them compensation and severance”.

This re-structuring task of the CSPIP may be difficult to implement, as the reaction of civil service workers may tend to sabotage the implementation process. This may happen because as discussed in chapter three, policies such as these create fear and uncertainty about the future among workers regarding their livelihood. Hence this aspect of the programme must be managed strategically.

6.3.2 Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP)

PUFMARP is the second component programme of the NIRP and the MoF manages it. The sub-programme seeks to show the strategies being used by the NIRP to build accountability and transparent practices in PSIs, which is part of the governance problems present in Ghana’s development management process. This reflects item two of the list of research questions in 4.2. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995) indicate that the sub-programme emphasizes “the idea that the re-organisation of the structures and processes of the PAS cannot be divorced from the re-organization of public finances”. This is a “comprehensive package designed to solve the current problems in Ghana’s financial

management regime from their roots”. The programme is a product of “Ghana’s realization through in-house reviews that there is a problem with the country’s financial management practices”. The programme also emerged partly from “various piecemeal attempts in the past to resolve some of the problems affecting the efficient management of Ghana’s financial resources” (see PUFMARF, 1997a)⁴⁷. Thus, “PUFMARF is taking a holistic view of the public financial management bottlenecks identified in the Public Expenditure Reviews (PER) of 1993 and 1994” (see Appendix F for a functional view of Ghana’s Current Public Financial Management System).

The programme is divided into eight components to ensure that all key aspects of the financial system are taken care of. The core component is the Budgeting and Public Expenditure Management System (BPEMS) which aims at reforming:

i. The Budget Preparation Sub-system

According to the documentary sources (see PUFMARF, 1997, 1997a; and 1998a), the reform objective of this component is to “improve the planning and budgeting of public expenditures and thus strengthen fiscal policy formulation and implementation”. The sub-system therefore seeks to:

- a. “institute a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) as part of the normal budgetary process. MTEF will cover both the recurrent and the development budget”. This will complement the BPEMS system and would be fully integrated. Other elements of MTEF are “an aggregate three-year expenditure and revenue framework, the Medium-Term Expenditure programming at sectoral level and a rolling three-year Public Investment Programme”.

⁴⁷ Some of the earlier initiatives were: the Public Investment Programme (PIP) to deal with issues affecting the Capital Budgets; the Civil Service Reform Programme and later the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Project (IPPD) to deal with staff costs burden on the budget. Others were the Budget Improvement Working Group (BIWIG) to help implement the Broad-Based Budget Concept; and more recently, the Expenditure Tracking System (EXTRACON) to monitor expenditure in MDAs.

b. “improve the annual budget formulation”. The changes sought will include:

“preparation of a model budget circular indicating the possible expenditure ceilings within which MDA budgets have to be formulated, development of a software for the Budget Division that will facilitate budget preparation and the installation of this budget software in all MDAs, arrangements for the eventual electronic transmission of budget proposals from MDAs to the Budget Division of MoF, and programme for consolidation and preparation of draft budgets”.

The budget software would enable the “use of historical and baseline data for budgeting purposes, and to facilitate the interactive process for budget submission, consolidation, and revision”. The use of this software will further enable “the budget process to be tracked from initial proposal to parliamentary approval”. This will also be useful in producing master copies of the budget in a form suitable for presentation to Parliament. It will also “permit the development of rolling expenditure plans and provide programme profiles requiring special attention”. This system will be an integral part of the BPEMS.

c. “train a core group of budget and finance staff from the MoF, the NDPC, and the MDAs in the preparation of MTEF and annual budget, and using the information system for preparation of such budgets”.

These changes will result in “a proper budget preparation for development policy implementation through improved database and improved link-up between planning and budgetary outlays in a specified macroeconomic framework”. This will also lead to increased ownership and enhance accountability.

ii Budget Implementation Sub-System

The objectives of this sub-system according to the documentary sources (see PUFMARF, 1997; 1997a; and 1998a) are to ensure “an orderly and smooth implementation of the budget, while providing adequate flexibility to the MDAs to manage their development programmes and projects within the budget”. This will enable the MoF to oversee macroeconomic stabilization. This programme is designed “to promote a system of accounting that impact on the effective utilization of the financial resources” of the country,

“provide a window to the public to ascertain the financial status of government, and serve as a major instrument in the formulation and implementation of government policies”. That is, the sub-system seeks to “implant a modern accounting sub-system which classifies, records and analyses in a timely, reliable and standard manner all government financial transactions”. This sub-system will provide basic financial transaction data and reports to all other sub-systems” and will “form the core of the new financial management system”. Under this sub-system, PUFMARF will introduce a common General Ledger System, to enable the CAGD to consolidate Treasury Reports, revise the processes for preparing annual operating statements by the CAGD, and specify Accounting Standards for PSIs.

iii. Accounting

The documentary sources (see PUFMARF, 1997) reveal that the reform in the accounting system will seek to “link accounting with the payroll and pension systems and install an effective public payments system”. Under the programme, “MDA staff will be provided with training in the new accounting system”. Each MDA is required “to implement an effective financial management system for planning, allocation, utilization and accounting of resources”. It is envisaged that these will lead to a “changed and complete base for public accounts, and a complete, timely and reliable financial information to assist MDAs in their policy implementation activities”. The sub-programme is also designed to “facilitate the proposed devolution of financial responsibility to sector MDAs and MMDAs”. The remaining components of the sub-programme are described as satellite sub-systems.

Satellite sub-systems

The documentary sources (see PUFMARF, 1997; 1997a; and 1998a) show that the satellite sub-systems include:

i. Revenue Management

This sub-system seeks to “promote systems of tax administration in order to achieve greater taxpayer compliance and convenience”. It is also intended “to increase the efficiency of revenue collection, reporting and forecasting”.

ii. Cash Management

This sub-system is designed “to achieve an efficient provision of the cash resources of the Government while voiding the immobilization of resources and minimizing the cost of borrowing”. This will be achieved through “the introduction of a modern cash management system that will estimate, project, monitor, and manage revenue inflows and expenditure outflows”.

iii. Aid and Debt Management

The documentary sources (see PUFMARF, 1997) reveal that the sub-system seeks to “strengthen the management of the acquisition, and servicing, of public debt”. The changes being made to this area include:

- a. “the integration of the external debt database between the Aid and Debt Management Unit (ADMU) of the MoF, the BoG, and the CAGD so as to provide a single complete status of Ghana’s external debt, and the full operationalization of an Aid Management Information System” (AMIS),
- b. the integration of information on technical cooperation, currently incorporated in the system of the National Technical Cooperation Assistance Programme (NaTCAP) with AMIS⁴⁸,
- c. the strengthening of ADMU as the focal point for external debt data, and

⁴⁸ *The responsibility for NaTCAP has been transferred to ADMU from the NaTCAP Secretariat.*

- d. the training of staff from the ADMU in areas such as debt portfolio analysis, negotiation skills, international finance, budgeting, and information technology related to their work.

iv. Procurement

According to the data (see PUFMARP 1997), the objective of this sub-programme is to “streamline the procurement of goods and services, and establish an effective monitoring and tracking system”. The project is reviewing “public procurement practices in Ghana with a view to formulating a national procurement code and establishing mechanisms for monitoring compliance with the code”. The exercise will specify and adhere to “competitive tendering and contracting procedures that will include the standardization of procurement across MDAs”. Secondly a database on the cost of procured items will be built.

v. Audit

The data (see PUFMARP, 1997 and 1997a) shows that the objective of this component is “to promote the timely and effective audit of transactions to ensure that resources are being used for the specified purposes”. The project seeks to introduce in external audit, “the development of national audit standards, specifications for audit reports, introduction of some value for money audit, on-line access to the budget implementation reports, logistical support, and training”. Under internal audit, the project seeks to “introduce effective internal audit, internal audit reporting, and institutional arrangement for internal audit”. The interview at the PUFMARP Secretariat shows that “audit practices are not strictly observed in the public sector”. The project will therefore

“set reporting requirements on internal audit, develop national audit standards, introduce specifications for audit reports, set the criteria for audit staff performance evaluation, performance development and formal training for staff”.

This strategy is intended to create a cadre of professional auditors. The data shows that the

“outcome of this strategy will be an audit service capable of performing reliable financial audits; implementation of procedures and sanctions when problems are identified in audit reports; internal audits being performed continually to provide feedback to the heads of MDAs for more effective management”.

Ancillary sub-systems

The documentary sources (see PUFMARF, 1997; 1997a; and 1998a) show that there are ancillary projects under the sub-programme, and these include:

i. Fiscal Decentralization

The data reveals that the fiscal decentralization sub-system is meant “to support national development by providing the government with the instrument required for a decentralized, effective and efficient financial management system which will allocate and manage financial resources at the district level efficiently”. That is under the sub-system, PUFMARF has responsibility to “strengthen operational management at the DAs, create a stronger accountability culture to inform institutions and individuals about what is being spent, how quickly, and for what”. It is envisaged that these activities will lead to a

“strengthened local financial management system, the provision of key tools to enforce the spending disciplines which helps to ensure macro-economic stability, enhanced central control and audit role at all levels of public sector, and greater accountability at the regional and district levels”.

ii. Changes to the Legislative and Regulatory Framework

According to the documentary sources (see PUFMARF, 1997), this change intends to “provide an adequate legal framework for public financial management”. It seeks to introduce transparency and accountability in the financial management process. The hitherto “existing legislative and legal framework has been rendered inadequate and obsolete by the changes in political and institutional arrangements in Ghana” that is, the transition from a military dictatorship to a civilian administration. Besides, “the legal system is inconsistent and contradictory”. The sub-programme is therefore to “review the current legislative framework and develop new financial rules and regulations”. The thrust of the changes in legislative and regulatory framework for financial management is that

“compliance with the new financial laws should lead to greater efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in the public administration system of the country”⁴⁹.

The evidence from Ghana’s past public financial management regime raise doubts about the usefulness of financial laws as a stand-alone remedy because the old system also had laws governing it but the system failed to produce good management. The present writer believes that perhaps what is needed also are strategies for negotiation in order to secure compliance. The Ghanaian experience suggests that financial laws may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for achieving efficiency transparency and accountability in the PAS. White’s (1995: 99) idea on making the legal system relevant for the development management process is useful to this discussion. White argues that the effectiveness of committing resources to the development process depends greatly on a set of rules. He believes that for this legal system to be effective, the rules must be known in advance, they must actually be in force, there should be mechanisms to ensure enforcement, conflict resolution should be carried out through the decision of an independent judicial body, and procedures should exist to amend the rules when they no longer serve their purpose. These may be useful strategies to make the new financial regulatory framework under the Vision 2020 effective. They may also be useful tools to eliminate the corrupt and non-transparent practices in Ghana’s PAS.

iii. Human Resource Development

The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997; 1998a) show that the design of PUFMARP strongly emphasizes HRD. The programme seeks to “provide public sector workers with opportunities for the transfer and acquisition of new skills and to contribute to

⁴⁹ *This opinion was expressed in a statement by Dr. R. Dodoo, Head of the Civil Service in an opening address of a Workshop on Financial Management at Accra on 20 October, 1997 and carried by the November 1997 edition of PUFMARP News.*

the national capacity for trained financial managers in government". The training programme under PUFMARP is divided into seven categories. These are:

- a. "specific training to key Government staff in the principles, concepts, and methodologies for the subject areas covered by the project components",
- b. "training related to the operational work of public sector staff",
- c. "general training to the personnel in the financial management chain related to aspects of financial management such as accounting, budgeting, policy making, taxation, etc."
- d. "general training to public sector financial management staff in standard computer software packages",
- e. "training to senior-level management and policy makers in the use of computer-based financial management information systems",
- f. "end-user training in the use of the computer-based financial management information systems", and
- g. "technical training to GoG system analysts and programmers in the use of the specific tools to be employed for developing and implementing the information systems under PUFMARP"⁵⁰.

According to the data,

"the project is providing these training needs in the context of an overall training strategy primarily using domestic resources and facilities. External training is limited to only those skills relevant to the success of the project but which cannot be obtained locally. Most of the foreign training are used to train local trainers".

This is intended to make the project self-sustaining and continuous.

"The project also permits a limited number of structured study tours abroad for key staff involved in the implementation of the project to learn from what other countries have done in modernizing their financial management systems. The training is based on separate training need assessments for each agency".

⁵⁰The software being used for the training programmes include RDBMS, UNIX operating system, etc.

The training need assessment process begins “with identifying the current capabilities of individual agencies, their shortfalls and the areas required for training, as well as the mechanisms for providing it”. The assessment process also takes into account the existing training facilities in these agencies and in the public sector generally.

iv. Manual Development

The interviews at the PUFMARF Secretariat and the documentary sources (see PUFMARF, 1997) show that PUFMARF is developing operating manuals to provide operational guidelines for the convenience of public servants. This is intended to help manage the government financial system because the current crisis in financial management has developed due to the lack of operating manuals on financial management processes with particular reference to budgeting and accounting. These manuals cover budget, accounting, and computer systems. This will also provide a standard reference for operations and training.

v. Information Technology Strategy

The documentary source (see PUFMARF, 1997) reveals that, “the information technology strategy seeks to develop a strategic plan for the use of computer based financial management system in all MDAs”. The data show that currently, “there is lack of skilled information technology staff across public institutions whereas there is a high turnover rate among data processing class”. There is also “a lack of adequate, timely and accurate data which is shared by all users”.

The goal of the exercise is to “ensure the availability of timely and accurate financial management information on *need-to-know* basis in the public sector, and the production of timely financial reports by PSIs to support development programmes”. PUFMARF is seeking to “institute an integrated data-sharing information system driven on an open system type of client-server information technology”. This will “provide the sector

ministries with adequate information to implement their programmes effectively and supply needed information to central government”.

6.3.3 Decentralization

Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development manages the decentralization component of the NIRP. This component programme addresses part of the governance problems identified by the list of research questions detailed in 4.2. The sub-programme shows how the NIRP is seeking to correct the distortions caused by over-centralization in Ghana's PSIs. The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that the “aim is to decentralize various aspects of national life including development planning and administration, and policy analysis”. The decentralization process will ensure “mass participation in the development process and engender consensus on the values of Ghana's development”. Powelson (1972: 190) has noted that consensus building will lead to increased development because from empirical evidence, all modern societies that have achieved high rates of growth have ultimately had to use consensus institutions. Ghana's decentralization programme has been met with fierce resistance from some public officials because “they suspect that their power base is being eroded with the inception of the new development planning system”. The reactions from these senior public officials are a great threat to the implementation of this component programme in particular, and to the NIRP process in general. NIRP must therefore develop strategies like those suggested by Hogwood et. al. (1984) to reduce this resistance (see 3.3.4).

6.3.4 Public Sector Incomes Policy and Administration

The Public Services Commission (PSC) manages this component of the NIRP. The programme is a facet of the HRD strategies being used by the NIRP to correct the human resource problems in PSIs. These problems are identified by item four on the list of research questions. The interviews at the NIRP Secretariat shows that “this is NIRP's

strategy towards the development of an appropriate human resource base to support the development process”, that is Vision 2020 implementation. The interviews revealed further that,

“the mission and vision statements of these reforms indicate that public sector employees in Ghana will be paid equitable salaries and wages in relation to their performance, equitable in relation to their colleagues in the private sector, and in relation to what the nation can afford”.

Hence in February 2000, the sub-programme produced a report on ‘public sector wages and salary structure’ that describes public servants salary scales. The report seeks to correct public sector pay disparities.

“This initially meant placing public sector workers on a universal salary structure in the year 2000. Thereafter, the universal structure will be reviewed and the structure will be changed and classified on the basis of the sector or job. In some cases, the classification will be made on the basis of individual institution's functions and will reflect productivity and market forces. Public servants will expect to have their performance appraised annually and the outcome of that appraisal to determine further pay progression”.

An attempt was made to implement the first phase of this project in February 2000 in a report produced by Price Waterhouse Associates. However, public sector workers have rejected the project because they see the report as unfavourable. In an informal discussion with three public sector employees, it was revealed that they are not even aware of the second phase which seek to correct the pay disparities. This is evidence that communication in the NIRP implementation has not been very effective.

According to the interview at the NIRP Secretariat, this public sector income reform is designed to

“reduce the gap in public sector and private sector salary schemes over the next ten years. The scheme will use a formula that is based on productivity and growth in the economy, performance improvement in the public sector and increases in domestic revenue”.

This income reform will “enable the public sector to retain its competent staff against losing them to the private sector”. In pursuance of this reform

“a management board has been set up with responsibility for the central management, coordination and implementation of all public financial, personnel and administrative

matters including salary administration and negotiations.... The income policy will have an overall effect of ensuring the effective delivery and implementation of government's policy initiatives and programme across the public sector in a structured and consistent manner".

The present writer believes that the achievement of this objective will depend on a properly thought out strategy to correct and avoid mistakes such as the lack of communication that associated the first phase. The public sector incomes administration reforms emphasise the concern for social justice that has been argued by the South Commission (1990: 80) to be an integral part of genuine development. According to the South Commission's argument, a fairer distribution of income is essential as a means of speeding up development and making it sustainable.

6.3.5 The Policy and Cabinet Process Reforms

This sub-programme is managed directly by NIRP and it underpins the emerging corporate structure and culture of the public sector. This sub-programme explores the managerial problems in the policy process as indicated by question (iv) on the list of research questions in 4.2, and it shows how the NIRP intends to correct the lapses associated with development policy. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; 1995c; and 1997c) reveal that the programme seeks "to simplify Cabinet committee structures and strengthen the cabinet secretariat by establishing a Policy Management Group" (PMG). The sub-programme will also "create an effective linkage between the PMG, the sector ministries PPMEDs and the NDPC". The sub-programme is also "building a strong and effective operational linkage between the policy process and the MTEF, and introducing a new format to coordinate policy decisions across the public sector". It is also building capacity for the policy process that encompasses "policy formulation, implementation, performance monitoring and evaluation, and incentive support programmes". In view of these objectives, NIRP is institutionalizing "a policy formulation and coordination programme that is aimed at securing coordination in the policy process". This policy formulation and

coordination programme seeks to “develop the practice of linking cabinet decisions to the resource allocation process”. This will ensure coherence in the process.

This sub-programme is underpinned by the prerequisites for building public sector leadership capacity which involves:

- a. “the establishment of a coherent government policy decision-making system to implement the mandate of government”,
- b. “the establishment of a coordinated management framework for ensuring an integrative and coherent approach to implementing the on-going public sector reform initiatives”, and
- c. “endorsing capacity benchmarks for monitoring and accountability to guide the performance of the public sector”.

The present writer believes that the above will require the establishment of an effective framework to bring together, streamline and modernize the current arrangements for implementation.

6.3.6 Legal Sector Reforms

This sub-programme addresses the problems in the legal framework as part of public sector governance problems that is identified by question two on the list of research questions (see 4.2). The section shows how the NIRP is seeking to build an effective legal base to support the development process in Ghana. The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General’s Department manages the legal reform. According to the documentary sources (see CHRAJ, 1996; 1998, and NIRP, 1995c; 1996a; 1997d), the legal reforms are “a response to the Ghana Government-World Bank Private Sector Development Project”. The data shows that this “came out of the concern of the private sector for support from the legal sector in its efforts to propel development”. It was realised that “unless the legal sector becomes responsive to private sector needs, the sector’s endeavours would be hampered and the

sector itself will not grow”. The broader objective of the Legal Sector Reform Programme however is to “consolidate the objectives and gains of the on-going public sector reform initiatives”. This reform seeks to “create the incentive and an enabling environment for the effective sharing of public governance and administrative authority between the centre and districts”. The data shows that “this will lead to a reduction of public sector participation in the delivery of service that could be properly provided by the private sector”.

The interview at the NDPC reveals that

“the legal sector reviews and modernization plans are critical strategies to enable the sector ministries, decentralized and centralized departments and agencies and the private sector to respond positively to implementation of their respective mandates”.

That is, “the legal reform is aimed at improving the overall public sector governance conditions”, and that includes the: incentives in the present budgetary system; financial management; procurement and contract management; operations of Cabinet decision-making process; civil service recruitment process; decentralization-centralization balance; and formal and informal rules for the public sector and how they relate to each other and to development policy implementation (see NIRP, 1997d). The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995c; 1996a; and 1997d) reveal that


“these changes will ensure that the aggregate internal systems, structures and process of the PAS are coherent, ensure the existence of an enabling environment in public sector performance and the creation of an enabling environment within the economy as a whole”.

Paltrel (1989) has argued that the rule of law which may be defined as “the subordination of the behaviour of state officials to rational, predictable and publicly recognised procedures” is also an essential precondition for accountability and predictability as discussed in chapter two under the national integrity system. It is important to emphasize that these changes that are sought under NIRP will require new grounds for direction, coherence, coordination, control, motivation and improved performance. Consequently, the magic elixir to cure these problems may be the creation of new public sector culture (see Thomas, 1996: 18) and a new *esprit de corps*.

6.4 Philosophy of the NIRP

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1997a) show that the underlining assumption of the NIRP is that “Ghana’s public administration system runs on rules and resources”. The problems of the public administration system, and the NIRP’s efforts to resolve them can therefore be explained in terms of the human and financial resources that are committed to public agencies towards the performance of their work, and the ways in which agencies are required to use, report and account for those resources (rules).

Figure 6-1
Scope of the NIRP Process



Source: NIRP (1997a)

The chapter has so far illustrated that the various components of NIRP are all attacking these basic problems regarding rules and resources in Ghana’s public administration. Figure 6.1 above provide a framework for understanding the scope and linkages between the various sub-programmes (see table 6.1 for an elaborate description of the linkages between the various reform programmes).

The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that “the NIRP has both coordinating and direct responsibilities regarding the implementation of the component programmes”. This enjoins the NIRP to coordinate activities of the various public sector reform initiatives and it is also responsible for collating, analysing and disseminating information to all key players of the various reform initiatives. Secondly, NIRP has “direct responsibility for improving the central mechanisms for policy formulation and linking the policy process to MTEF”. It also has “direct responsibility for improving the governance situation and operational efficiency of PSIs”.

6.5 The Institutional Renewal Policy Outcomes

This section describes what the NIRP envisages to be the outcome of the problems it intends to eliminate as identified by the list of research questions. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; 1995b) reveals that, “the NIRP intends to strengthen the development management process in Ghana”. The programme has “maintained focus on improving development policy analysis capacities in key PSIs so as to achieve Ghana’s development objectives”. This includes “building the capacity for public sector management to collaborate their activities for better implementation of development policies. Through these efforts, the NIRP hopes to

“turn Ghana’s public service into a productive and motivated establishment capable of contributing towards the attainment of broad development policy objectives (through good governance) in private sector development, and accelerated but equitable social and economic development”.

According to Baum and Tolbert (1984: 499), this ID effort is an investment that transcends the efficient execution of just one policy, and in fact it may have serious repercussions beyond the policy implementation. NIRP therefore hopes to “progressively bring about a fundamental and strategic change in the Ghanaian Public Service by re-orienting its current practices and mind-set from the vestiges of regulatory management to developmental and promotional ones”. From the programme’s perspective, “this is the key to building

capacity for achieving national development targets and goals”. Thus, the overall purpose of NIRP is to enable PSIs:

- a. “observe good governance practices”. This means that NIRP is “building processes into public sector practices to ensure that institutions discharge their functions in a transparent, competent, accountable and cost-effective way”. NIRP is also

“introducing good governance practices in the national policy process by improving public sector capacity to set institutional goals in relation to national priorities, set specific policy objectives, set outcomes and targets to be achieved by institutions, establish transparent procedures and processes, establish accountability mechanisms in the policy process, and align resource generation procedures with capacity to obtain results...Good governance practices will contribute positively towards the creation of an enabling environment for accelerated growth and equitable social development”.
- b. “work towards achieving accelerated growth and equitable social development by raising GDP growth from 5% to between 8 to 10% per annum in the medium term”, and also “to provide support and incentives for the private sector to become an effective engine of growth”. This is intended to facilitate the systematic alleviation of poverty and raise living standards.
- c. “become a more compact public sector. This is aimed towards maintaining a sound public expenditure policy as part of overall budgetary reforms”⁵¹. Secondly, NIRP will “disengage the public sector from those activities that can be satisfactorily undertaken either by the private sector, through community self-help or the NGO’s”.
- d. “attain enhanced public-private sector partnership to provide the enabling platform for effective interface of the public and private sector in the development of the national economy”.

In order to achieve the above outcomes, the documentary data (see NIRP, 1995a; 1995b) show that, the NIRP is using a strategy that seeks to:

⁵¹ *This reform seeks to overturn the current practices where large wages and salaries causes huge budget deficit.*

- a. “explain and communicate to all PSIs the importance which government attaches to the current policies for accelerated economic growth and social development”,
- b. “assist the various PSIs to review their missions and objectives, policies, programmes, targets, inputs and outputs relationships to ensure that they are relevant to, and consistent with, the national policy goals”,
- c. “assist PSIs in strengthening their existing arrangements for monitoring the policy implementation processes”, and
- d. “assist these PSIs to make productivity gains by achieving more with fewer resources, through the introduction of market testing and the creation of executive agencies”.

NIRP is using these strategies to achieve the programmes intended outcomes through its component programmes:

a. CSPIP

The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat show that “CSPIP is seeking to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the development policy process through institutional capacity strengthening in all MDAs, RCAs, and DAs”. It also seeks to “institute a good governance culture in all aspects of the organisation and management of the Civil Service”. The sub-programme intends to “rectify the shortcomings and the critical policy implementation gaps” (identified in chapter 5), and to “respond to the challenges of Vision 2020 through an urgent and critical review of available capacity in the civil service”. The process will require the civil service to:

- a. “develop and strengthen leadership at the management levels”,
- b. “promote inter-sectoral coordination of functions through helping civil servants, to view the public administration system in a holistic manner giving due recognition to the fact that the functions of the sectoral MDAs are only part of the overall responsibility of government”,

- c. “encourage civil servants to fully appreciate the importance of their role in policy analysis and in managing development, and to be more responsive to the public and particularly to the private sector in its new role as the engine of growth”, and
- d. “promote a critical review of available human capacity within each MDA and identify and eliminate the constraints to the effective utilization of such manpower”.

The interview indicated that, “it is hoped that at the end of this exercise, CSPIP will remove all the constraints on the civil service capacity for policy analysis”.

The documentary sources (see Dodoo, 1997; 1998a) also show that CSPIP seeks to encourage all civil service institutions to:

- a. “adopt transparent, competent, accountable and cost-effective best practices in service delivery”,
- b. “ensure judicious utilization and maintenance of assets and resources especially for policy implementation”,
- c. “improve responsiveness to the needs of clients, and private sector and contribute towards the national accelerated development efforts”,
- d. “evolve efficient, compact and well-managed institutions which will deliver “value for money” services”,
- e. “establish a culture of strategic planning, programming, target setting and performance measurement in civil service institutions”,
- f. “identify shortages of specific skills and develop the human resource capabilities”, and
- g. “motivate civil servants towards result result-oriented practices and performance, and justify the linkage with appropriate pay and incentive schemes”.

The data envisages that “these goals will lead the civil service to improve its performance capacity in the development process”.

b. PUFMARP

The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) show that PUFMARP seeks “to evolve adequate processes to enable PSIs manage public finance with maximum efficiency to enhance accountability and transparency in public financial management”. This will enable “government to maintain macro-economic balance to facilitate development policy implementation”. Besides, “BPEMS will enhance accountability in all segments of public financial management”. The programme also aims at “developing an integrated public financial management system in Ghana through a system of common, reliable and unified database to and from which all-financial data flows”. This system will be shared by all PSIs.

These documentary sources reveal further that PUFMARP is seeking to “ensure that PSIs comply with all laws and administrative regulations in their work”. This is intended to “improve the planning and budgeting in the development policy process and specifically to strengthen the nation’s capacity for policy implementation”. This strategy of improving the planning, budgeting and accounting processes is being implemented through the MTEF. PUFMARP also seeks to “integrate all donor-financed projects and programmes into the mainstream national projects and programmes”. This will make all such programmes an integral part of the national development programme – the Ghana-Vision 2020. PUFMARP is further seeking to “ensure that the expenditure profile for each MDA are prepared on the basis of objective programmes, under which forecasts are limited to existing national policies”. This outcome will “facilitate the allocation of limited resources to those priority sectors and programmes that are most likely to achieve the Vision 2020 development objectives”. In order to realise this outcome, the “MTEF will provide information and financial management resource that are required to improve the allocation of the nation’s scarce resources for policy implementation”.

The NIRP's intended outcomes, just like in any reform policy implementation process is susceptible to a variety of outcomes ranging from successful implementation through to failure (see Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Grindle and Thomas have argued that most cases of policy implementation lead to outcomes not intended by policy makers. These varied outcomes are products of implementation logic and are factored on the capacity of policy makers to understand the location, strength, stakes and strategies of attempts by those affected by the policy to promote, alter or reverse the reform policy⁵². Grindle and Thomas (1991) have argued that the complexity and demands of the implementation process affect the performance of implementers and for that matter are a great determinant of the outcome of the implementation effort. Already, the interview at the PUFMARP Secretariat shows that public sector workers have rejected the incomes policy reforms. This is an indication that public sector workers are reacting to the ID process in numerous ways and these reactions are likely to generate outcomes that differ from those discussed above. The present writer is of the view that in order for the NIRP to achieve its intended outcomes, it is imperative to intensify strategies to secure consensus on the programme and thereby to contain the reaction of public sector workers who are most affected by the reforms.

6.6 Methodology for the ID Policy Formulation

Hogwood et. al. (1984) have argued that one of the conditions for making policy implementation smooth and reducing implementation risks is to consider the implementation process at the policy formulation stage especially since the outcome of the policy is dependent on its implementation. He stresses that policy formulation and implementation are interdependent and to ensure proper implementation, policy makers must be involved and interested in the implementation process. Thus the methodology

⁵² *Implementation logic is the strategies and tactics for the process, mechanisms for delays as a decision parameter, motives of individual implementing agencies, and coalition building to fix the outcome.*

for formulating any policy is also a great determinant of the success or otherwise of its implementation. PUFMARP (1997: 2) has also added that the critical success factor in this implementation process is the way human and organisational issues are planned and interconnected. This section therefore examines the NIRP policy formulation methodology to ascertain whether the policy formulation process has any impact whatsoever on the NIRP implementation. This section explores the correlation between the NIRP's strategies to eliminate the problems identified in the list of research questions, and what the real outcomes are likely to be. This is important in view of the fact that the NIRP is an on-going process for which reason the implementation outcome cannot be currently assessed, it is useful to analyse the methodology in order to make some predictions about the possible implementation outcomes. The human-organisational interconnectedness will be a useful benchmark for making such projections. The framework for the NIRP methodology impinges on consultative and participatory processes through meetings, workshops and surveys.

6.6.1 Consultative Processes in the NIRP Formulation

The interviews at the NIRP Secretariat revealed that as part of the methodology for designing the ID policy,

“NIRP involved the core public sector management teams and provided them with financial and technical assistance to discuss, review and develop a common strategy to address the current public sector orientation which is anything but enabling”.

The data show that “the review process encompassed public sector top to bottom management diagnosis” that dealt with:

- a. the governance and management framework for public sector institutions,
- b. the framework for decentralization of management to lower staff, and

- c. current best practices to assist with the development of appropriate supporting structures, systems, processes, staff capacity development requirements and governance in PSIs.

The diagnostic process also encompassed the “current public sector budgeting and financial management system and it was intended to design and implement an appropriate medium-term financial strategy and budgetary system” that:

- a. sustains fiscal discipline,
- b. enhance public sector priority setting,
- c. ensures technical efficiency in achieving programmes outputs and outcomes at the agency service delivery level, and
- d. generates transparent and timely performance based financial and accounting reporting to Cabinet, Parliament, the business community and the general public.

Moreover the data shows that, “the public sector decision-making process that involves analysing the way in which policy decisions are currently made and the processes for coordinating and monitoring their implementation was diagnosed and opportunities for improvements were identified” (see Appendix C for the model of the diagnostic process).

The interviews show that this consultative process “is a strategy that was designed to secure considerable participation and consensus building by all stakeholders of the NIRP, and also to engender their ownership of the programme”. This interview at the NIRP Secretariat revealed that,

“the consultative process started with an initial briefing sessions for the political and technical Heads of the PSIs. These sessions were led by an official from the office of the President and supported by the NIRP’s Technical Group. The subject for the briefing was the objectives of the programme, and propagation of related concepts and principles that sought to create a shared vision about the scope, size and expected performance of the public sector. Thereafter, the Heads of PSIs were assisted by the Technical Group to take their turn to brief their own management teams who consequently communicated the policy, concepts, and objectives of the programme down through their institutions. The

Technical Group also assisted the Heads of the PSIs to plan and organise a series of structured meetings and workshops for these institutions”.

This strategy is underpinned by Powelson’s (1972: 26, 143) idea that national consensus on economic and political ideology is a *sine qua non* for institutional effectiveness. This implies that the strategy pursued by the NIRP in the policy formulation is an important lever for building a consensus necessary to enhance the implementation of the programme. For example in conflict situations, it is the consensus mechanism that helps in resolving the conflict. Consequently, Powelson (1972: 180) has argued that without a consensus on a set of values, any conflict resolution will be ad hoc.

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995d; 1996c) reveal that during this consultation process, the NIRP also “served PSIs with a Self-Appraisal Instrument (SAI) to guide their capacity diagnosis and to develop teams to manage the diagnostic process”. This self-appraisal process was designed to open new horizons for PSIs to understand and address their management challenges towards the new public service paradigm envisaged by NIRP. NIRP used this SAI to assess and measure the level of preparedness of the PAS to respond to the demands of Ghana’s macro-economic and development policy goals. This helped determine the performance gaps and consequently aided the design of the performance improvement and restructuring plans of the NIRP. According to this data, the SAI process is categorised into:

- a. introductory in-house teamwork which consisted of a briefing session held for institutional heads, liaison officers and in-house CDTs to familiarize them with the SAI and to specify the team’s tasks.
- b. extended teamwork that reviewed extensively the building blocks of the NIRP (see Appendix C for details of these building blocks). This was preceded by briefing sessions and workshop where the issues, lessons and observations from the output of the introductory work were shared and discussed to enrich the team tasks.

- c. concluding in-house teamwork. This was a concluding briefing session of workshops organised for institutional heads and in-house teams to share the issues and lessons gathered from the extended teamwork. This explained and specified the team's tasks. These tasks involve the review of service-wide and governance issues, as well as integrating the various in-house tasks into a unified and coherent whole.

The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that,

“the data gathered from the SAI was fed into the briefing sessions and workshops and they have been used to model the appropriate type of public service capacity development and utilization programme. The basic features of this model are to make the public service mission-driven, market sensitive, transparent, accountable, compact and responsive to private sector growth and the development policy process”.

The interview also shows that,

“the latter stage of the SAI process sought to explain the new operating environment, *the rules of the game* in that environment, how PSIs relate to one another in that domain, and how the linkages influence the quantity and quality of the resources made available for policy implementation. It also addressed “issues of accountability to both external and internal stakeholders regarding the use of resources and inputs that will be made available to them for policy implementation. The final in-house team reported on what each PSI wants to achieve in terms of improved access to resources, and changes in internal processes and activities. This is categorised into short, medium and long-term perspective⁵³. The final in-house outputs were circulated to key stakeholders that is, key user groups, the sector ministries, the private sector, policy research institutes, donor and the NTG for study and comments. These outputs were revised and key contributions were incorporated. The revised output has been formulated into a short and medium term capacity enhancement and institutional strengthening plans”.

The documentary data (see NIRP, 1995d; 1996c) indicates that the SAI encompassed “a series of bottom-up capacity diagnosis and self-appraisal exercise at the micro public service institutional level and a macro top-down process”. The interface between the two

⁵³ *The short run represented what the PSI can achieve for itself just by managing itself more coherently in the light of the diagnosis just completed. The medium run reflects the opportunities for change which can be worked out by the PSI in conjunction with other players, that is, central agencies under existing “rules of the game”. The long run represents what might be done, if these rules changed. The long run options clearly lie outside the institution's power to achieve, but it offers a tentative diagnosis, which was looked at, and the issues raised were addressed under the macro review process organised by the NTG.*

processes is intended to produce a healthy interactive and integrative process so essential for sustainable policy process. To ensure this sustainability, the interview shows that the

“government has designed the NIRP to be a wholly *home-grown* and coordinated product built on lessons drawn from previous un-coordinated SAP related public sector reform attempts and recent capacity development initiatives”.

NIRP has also conducted a survey of beneficiaries of public sector services regarding their expectations of the public sector. This is intended to involve the entire civil society in the NIRP process.

The interview reveal that “the outcomes of these systemic reviews, the beneficiary surveys, and the diagnostic workshops have been analysed, coordinated and collated into an Interim Strategy Document” (ISD). As mentioned before, this served as inputs into joint workshops organised by the NTG and the core public sector management agencies to address the overreaching system-wide constraints to public sector performance and good governance⁵⁴. The ISD was introduced to assist the NTG to implement the NIRP policy goals. According to the documentary data (see NIRP, 1995d; 1996c) the main features of the ISD are the:

- a. sector’s mission statements and mandate(s),
- b. definition of component product and services, and the development of regulatory and incentive framework for the private sector involvement in the delivery of the products and services where appropriate,
- c. development of appropriate structures, systems, processes, organisational designs (including work flow patterns and open plans) and staffing arrangements in line with the sector’s collectively agreed mission or mandate,

⁵⁴ *The workshops assimilated the outputs from the National Capacity Development and Utilization workshops. Secondly, relevant ideas from the deliberations of the Private Sector Roundtable Group held specifically on the subject was incorporated.*

- d. identification of centrally managed administrative systems, rules and procedural constraints that need to be addresses to enhance the sector's operational and technical efficiency in product development and service delivery,
- e. the sector's medium-term financial plan,
- f. an appropriate sector performance management scheme and good governance policy framework that acknowledges management's accountability to clients and key stakeholders, that is the executive, parliament and the private sector,
- g. sector capacity development and expansion plans including skills inventory and mobilisation plan and the appropriate database for identifying and managing critical skills,
- h. short, medium and long-term programme costs to guide the rationalization of sector policy implementation by departments and agencies,
- i. performance improvement plans to manage the challenges of Ghana Vision 2020 policy objectives (see appendix D for a sample guideline of the performance improvement plans), and
- j. sectors' short, medium and long-term implementation plans, including benchmarks to measure and monitor performance and policy outcomes.

These consultative and participatory strategy used by the NIRP in formulating the institutional renewal policy are acknowledged by Subramian as a process that reduces the risk of start-up problems and of project implementation failures⁵⁵. Elmore (1978) has added that regardless of how well organised an agency may be, its ability to implement programmes successfully depends on its ability to influence other agencies at other levels

⁵⁵ This argument was made by Subramian of Price Waterhouse Associates in a presentation on "Change Management" at Accra in December 1996 and published in PUFMARP News on July 1997.

of government. Elmore's observation shows the importance of consultation in the policy implementation process.

6.6.2 CSPIP's Participatory Approach

According to the interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat, CSPIP used a separate but the same methodology as NIRP to plan its programmes. That is,

“CSPIP organised briefing sessions for all heads of civil service institutions. The purpose was to communicate and explain government policies regarding accelerated growth, equitable social developments, management improvement and the development of a coordinated and shared vision for the future. These are all linked to public sector performance. The briefing team was led by the Head of the Civil Service and assisted by personnel from the Reform Coordinating Unit, and the CSPIP Technical Team. The Heads of civil service institutions were thereafter assisted by the CSPIP Technical Team to take their turn to brief their own management teams and workers. The aim was to make the management teams and workers aware of the concept, objectives and methodology of the reform programme. The aftermath of this exercise made the CSPIP Technical Group with the consent of the Head of Civil Service plan a series of structured tasks and workshops for civil service institutions. These schedules were designed make use of experiences and ideas gained from earlier workshops”.

The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat also stressed that,

“CSPIP's methodology for the programme design has been transparent and participatory in approach. The programme was built on consensus through extensive deliberations on the activities related to the programme between the civil society and civil service institutions in partnership with donor agencies. This design was intended to ensure the commitment and ownership of Ghanaians to the programme. As part of its strategy, the programme publicized the poor performance of the civil service. This was a strategy intended to mobilise the energies and expectations of civil servants and the general public as a force to change the current inertia and help propel the service into becoming a leading example of national discipline, excellence and merit”.

The interview revealed that CSPIP served all civil service institutions with a SAI (see Appendix E for a sample SAI).

“...this is an internal institutional appraisal process in which a cross-section of personnel from the various institutions reviewed the institutional capacity and performance in relation to the institution's mission. To facilitate the review process the instrument focused attention on the institution's mission, accountabilities, its structure, programmes, projects and service delivery capacity, efficiency, linkages with other institutions, and mandates. The processes for self-appraisal and capacity diagnosis involved an analysis of five fundamental categories of factors that influence institutional performance”.

These are the:

- a. environment or context in which the MDAs operates

- b. the inputs made available to the MDAs,
- c. activities, organisation, processes and systems internal to the MDAs,
- d. outputs of the MDAs, and
- e. “implementation of national policy goals by individual MDAs”.

The interview shows further that,

“CSPIP used workshops and seminars to facilitate this diagnostic process. At these workshops participants used the information emanating from self-appraisal and beneficiary surveys to identify the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) to the institution. They subsequently developed strategies for building upon the strengths, eliminate weaknesses, taking advantages of opportunities and mitigating threats. Participants in these workshops included a cross section of staff from civil service institutions and representatives of stakeholders, beneficiaries and users of the services of the institution concerned. CSPIP engaged local facilitators (in the form of consultants) to guide the process. This diagnostic process identified system-wide constraints that are to be addressed jointly by the specific institution like OHCS, NDPC, MLGRD, and other appropriate statutory institution”.

The interview reveals also that,

“in order to receive feedback on the methodology for the policy design and also to keep faith with its philosophy of participation and consensus building, CSPIP have held a series of high level consultations involving 500 participants with selected target groups. This exercise also sought to create a sense of ownership of the programme within the civil service. The consultation process also helped to communicate the CSPIP message to selected key target groups. Subsequently, MDAs also conducted beneficiary or user surveys to obtain feedback on the quality and quantity of the services or outputs they deliver. These surveys are intended to enable each institution to get to know how its clients assess the type of impact it makes on them. The parameters for assessing the impact include staff orientation towards client needs, the transparency and efficiency with which the institution’s services are delivered, and level of institution’s accountability to its stakeholders. The aim is to get public institutions to acknowledge the views of their clients in designing policies, programmes and projects for service delivery”.

The interview shows further that,

“CSPIP used local consultants to assist MDAs in selecting the priority services for investigation and the appropriate survey instruments for drafting and programming the selected survey method, conducting the survey, producing the report, organizing review workshops and formatting the report for use in subsequent diagnostic workshops. The beneficiary survey and the diagnostic process served the purpose of identifying service wide constraints to MDA performance. Through these, the MDAs specified their capacity constraints and developed their capacity building plans. These plans are being implemented currently”.

This consultative strategy adopted at the policy formulation stage is a useful tool that will be an advantage to the policy implementation process. That is, the strategy has sought to

involve all implementing institutions in the policy formulation and therefore generate a sense of ownership of the policy in these institutions. Besides, the strategy will reduce the number of active opposition to the policy implementation process. Some skepticism associate the achievement of this goal because an informal discussion held with one junior officer at the MESW indicates that, “most junior staff are not aware of these new developments in the PAS”. This respondent therefore expressed doubt about the success of the programme.

It is very significant however that CSPIP pursued a separate methodology from NIRP’s in the policy formulation process even though the two methodologies are the same. This is evidence of division and independence of the various component programmes in the NIRP process. This situation may present some difficulty regarding NIRP’s effectiveness in coordinating and monitoring CSPIP’s performance. And already, the interviews at the PUFMARP Secretariat revealed that the NIRP has not been effective in performing this coordinating role.

6.6.3 Workshops

The interview reveals that

“workshops were used as another strategy to facilitate the institutional renewal policy formulation. Currently, more workshops are being held to facilitate the implementation of the policy and also to address implementation problems....The workshops are organised either for a specific institution or cluster of institutions as appropriate”.

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996c; 1997a) show that there are two categories of workshops. These are:

a. Phase 1 Workshops

These workshops were held at the diagnostic stage and “included reviews of the policy objectives, programmes, targets, inputs and outputs of each institution”. They also included “analysis to identify public sector activities that may not be necessary or could be

better undertaken by the private sector, NGOs or the communities”. These workshops also “identified change-actions that were aimed at creating a more compact public sector that is able to make cost-effective use of existing capacity”.

b. Phase II Workshops

This category of workshops is ongoing and they seek “to develop strategies and activities for bringing about the necessary changes and define specific programmes which are linked to the ID process to ensure their timely implementation”. The National Technical Group (NTG) coordinates the outputs from these workshops. The data show also that

“the NTG is collaborating with the CPSCMAs through these workshops to produce a consensus change strategy with a realistic time frame for addressing these overreaching system-wide constraints on effective public sector performance”.

The interview show that the “NTG will also make proposals for unifying the overall responsibility for public sector management”.

6.6.4 Macro Review of MDAs Performance

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995b; 1996c; and GoG, 1994b) show that this is “another phase of the MDA capacity diagnostic and development programme”. This phase was prefaced by

“a series of preparatory joint planning sessions of the key central agencies. These planning sessions were aimed at harnessing the collective technical capacity of these central agencies and giving a greater policy focus to the annual manpower and financial budgets”.

The data show that under the macro review process, the programme intends “to assign one central agency to coordinate the central management and control functions of these central agencies as they have hitherto been fragmented”. The NIRP has proposed to form this central agency from the staff of MoF, CAGD, NDPC, OHCS, MLG and NIRP’s NOC. The NIRP’s assumption is that this collaboration can be strengthened through their membership of the Committee of Administrative Reform and PUFMARF. Under this

macro review process, the documentary sources reveal that, “MDAs have had to do a rational and systematic examination of their strategic plans” with emphasis on:

- a. policy,
- b. national and sectoral development goals and priorities,
- c. delegation and decentralization,
- d. macro-economic budgeting, that is ensuring optimal allocation of national resources between the private and the public sectors, and between the sector ministries,
- e. assessment of social and economic rates of return on social and capital projects and their linkages to the national accelerated growth programme,
- f. efficiency gains, that is realistic balances between personnel emoluments costs and operational and maintenance costs,
- g. establishment of performance indicators and targets, and
- h. review of policy implementation processes and accountabilities.

This data also show that the macro review process “aims to integrate MDA capacity development with broad national development policy objectives on accelerated growth and equitable social development”. The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat indicates that as a result of this aim,

“MDAs were briefed on national and sectoral development goals, macro-economic implications of their annual budgets, standards of labour productivity, and opportunities for efficient performance. After these processes the Chief Directors and their project management teams were made to draw up action plans and project proposals for institutional restructuring and capacity development programmes aimed at a more effective, efficient and compact civil service. The outcomes of the macro review process and the ISD are being enhanced by study visits abroad by key staff from the central agencies and their Chief Directors. These personnel travel to countries like the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Malaysia to learn about the experiences of these countries’ civil service”.

One may argue that this exercise reflects the argument for universal application of standard ID programmes which is rejected by Thomas (1996: 11). Thomas holds the view that the apparent widespread agreement that a universal ID standard is required for successful institutional change is misleading. The World Bank (1991: 13) has also added that

overseas training and education that are sometimes used as part of the traditional technical assistance approach have not been entirely successful in solving Africa's capacity problems. The reasons are that the low pay structure in African countries often causes trainees to remain abroad. Secondly, nothing is done to ensure that the overseas universities or training institutions selected for fellowships have programmes relevant to the needs of African participants. Consequently, returning students often find that they have acquired theoretical concepts and tools that are inappropriate to the practical problems they face as practitioners in their own countries.

The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat also reveal that "selected resource persons including internationally renowned economists are being requested to make inputs regarding the public sector reforms and how this will impact economic growth and poverty alleviation". The present writer holds the view that it is important to watch how these expatriate input will evolve because Lisk (1996: 53) has cautioned that expatriate technical assistance do not and cannot solve all kinds of development problems in Africa. Lisk argues that far from solving problems, these technical assistance inputs have in some cases become destructive forces that undermine the development of domestic capacity (that is critical to solving local development problems).

6.6.5 Political Support

According to the interviews at the NIRP Secretariat, "the programme has sought and has been granted political commitment to the reforms by the President and endorsed by the professional and technical heads of PSIs". This is very urgent because considerable levels of stakeholder participation with differing interests are associated with the NIRP implementation process. Hence implementation activities must be given political support to contain and resolve the emerging conflicts and environmental reaction to the implementation process. It therefore behoves on political leaders to develop strategic

management capabilities to help manage the NIRP. This requirement is very important to sustain the NIRP implementation process. Kaul (1997: 25) has acknowledged the importance of securing the highest level of political authority to management reform programmes, and the commitment of ministers and senior officials to the process as major influences on implementation management. Mutahaba et. al. (1992: 49) have said that in order for any new system to function effectively, it should have a clear mandate. In the case of a system that is supposed to question the viability of existing practices and values, the mandate should be clearly established in the overall national policy framework. The present writer however argues that this mandate is made more authentic and visible when the programme receives an overwhelming political support.

6.7 The NIRP Implementation Process

This section explores the NIRP's strategy for dealing with the problems identified by the list of research questions in 4.2. The section is underpinned by the theme that the failure of most public policies in developing countries is a product of poor implementation (see Ayee, 1992). It is therefore important to examine the implementation process of the NIRP to determine the extent to which the programme can eliminate the problems identified in the list of research question.

The variety of implementation model being used for NIRP's implementation is the interactive model (discussed in chapter three). The programme has included all stakeholders in the reform process and according to the interactive model, the actions of these stakeholders may influence the outcome of the reforms. The interviews at the NIRP Secretariat and the NDPC reveal that,

“the NIRP's approach to the programme implementation involve extensive participation and consensus building across the whole public sector, while at the same time fully recognizing and respecting the individual autonomy of institutions whose independence is set out in the country's constitution”.

Chapter three has shown that in the analysis of any implementation process, there are other important prerequisites that are necessary for a successful implementation. Under the NIRP implementation, these pre-requisites include:

6.7.1 Implementation Structure

Hjern and Porter (1981) have described implementation structure to consist of units within the institutions who view policies as their fundamental or instrumentally important interests. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1997b) show that in “order to facilitate the successful implementation of the NIRP, a central structure has been set up to put the policy into effect”. This structure will “oversee the implementation process and provide technical guidance”. This structure is constituted by:

a. National Overview Committee (NOC)

The data shows that “the NOC is responsible for providing policy guidelines for the programme”, and also

“makes recommendations to cabinet on major issues such as fundamental changes in the structure, composition and performance of public sector institutions, and national human resource capacity development that merit consideration at that level”.

“A Presidential Adviser on Governmental Affairs is the Chairman of the NOC. Other members include the Minister of Finance, the Head of Civil Service, and representatives from the NDPC and the private sector”. The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that

“there are also senior representatives from all the NIRP component programmes as members of the NOC. The NOC is both a coordinating and policy making body, and as a coordinating body its membership represents the key clusters under which the NIRP target institutions have been grouped. There is a sizable representation of the private sector on the NOC and that is indicative of the vital links NIRP seeks to establish between the public and private sectors”.

The present writer believes that this linkage is essential for enhancing private sector partnership in the development process. This is important for accelerated and equitable social development. The interview shows that

“the NOC has absolute responsibility for the design and successful implementation of the NIRP, and it does this by establishing the appropriate policy framework and guidelines for

the programme, soliciting donor support for funding of the programme, and leading the initial briefing sessions for the Heads of the targeted institutions on the rationale and scope of the programme. The NOC also gives policy and strategic direction and leadership to the process and serves as a forum for bringing together the stakeholders. It acts as a clearing-house on issues of strategic importance”.

b. National Technical Group (NTG)

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1997b) show that the NTG reports to the NOC and is responsible for providing central operational guidance, technical support and progress monitoring. The major tasks of the Technical Group include:

- a. pre-workshop planning,
- b. conducting workshops,
- c. coordinating output of workshops,
- d. central review of policy objectives, programmes, functions, inputs and outputs, and system-wide problems,
- e. developing strategies and formulating implementation plans for tackling system-wide problems, and
- f. monitoring the implementation of work plans of the individual PSIs and the overall work plan for the entire programme.

The documentary data shows that “the NIRP also require the NTG to work with the Heads of institutions to identify and appoint reform coordinators or project managers who will work closely with the NTG, and will report directly to the Heads of their respective institutions”. Again the NTG works closely with the Heads of PSIs to identify and appoint full time liaison officers for the capacity development teams (discussed below) who would work with the NTG and who would report directly to the Heads of their PSIs. The NTG is responsible for selecting and providing overall guidance to a team of facilitators chosen for their experience and ability to prepare documentation for the workshops, conduct the workshops, and report on the results of the workshops.

The documentary data shows that the NTG also “facilitates a micro-institutional bottom-up process to identify capacity and service-wide constraints associated with implementing the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy”. The group “works in consultation with the key stakeholders and public sector lead managers from Parliament, Cabinet, OHCS, and MoF. NDPC, SEC, PSC, MLGRD etc., and the private sector. This consultation process enables NIRP to coordinate the reform activities”. The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that in managing the reform programme, “the NOC and NTG will provide guidance for the lead agencies to carry the process through from feasibility and design through to the point of implementation”. NTG is responsible for monitoring progress, ensure linkages with the sub-reform programmes, and assist in resolving problems during the implementation stage.

c. National Secretariat

The documentary data shows that the Secretariat backs up the NTG and the NOC with the administrative work of the NIRP.

d. Capacity Development Teams (CDTs)

The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1997b) show that CDTs have been established in all PSIs to act as a liaison between their respective institutions and NIRP. “They serve as change agents to catalyze the public sector transformation process and the implementation of the broader NIRP agenda”. Besides, “the CDTs are window into the MDAs and the MMDAs and they provide an on-site accountable team for supporting their reforms and assessing their capacity to manage change”. The interview with the NIRP Secretariat reveals that,


“to make these teams effective, members have been provided with training in change management or institutional development tools and techniques. NIRP is also focusing the CDTs abilities on “visioning” and strategic planning as well as on the abilities for performance improvement plans”⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ *These are being achieved through a training component in the Vision 2020 change-agenda workshops and its follow-up exercises.*

The NIRP has increasingly “involved the CDTs in identifying Capacity Development and Utilization issues that are associated with the development and implementation of action plans for the institutional renewal policy”.

e. Task Force on Central Policy Process

The documentary data indicates that, “the task force is mandated to support and augment activities for the re-orientation of Central Government Ministries towards a more policy-oriented role, and to strengthen the management and effectiveness of the national policy process”. Figure 6-2 below describes the NIRP management structure.



Source: NIRP, 1996.

Separate structures have been set up for the CSPIP and PUFMARP implementation.

6.7.1.1 The CSPIP Implementation Structure

The documentary data (see Ghana, 1994; 1994b) show that the Committee on Administrative Reforms and the Civil Service Advisory Board constitute the CSPIP implementation structure. These are also two advisory bodies to CSPIP. The Head of Civil

Service (HCS) is the chairman of these two bodies. Below these two sub-structures and also responsible to the HCS are:

i. Project Management Team

The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat show that,

“the project management team is the technical group and it has been established for the overall implementation and management of the sub-programme. To make them confident and perform competently, the members of the team have been given training and sponsored for study tours to learn about state-of-the-art and best practices of the ID processes in other countries. This group is made up of six members and it includes the Head of Civil Service and a DFID Adviser whose role is to provide technical guidance when required. The team also monitors the progress and performance in CSPIP projects”.

ii. CSPIP Secretariat

The interview shows that the Secretariat is headed by a Director and assisted by a small supporting staff. It caters for the day-to-day administration of CSPIP.

iii. CSPIP Support Office

The interview shows that “this office helps to administer DFID input. It directly aims at supporting CSPIP activities, to provide essential logistical and financial support to CSPIP, and to ensure the successful implementation of DFID’s support to CSPIP”. A DFID representative heads it.

iv. Reform Coordinating Unit

The interview revealed that, “this Unit was established to meet the requirements of Civil Service Law 327 (1993) which calls for a unit to coordinate all other reforms in the Civil Service and help establish linkages between these”. “The technical support required for this task is being tapped from freelance consultants with good track record”.

v. Capacity Development Teams (CDTs)

The interview and documentary source (see Ghana, 1994; 1994b) reveal that

“CDTs have been established in all MDAs under CSPIP with capacity development coordinators at the headquarters of each ministry. This coordinator liaises with the Reform Coordinating Unit and the Technical Group, and will report directly to the Chief Directors

of the ministries. The CDT's which are the change agents and include 5-8 senior staff would have to work as a team for designing and implementing the reforms".

The interview shows further that,

"at a diagnostic workshop, the HCS recommended the membership attendance of junior staff. This is extraordinary because it is not part of administrative framework and the proposal seeks to involve junior staff in the programme implementation. Heads of the respective civil service institutions are the Chairpersons of the CDTs, with the CDTs themselves becoming the centre of all reform activities. CDTs are not restricted regarding the number of membership but are required to allow sufficient membership to represent proportionately the main parts of the institutions. The Heads are assisted by CDT coordinators to facilitate the smooth implementation of the policy. The coordinators are deputy Directors in the Civil Service or officers of equivalent rank".

6.7.1.2 The PUFMARF Implementation Structure

The PUFMARF implementation structure has been categorized into four distinct but functionally linked bodies. These are:

i. The Steering Committee

The documentary sources (see PUFMARF 1997; 1997c) reveals that "the Steering Committee has the responsibility to oversee the overall implementation of the reform programme". The data shows that "it is the highest policy making body of the sub-programme but it also has responsibility to make recommendations to government on difficult issues for decision". The Steering Committee is also

"responsible for coordinating and approving the various component projects to ensure coherence and compatibility in design, management and implementation, building a consensus on and maintaining commitment to PUFMARF, and reviewing and approving the procurement of goods and services for PUFMARF implementation".

The interview at the PUFMARF Secretariat show that "the committee is made up of fourteen members who represents various MDAs who are either large spenders or who are implementing programmes which will affect the financial management systems such as the decentralization programme".

ii. Project Management Team

According to the interview,

"this team comprises of three personnel and their main responsibilities include assuring quality programme output. It is also responsible for coordinating activities in the various

component projects to ensure their smooth integration and ease of implementation. The team also supervises the work of the consultants, and report to the Steering Committee”.

This data shows that,

“the three positions in the Project Management Team comprises of the Project Manager as the Head of the Secretariat, and a Finance Manager who handles the financial management policy issues, regulatory framework and standards, as well as the re-engineering of the business processes needed in the reformed system. The third position is an Information Technology Manager whose role is primarily to ensure that the revamped system operates in a smooth computerized environment with the appropriate hardware and software and by a well-trained operating and technical staff”.

This management team is supported by an administrative support staff and aided at the higher level by senior administrative personnel of the MoF.

iii. Consultants

The interview at the PUFMARF Secretariat reveals that the “day-to-day activities of the project which need to be carried out in order to design and implement the various components are being undertaken by foreign consultants”. The data show that in order to facilitate teamwork, the consultants work closely with the Project Management Team as well as GoG counterpart staff to ensure that project objectives are achieved.

iv. Project Implementation Teams (PITs)

The interview reveals that PUFMARF has set up PITs in MDAs to introduce the changes envisaged by the programme in their respective institutions. These are separate units from the CDTs of the NIRP and CSPIP. The data indicates that


“these PITs will manage the micro implementation of PUFMARF and the team is composed of three main groups of personnel, namely one staff each from the project management team, the respective MDAs, and the Consultants”.

The data show further that in order to ensure successful implementation, everybody who is involved in public financial management function would play a role or the other. The data show also that

“the role of the PITs is to serve as the flag-bearers, the front line implementers, and the Trainer-of-Trainers for the purpose of implementing the reforms in the respective Ministries. The PITs will work closely with the Project Management Team and Consultants to understudy the sub-systems being developed and to help ensure that these systems meet the specific needs of MDAs. The PITs also serve as leaders of PUFMARP’s implementation in MDAs or as Change Agents. The PITs are therefore set-up as one means by which representatives of key stakeholder institutions will be more and more involved in the implementation”.

The present writer believes that this will ensure ownership of PUFMARP in PSIs and also minimize implementation problems. Figure 6.2 below graphically explains the PUFMARP implementation structure.

Figure 6-3
PUFMARP Implementation Structure



Source: PUFMARP News (1997:9)

The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) show that members of the PITs work with the consultants and Project Management Team to acquire the needed skills to replicate and maintain the system. According to the data,

“members of the PITs have been given formal training in areas of need so as to enhance their skills appropriately. They work closely with the consultants and Project Management Team to replicate the designed sub-systems in their respective MDAs and they are responsible for expanding the system throughout the MDAs”.

From the structures outlined above, it may be argued that the NIRP implementation structure is very well set up with properly outlined responsibilities and it confirms Hjern and Porter's (1981) argument that almost no programme is fully implemented by a single institution. But it is important for the individual groups within the structure to coordinate their activities in order to secure smooth implementation. As discussed in 6.7.4 below, this has been lacking and if this problem persists, the situation may impede the NIRP implementation. Secondly, the membership composition of the individual groups especially the capacity development teams is highly skewed in favour of public sector management. In the case of CSPIP, the HCS has been seeking to make some changes in the membership of the CSPIP's CDTs. However, the nature of the composition questions the interactive underpinnings of the ID implementation process. This is a potential platform for organised and unorganized opposition to the implementation process, particularly from public sector junior officers. Nixon (1980: 129) has cautioned that, "where implementation involves more than one level of administration, the whole process becomes more complicated" (see Hogwood, 1984; and Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). This observation presents a serious threat to the NIRP implementation in terms of how smooth the process is likely to be against a backdrop of a variety of institutions responsible for managing the various sub-programmes. Bowen (1982) however sees the problem differently. He argues that a carefully thought out agreement strategy will increase the chances of success. The present writer believes that the multi-institutional management of the NIRP implementation may however be explained by the nature of the policy itself. That is, the policy seeks to build capacity for development management in the entire PAS. In view of the fact that the PAS is constituted by a large number of PSIs, the programme cannot be managed any better than having a number of key institutions to be responsible for the implementation of the various facets of the programme. But Mutahabe and Jide (1992: 62.) have noted that the ID programme can achieve its intended objectives only when it takes into account, the interactions among the component institutions. This perspective emphasizes the importance of consultation and networking among agencies in

the implementation structure in order to successfully implement the programme (see 6.7.4 below).

6.7.2 Resource Requirements for the NIRP Implementation

Barret and Fudge (1981) have argued that for institutions to develop the capability for policy implementation, they must have the ability to bring together human and material resources in a cohesive organisational unit and motivate them to execute the policy objectives. The documentary source (see NIRP, 1996a) and interviews reveal that two distinct resources have been made available for the ID policy Implementation. These are financial and human resources. The World Bank, the British Council, the Commonwealth Secretariat, CIDA, and the DFID are the key financiers of the NIRP apart from the GoG.

i. Financial Resources

The NIRP requires financial support for technical assistance, training, acquisition of equipment etc.. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; World Bank, 1996) reveal that international donor agencies play a great role in NIRP's implementation in terms of funding and the provision of other resources. These donors are "providing assistance in terms of international resource persons, short-term consultancies and funding of the NIRP workshops". For example "at the start of the programme the World Bank made available US\$50,000 to give an early start of the NIRP programmed activities in 1996". The Bank has since made available a large policy based credit and technical assistance support". The Bank has also "been supporting the central workshops and top-down reviews to enable NIRP outline strategic options for addressing the overreaching system-wide constraints to public sector performance". The data shows also that,

"the DFID and the World Bank have aligned their technical assistance projects in Ghana into the NIRP agenda. The World Bank, the DFID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the British Council, and the Commonwealth Secretariat are also working individually to make available to the NIRP, the financial resources required for the programme implementation".

Under this scheme however, the interviews at the NDPC and the NIRP Secretariat reveal that donors are being guided by NIRP regarding their contribution to the programme. The interview at the PUFMARF Secretariat however shows the contrary as the very funding schemes of these agencies are distorting the linkages between the component programmes. The interview from the NDPC on the other hand reveals that,

“the philosophy of donor practice is that if an agency commit funds to the programme or a sub-programme, the agency sees the programme or sub-programme as its sphere of influence. Hence no other agency must thread this area. This practice has presented a formidable problem to the NIRP’s coordinating function”.

The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat show that “the GoG has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the UK government by which the DFID is funding CSPIP during its full operation phase for a period of five years (that is September 1996 - August 2001)”. But the question is how the capacity built under the CSPIP can be sustained when the period of British support comes to an end. Perhaps a new Memorandum of Understanding may be agreed with the DFID or another donor. Secondly, the interview shows that CSPIP has built an inherent mechanism for continuous and self-improvement. For example, the CSPIP Secretariat will be integrated into the Reform Coordinating Unit to continue its facilitatory activities. It is also expected that by then, the major phases of the reforms would have been implemented already. The CDTs in the MDAs will have been well established as change agents and reform implementers. The ministries would have been structured along the performance agreements to discharge their duties effectively. Hopefully, the decentralization process would have advanced and departments integrated into the DAs and therefore major funding would not be necessary. The present writer believes that while these are possibilities, the best guarantee is for Ghana to incorporate the reforms into the national budget. The interview at the PUFMARF Secretariat also shows that,

“donor agencies including the DFID, IDA, CIDA, the European Union and the World Bank are providing funding for PUFMARF. In the past, different donor agencies have been known to fund the implementation of accounting systems for MDAs which has contributed to the lack of uniformity and distortions in processes and procedures of MDAs operations”.

The interview at the NDPC shows that,

“under the new development management system, these donors have been requested to refrain from funding stand-alone systems in Ghana. Therefore any forms of assistance, like funding and other support systems that are provided by these agencies and their existing commitments to individual MDAs are being coordinated to ensure that beneficiary PSIs do not thwart the NIRP implementation process. NIRP has therefore adopted a scheme to systematically manage donor contributions to the programme and to national development programmes in general than it has been in the past. In the new scheme donor organisations are in practice required to respond to the agenda set by the government. This is a complete departure from past practice where donors set in motion a series of interventions which usually had no recourse to national development priorities and in their implementation, local resources which could have been used more effectively elsewhere were diverted. This new scheme is embedded in the national and sector capacity development and investment plan which is a product of the outputs of the Vision 2020 change-agenda workshop and the performance improvement plans⁵⁷.

(see also NIRP, 1996a)

The present writer holds the opinion however that, this new policy on donor support may only exist in theory because the data did not produce any evidence of the new practice being operational. The evidence on the contrary show that donor agencies continue to fund programmes independently which has contributed to coordination problems in the PAS. Perhaps there are plans to enforce this policy at a latter time. This heavy donor involvement with the CSPIP and PUFMARF may explain why the two sub-programmes used separate methodologies apart from the NIRP's in the design of the programmes. Secondly, this may be the reason why these two programmes have their individual implementation teams (see 6.7.1). Donor involvement in the development policy process is captured in the last element of the research question and it seeks to explore how the NIRP intends to correct or eliminate the distortions that associate donor practices in Ghana. However, from the analysis made above, one may argue that the NIRP itself has become a victim of the problems and hence may be unable to make any remarkable changes in this area.

⁵⁷ *The plan provides the framework for which current and future aid-funded programmes and technical assistance would relate.*

The documentary data (see NIRP, 1996c) shows that the NIRP also “receives funding from the national budget, the district common fund, savings from re-deployment, and divestiture, and private sector contributions”. For example, “the government provides funds for PUFMARPs recurrent expenditure”. Secondly, “a Performance Improvement Facility (PIF) has been created by the GoG to make available the required financial resources for the NIRP implementation”. This facility has been necessary because

“the programme will incur transitional costs as well as cost in areas like equipment, consultancy or training that can make significant short term difference before the government’s annual budgetary process gets round to incorporate the cost of the NIRP”.

Thus, the PIF is built into the programme to provide for these elements on a small but important scale. Berg (1993: 58) has provided a useful lesson regarding this. He has noted that development depends critically on the strength and quality of a country’s institutional capacity and therefore development cooperation and technical cooperation efforts must contribute to achieving this objective. Berg argues that an aid activity cannot be regarded as successful unless it has contributed to strengthening local institutions. Berg’s major concern is that capacity building should be the central and unique goal of technical cooperation.

ii. Human and Technical Resources

The interviews at the NIRP, CSPIP and PUFMARPs Secretariats concurrently revealed that, “due to the NIRP’s objective to develop local capacity, local consultants are being contracted to fill the public sector capacity gaps”. This conforms to Nancy Baster’s (1972:2) argument that the growth of national independence is an important aspect of development that requires indigenous personnel to be in key positions, as well as indigenous people to develop indigenous technology. This is a part of national autonomy that is seen as an important element of development, and it confirms the idea that “the

success of any change project depends upon human resource base” of the country in question⁵⁸.

Secondly, the data shows that the NIRP has also

“engaged institutional experts from the DFID to work with the NTG and the NIRP target groups in identifying local partners to provide facilitative and technical consultancy back-up support for the programme.... The contracted local consultants provide technical consultancy to PSIs to conduct their change-agenda workshops and follow-up exercises to generate individual institutional performance improvement or capacity building and implementation plans....Resource persons from the public sector institutions with appropriate skills and commitment are tapped to augment the NTG core staff as and when needed. The World Bank also has taken up the responsibility to provide professional expertise to assist the NTG with the national debate, discussions and dialogue to put in place the essential public administration delivery systems consistent with national development goals and aspirations. But NIRP monitors the quality of sector programme outputs to ensure that the essential features of the NIRP methodology are not compromised”.

The data shows that, the programme recognises that at the heart of every reform programme is the human factor. Therefore if the human factor is not well taken care of or do not fully comprehend the system being implemented, the new system would simply not attain its objectives⁵⁹. NIRP has introduced an incentive mechanism and to train and retain these and other well-trained and highly skilled professionals to run the system⁶⁰. The interview at the PUFMARPP Secretariat shows that

“PUFMARP for example has under the scheme contracted two consultants from the Civil Service College in the UK to be responsible for the HRD component of the programme. Their brief is to produce a training strategy that provides the framework for identification of all the skills that are needed for implementation of PUFMARPP and to ensure that initiatives for training and development will be undertaken to cover the individual components of the sub-programme”.

⁵⁸ This is quoted from a Statement made by Robert Smith of the Civil Service College in the UK in an interview with PUFMARPP News and published in the March 1998 edition of PUFMARPP News at Accra.

⁵⁹ A statement by Joseph Adda, PUFMARPP Project Manager, at a workshop for Project Implementation Teams, held at Akosombo from December, 11 - 12, 1997.

⁶⁰ This mechanism involves a Salaries Rationalization Programme to deal with issues of pay (discussed already in 6.2.1(c) and 6.3 (d)). The timing of this salary scheme has been so determined to facilitate the implementation process of the programme.

The documentary sources (see Bank, 1996) indicate that the World Bank also undertakes frequent supervision missions using both Bank staff and consultants.

The thrust of the NIRP training programme is reflected in the idea that the provision of training and education at all levels are very important conditions for development (Tinbergen, 1958: 5), and that they bring equity and efficiency into the economy (South Commission, 1990: 80). The South Commission's perspective also adds that large investments on human resource tend to speed up development performance (South Commission, 1990: 101). NDPC (1994: 2) has said that human resources are not only considered critical for economic, social and political development of a country but constitutes both the means and the end of development. This is because a properly planned, selected, placed, trained and motivated workforce reduces waste, enhances productivity and ensures survival and growth of institutions (NDPC, 1994: 54). Mentz (1997: 10) has also argued that capacity building is the ability to build up personal reservoirs of knowledge, experience and expertise over a period of time. Mentz believes that this is necessary because personal capacity constitutes the nuts and bolts of capacity building (Mentz, 1997: 13). The interview at the NIRP Secretariat reveals however that the NIRP is

“aware of the practice where some donor agencies send inexperienced consultants with the objective to create jobs for their home countries. Such consultants are unable to conduct thorough research and are also incapable of doing any thorough work. They rather introduce pre-cooked systems that may not be relevant to the Ghanaian environment. NIRP is watching and monitoring all work and inputs of expatriate technical experts. We are screening the choice of consultants for every aspect of the programme and also scrutinizing their work to ensure that their inputs meet the national standards and are acceptable”.

The interviews at the PUFMARF Secretariat also show that,

“under PUFMARF, the Project Management Team and the Project Steering Committee, have the responsibility to ensure that consultants add value. Where it has been necessary, sub-committees have been formed to examine and assess the consultants' activities and outputs in their previous assignments elsewhere. Besides, PUFMARF is designed to enable Government officials take over from consultants at some stage in the implementation process. This would truly ensure the sustainability of the reform programme. This complementary government staff will join the Consultants and work together to ensure that they develop the necessary skills to replicate the project across board”.

This strategy has been endorsed by Jaycox (1993: 3) who has observed that, without demand for qualified African professionals on the part of African governments, much of the efforts and resources expended on capacity building will be wasted (see also The World Bank, 1991: 8).

This level of donor involvement in securing resources for the NIRP implementation questions the sustainability of the entire programme. This method of resource procurement throws some doubts about the NIRP's capacity to monitor the activities of these donors, and it also suggests a lack of indigenous capacity to implement the programme in terms of both financial and technical resources. Consequently, the World Bank (1991: 12) has advised that both African governments and donors must resist the use of expatriates as first choice in capacity building programmes and the development management process in general. The reason for this argument is that donors have tried to promote capacity building in Africa in the past couple of decades but the results have been uneven and generally disappointing. Mathur (1986: 99) has observed that this dependence on expatriate experts further aggravates the capacity inadequacies of developing countries and does not provide a long-term solution to the problem of matching management to the newly emerging developmental challenges. Bologun (1997: 78) has added that capacity building for development in essence refers to the practice of strengthening indigenous capacity in policy analysis and development management. This argument means in effect that certain practices like engaging foreign experts in the capacity building programme makes the entire capacity building process contradictory. Lisk (1996: 53-4) holds the opinion that the interaction between donors and African governments has not at all served the interest of capacity building in Africa. Lisk argues that at best, technical assistance should be directed mainly at developing the necessary domestic capacity rather than undermining the existing or potential capacities. The present writer believes that, this level of donor involvement with the NIRP will subject the ID process to the dictates of the donor institutions and any attempt to change this may threaten the continuous flow of financial resources. Should

such a situation occur, it would change the policy outcome. This practice may therefore constitute a serious setback to the NIRP implementation as occurred under the SAP. Secondly, the practice is a setback to indigenous initiative and capacity to manage national development. Currently, donor provision of these resources may appear very attractive in terms of helping the policy implementation process but in the long run, this practice may reduce the very capacity NIRP is seeking to build. Paul (1990: 28) has argued that ID processes and strategies may differ due to exogenous factors like the differing macro-economic or sectoral environments of the development policy, and other policy design related factors. The donor involvement is also likely to complicate Dia's observation that the institutional crisis in African countries is essentially caused by a structural and functional disconnect between formal institutions mostly transplanted from western countries and indigenous institutions built on the African history and its culture (Dia, 1996: 25).

Donor role as resource providers in the ID policy implementation logically gives donor institutions the right to review and monitor the policy process. The basis of this argument is that if donor institutions provide resources for policy implementation, then they are politically obliged to monitor how these resources are used. This view does not however negate the facts of the arguments advanced above. Despite this political obligation, donor institutions use their respective monitoring procedures and these may deny the NIRP of a standardized framework for monitoring the programme in an integrated manner. This situation provides these agencies with the opportunity to inject foreign values into the NIRP process although it is intended to be "home-grown", and this is likely to produce a policy outcome that is different from what NIRP originally envisaged.

6.7.3 Evolutionary Nature of the NIRP Implementation Process

Any policy implementation is an evolving process with continuously changing phases usually making it different from what has been planned. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995b; 1997a) reveal that, “NIRP has created a ten-year horizon in which the programme will logically address the institutional development issues in stages”. These stages have in-built visible parameters for measuring progress and determining structural linkages and relationships with the NIRP component programmes. These stages also provide a framework for managing the overall ID policy implementation in a structured way. The data suggests that these stages for NIRP implementation may be identified on three main levels that reflect the major areas of focus. The focus does not limit reform activities but emphasizes the core issues of the period. These are:

i. Level A

“This level focuses on institutional building issues. It spans from between three to five years and the programme is currently operating in this phase”. The focus is to develop and implement the management framework and tools to enable the public service to operate more efficiently and effectively. During this period, other activities would continue to take place concurrently in view of the enormity of the tasks involved in the ID process. “Those extra activities to be given priority attention are those that contribute to the basic processes and systems of government operations” and secondly, “the framework, rules and regulations within which the public sector will be expected to operate”.

In this period, “legislative instruments based on acts governing the financial management framework, local government, civil service etc. are being promulgated” and the roles of the central public sector core management agencies and the MDAs are being re-classified as prescribed by the constitution.

ii. Level B

The level B phase “emphasizes accountability and performance and it will span for three years”. This stage will reinforce the accountability framework and results management process in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness in development management. The objective of this phase is “to maintain control in the critical devolution period”. For this reason, “audit and performance measurement, data gathering and results identification processes will continue to be developed and strengthened at this stage”. Other expected activities will include:

- a. standardizing performance agreements with central agencies,
- b. setting minimum standards of accounting practice and performance record keeping,
- c. setting minimum audit requirements and time-keeping standards,
- d. defining top down policy direction or bottom up planning functions in development planning both between and across institutions, and
- e. phased implementation of management systems across PSIs.

The data shows that in this phase “MDAs will undertake a series of diagnostic and strategic workshops in which they will specify their mission, methods of accomplishing this, and what support and resources from the centre will be required”. This process will culminate in a set of contractually agreed programmes and performance indicators for PSIs.

iii. Level C

The data shows that “the level C focuses on professionalism in the public sector”. The programme will span for four years. The programme at this stage will “place emphasis on developing the professional capacity of public sector personnel”. This phase will require the “available human resources to be equipped with the knowledge, attitude and resolve, and service oriented public sector culture to sustain improvements in the system”. Professional development plans for managers and employees would be developed as part of the annual performance schedule. These plans will require “the Public Service

Commission (PSC) and the other central public sector management core agencies to set out best practice guidelines and norms". These agencies will be expected to "monitor the development and application of such "in-house" systems, to be sure that they are adequate and consistent across the public service".

The present writer believes that the levels A, B, and C reforms will facilitate better management and accountability for the scarce allocated resources for development policy process and also enhance ownership of the process in Ghana. The data shows that the reform will also

"free the central public sector management agencies from their current control and micro-management of the MDAs to concentrate on developing appropriate inspectorate, management information, consultancy and advisory capacities to assist the MDAs to respond efficiently and effectively to current reform policy agenda and manage institutional change".

The programme is however subject to delays in view of the dynamics discussed above. This confirms Linders et. al.'s (1987: 466) observation that policy is a construct that emerges from interaction and has no life of its own. For example the interview at the PUFMARF Secretariat reveals that,

"under PUFMARF, BPEMS⁶¹ was initially planned to be implemented over a two-year period. However, improvements to the system and the consequent replication exercise in non-pilot institutions are intended to be carried out over a five-year period".

This indicates that the project will not meet its targeted date. The data shows that,

"this is being implemented in a phased manner. In Phase I, BPEMS is to be designed, and specifications will be developed for the required software, hardware and procurement arrangements to be completed. Under Phase II, BPEMS will be implemented in the seven priority ministries that were chosen because of the size of their expenditure⁶². Under Phase III, BPEMS will be replicated in the remaining Sector Ministries and Regional Administrations"⁶³.

⁶¹ As the "life-line" of the programme, BPEMS aims to reform the budgeting, accounting and financial reporting sub-system and to provide the computerized platform to run the entire financial management system.

⁶² These pilot ministries are the MoF (including CAGD), Min. of Roads and Transport, Works and Housing, Min. of Education, Min. of Communications, Min of Health, and the Min. of Local Government and Rural Development

⁶³ Price Waterhouse Associates (PW) are currently implementing this component of PUFMARF in three phases at fifty sites spread over seven Ministries.

6.7.4 Channels of Communication

The present writer believes that the process of implementing a reform policy is not done by any one institution. The process requires a combination of a number of institutions to perform differing roles to achieve the set objectives. It is important therefore at the policy formulation stage to also design strategies for enhancing effective communication to facilitate the policy implementation. Thomas (1996: 21) has stressed that, “leadership, cultural change, conflict resolution and overall organisational change depends upon effective communication”. The NIRP process acknowledges this fact and has designed strategies to ensure effective communication. These include:

i. Programme Linkages

The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat reveals that

“there is a key group of central agencies namely, MoF, CAGD, NDPC, MLGRD, and the OHCS that have responsibility for system-wide issues. These agencies collectively set the context for MDA coordination and collaboration. For example, under CSPIP, the OHCS has liaised with these central agencies to mobilise support and inputs into the MDAs self-appraisal exercise. Thereafter, these central agencies were called together to determine the new dynamics of MDAs operation. The OHCS led the process under the aegis of NIRP’s NOC that is responsible for overall public sector capacity development”.

NIRP has also maintained important links with the other sub-reform programmes. For example, “the linkage between NIRP and CSPIP has kept some level of technical and professional relationship between the two programmes. CSPIP regularly submits progress report to NIRP”. Such reports, according to the interview at the NIRP Secretariat,

“enhance the managerial work of the NIRP Secretariat and the technical work of NIRP’s NOC. The NIRP Secretariat in turn reports on CSPIP’s activities in its periodic progress reports to the NOC. The NIRP Secretariat communicates the NOC’s reaction back to CSPIP”.

Secondly, the data show that “the HCS is a key member of the NOC and the National Coordinator of NIRP serves on the Committee for Administrative Reforms which is the body responsible for steering CSPIP”. An equally good linkage has been established among the component programmes. The interview revealed that

“because of the relevance and importance of PUFMARF to the implementation of CSPIP, strong links have been established between the two. CSPIP through the OHCS is

represented on the PUFMARF Steering Committee and has so far provided assistance for the design of the project. The Project Management Team of PUFMARF is in constant touch with the CSPIP Secretariat and also with the NIRP's NOC".

Table 6-1

An Example of the Linkages between some of the Component Programmes

<i>NIRP Activity</i>	<i>Depends on</i>	<i>Reason</i>
CSPIP	PUFMARF	Success of performance improvement plans & performance contracts rest on ability to predict medium-term resource availability
	Incomes Policy (PSC)	Civil service efficiency is linked to better pay and incentive regime
PUFMARF	CSPIP	Successful implementation of PUFMARF requires improvement in civil service performance management
	Incomes Policy (NTG)	Successful implementation of PUFMARF requires reform in incentives to civil servants
	Policy reform (NTG)	Rational resource allocation decisions depend on effective use by policy designers of MTEF
Central Policy Process reform (NTG)	PUFMARF	Rational policy making process depends heavily on successful implementation of MTEF
	CSPIP	Implementation of new policy-making system depends on staffing and management of PPMEDs
	Incomes Policy (PSC)	Successful implementation of new policy-making process requires reform of incentive regime affecting civil servants
Incomes Policy (PSC)	PUFMARF	Feasibility of new incomes policy depends on clear determination of its affordability, and MTEF is the suitable tool
	Policy reform (NTG)	Sustainability of new incomes policy linked to fundamental policy decisions about appropriate size and role of government

Source: NIRP (1997a)

These networking initiatives of the NIRP are underpinned by two conditions that are described by Mutahaba and Jide (1992: 67) as necessary for institutional reforms. These conditions are:

- a. cohesion at the highest level of government to ensure the stoppage of the long-drawn battles between political functionaries and career officials, and consequently focusing the attention of both groups on solving ongoing problems, and
- b. adopting a holistic approach to the new policy.

Table 6.1 above is an example of the linkages between the various component programmes. The table is underpinned by the ideas that implementation effectiveness will depend most importantly on the quality of inter-institutional relations among the implementing institutions. These inter-institutional relations must be characterised by agreement on goals, open communication, mutual trust and support, full utilization of member skills, effective conflict management, and institutional motivation and commitment.

ii. Participation

The documentary sources (see Ghana, 1994a; 1994b) reveal that, “the NIRP insist on stakeholder participation to ensure their total commitment to the reform process”. In the first place, the major stakeholders are all represented at the NOC level to help direct policy and guide implementation of the programme. Secondly, all stakeholders especially those who are direct beneficiaries of the programme are involved in every level of activity of the programme implementation. For example: the confirmation of the critical issues affecting their operations, the development of work plan to carry out the activities in their respective areas, and the recruitment of consultants and the procurement of logistics. These stakeholders also participate actively in the workshops, seminars and training in order to upgrade their skills. This participatory networking process emphasizes the obsolescence of conventional notions of control and conformity strategy used in most policy implementation. It shows that effective strategy for the NIRP

implementation rest on consensus building and communication between policy-makers and implementing agencies. This is a key feature of the interactive policy implementation process and it shows that the NIRP seeks to ensure that implementing agencies have a direct personal stake in performing their roles. This is emphasised by Ham and Hill's (1984) argument that successful implementation depends on effective linkages among institutions involved in the process. Bhatnagar and Aubrey (1992: 161) have advised that in order to generate commitment to participation, it is important to change the mind-set of the people, through a profound change in attitudes and values. He insists that it is unrealistic and impractical to assume that people can be taught or persuaded to be sympathetic to participation. This is important to sustain the participatory process of the NIRP.

iii. Communication Strategies

The documentary data (see Ghana, 1994a; 1994b) shows that the NIRP has launched a publicity and communication strategy to facilitate and promote national discussions and debate to get greater participation and ownership of the NIRP. This strategy is designed to solicit public support for the NIRP, and it include brochures and booklets publication, the publication of a NIRP Newsletter, periodic press briefings, workshops for media practitioners, advertisements, and radio and television talk shows.

6.7.5 Environmental Reaction

The policy implementation theory (discussed in chapter 3) stresses that in any reform policy implementation, the consensus required to see implementation through are often problematic as various groups of actors engage in isolated maneuvers to enhance their sectional interests. This means that the implementation of reform policies almost always generate some form of reaction from those affected by the policy. Thus, people always fear change because it means uncertainty and a threat to personal security (see Hogwood

et. al., 1984). Grindle and Thomas (1991) have added that the government efforts to effect change usually produce problems of opposition from many quarters that disrupts the implementation efforts.

The interviews at the NIRP Secretariat, MESW and MDPI show that in the NIRP implementation process, this revolves around “the fear about economic effects of change in terms of earnings, benefits, job security, career prospects etc. that constitute threat to people’s livelihood”. This fear occur in the form of uneasiness about having to learn new skills, assume different responsibilities, meet higher standards, or work with colleagues in a new setting. Hence “efforts at implementing any of these changes are being resented in certain quarters, especially as the programme outcomes include reducing the staff size and reduced personal autonomy”. This shows that the context of change is an important influence on attitudes. For example where change is thought to imply serious failures or shortcomings in the existing arrangements, management personnel may use various forms of manoeuvres to create an atmosphere of rumour and suspicion that will consequently lead to opposition to the policy. This is likely to explain the resistance that the NIRP has incurred from some senior managers in PSIs. The interview at the NDPC shows that “these managers see the reforms as a process that is directed at eroding their power base”. For example,

“in order to get the MoF and other MDAs to work together under the NIRP implementation process, the government had to first eliminate some of the MDAs' suspicions that resulted from the practice where some top officials entrenched the status quo to strengthen their positions for decades. The government therefore effected transfers in order to put in key positions, people who are reform minded and would like to see the programme successfully implemented. Thus some key chief directors and directors were transferred and new ones appointed”.

Ayee (1992) has argued that this situation is very typical of most reform policy implementation because the policy implementation process is a platform for competition and conflict among individuals and groups who seek to pursue and assert their interests and compete for scarce resources.

The present writer believes that the NIRP process is reminiscent of the SAP experience in Ghana where the introduction of the SAP administrative reforms resulted in massive staff redundancy in the public sector. It has been noted already in 6.7.3 that the NIRP will reduce the size of the public sector in terms of staff. With this SAP experience therefore in mind, the present writer believes that the NIRP is likely to attract some negative reactions from public sector workers. Already, the interviews at the MESW have indicated that

“junior and middle level management staff (of PSIs) are not satisfied with the methodology for the programme design and implementation. They feel excluded in the processes and they are doubtful about the success of the reform programme”.

Hogwood and Gun (1984) have added that people always fear change due to the associated uncertainties. They add that for a policy that is reminiscent of a previous one under which serious disruptions occurred due to redundancies like the SAP-ERP in Ghana in the 1980s, there is likely to be greater resistance to the policy.

Another problem in the implementation process is the lack of commitment on the part of leadership to implement certain key aspects of the programme. The interview at the NDPC and the NIRP Secretariat shows that

“the sector ministries under CSPIP, the CPSCMAs, and the Office of the President are responsible for reviewing options for modifying and changing the operating circumstances of PSIs. However, strong commitment required from these institutions for a successful implementation is lacking. Currently there is lack of performance from the sector ministries and the CPSCMAs to implement these changes”.

This may be interpreted as passive opposition to the policy. Grindle et. al (1991) therefore recommend that in developing a strategy for implementation, policy makers will need to develop the capacity to anticipate the differing forms of reactions and responses to the policy, as well as where these are likely to emanate from (that is *implementation estimates*). Thus, if implementation estimates were done at the initial stages of the policy formulation, it would have afforded the NIRP an opportunity to devise strategies to alleviate the problem from its very roots. This problem may be explained by Elmore’s idea

that much of the work of high-level administrators in the implementation process consist of anticipating recurrent problems at lower levels of the system and attempting to programme the behaviour of subordinates to respond to these problems in standardized ways (Elmore, 1978). These problems may put the policy implementation at risk if NIRP does not adopt strategies to eliminate them.

Grindle and Thomas (1991) have emphasised that change policies are normally shaped by the actions of individuals in strategic locations. Therefore it is important to the policy's feasibility in the context of support and opposition to the change it envisages, stakes in pursuing the change as well as political and bureaucratic resources needed to sustain the process to design strategies to contain such actions. Grindle and Thomas argues that in the interactive implementation process, the reform policy initiative may be reversed and even changed at any level in the implementation process by pressures and reactions of those who are opposed to it. Hence, the capacity to understand the location, strengths, stakes and strategies of those opposed to the policy is a key to successful implementation of the policy. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) have advised that in situations such as these, the policy must be frank about such problems and dangers through effective communication. They add that this must be directed at converting informal and opinion leaders to reduce the possibilities of resistance. They further advise that management should also create an atmosphere of trust by showing concern for people's interest and for their feelings towards loss of work-mates and personal insecurities. They recommend that management would need also to create an atmosphere in which people will express their fears about the policy.

PART V

Conclusions

Building Institutional Capacity for Ghana-Vision 2020 Implementation

7.1 Introduction

The chapter is a summary of the research report discussed in chapters five and six. It provides an overview of the lessons obtained from the Ghanaian experience of policy implementation in the development process. These lessons suggest that weak performance of indigenous institutions is one of the biggest bottlenecks to Ghana's development (see Berg, 1993: 59). The lessons focus on the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and shows that the problems associated with this process has necessitated Ghana's capacity building programme. The chapter also provides a brief of the capacity building process which looks at the dynamics of the NIRP implementation and comments on potential sources of threats to the NIRP.

7.2 Ghana-Vision 2020 Implementation: A Rational for the NIRP

The discussions made in chapters five and six have revealed that the development management process in Ghana has until the early 1990s been ad hoc and did not follow any set procedures. Secondly, the process also lacked political commitment and popular participation. These made development management especially development policy implementation almost un-operational.

Since the beginning of the 1990s however, the development management process has been made comprehensive and given the necessary political commitment. This comprehensive development process has been the product of the new development planning strategy called the *programme approach* and its participatory character. The new development management process also centers on private-public sector partnerships and it sees the public administrator's role as a technician and a facilitator of national development. This new approach has democratized the development policy process, especially policy implementation. Thus, the changes made to the development management system reflect a new dynamism in development policy analysis in the sense that policy analysis has now become participatory, although there is still the opportunity to improve on this.

In 1996, the GoG formulated the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy, which is a twenty-five year development policy. This development policy has since been operating under the new development management system. This new system has had a tremendous impact on the Vision 2020 implementation process. For example, under the scheme of the new development management system, a clearly defined structure of public sector institutions has been set up to implement the Ghana-Vision 2020. In view of the fact that these institutions are responsible for implementing the Ghana-Vision 2020, they are required to have strong capacity for policy implementation. The study has however identified a number of constraints to this challenge. These are:

a. Resources

The study has identified three major types of resources that are needed for implementing the Vision 2020. These include human resources, financial resources, and infrastructural provisions. However, these resources are not adequate and they are associated with a number of problems. For example in terms of human resources, there is a serious lack of managerial, financial, accounting, budgeting and policy analysis skills but surplus skills in all other areas. The study has shown that poor wage and incentive structures, inflexible public policy regarding recruitment and placement, as well as other socio-cultural and

institutional factors have caused these human resource problems. This phenomenon has caused the country to depend on expatriate skills to fill the human resource gap in the country. This human resource factor acts as a major constraint to development as the research question suggests. The World Bank has suggested that if sufficient numbers of high quality indigenous economic managers and analysts can be created, the current intellectual and professional dependence on expatriate technical assistance will be reduced. Consequently, the process will strengthen indigenous ownership of development programme and improve the prospects for the design and implementation of effective policies (World Bank, 1991: 7).

In terms of financial resources, there are inadequate procedures for local resource mobilisation and disbursement as well as systemic financial problems in budget preparation, implementation, audit, debt and cash management. These problems have caused distortions in local funding for policy implementation and have rather necessitated donor intervention through funding and technical assistance programmes which provide the platform for external intrusion and influence on national development. This way of perceiving development in Ghana dates as far back as the 1960s when the government saw the mobilisation of foreign capital as the major driver of national development. But it is significant that even in the 1960s, development experts were skeptical about the efficacy of mobilising foreign capital for indigenous development without local institutional reforms (see Perera, 1968: 52).

Thirdly, Ghana's public sector lacks basic infrastructure such as vehicles and office equipment needed to aid the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. All of these problems limit public sector capacity for implementing the Vision 2020 policy.

b. Co-ordination

The top-down policy implementation model that pertained in the old development management system has also persisted under the new system and some stakeholders are seeking to change this. The model is a serious impediment to programme co-ordination in the Vision 2020 implementation in the sense that it alienates some stakeholders from the policy implementation process. This underpins the fact that the public sector framework is fragmented and is without any strategy for policy co-ordination and networking.

The study has revealed further that this problem of public sector co-ordination and consultation is becoming perennial and difficult to deal with because the two lead institutions in the development management system - the NDPC and MoF - have failed to resolve their differences regarding the specific roles required of them in the development process. These two lead-institutions are therefore basically unable to hold PSIs together. The result is that PSIs operate without recourse to the overall national development policy. Hence, the differences between these two institutions are a threat to the successful implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020.

A second explanation to the lack of co-ordination and consultation among PSIs is the NDC government's decision to unconstitutionally force a Chairman on the NDPC with the responsibility to oversee national development. This is abhorred and rejected by most stakeholders in the development management process. These stakeholders have therefore refused to recognize and co-operate with the leadership. Most stakeholders refuse to attend policy-hearing meetings organised by the NDPC as a sign of protest. Thirdly, the ERP implementation process has partly caused the co-ordination problem because it sought to compartmentalize institutional responsibilities. The fourth cause is donor intervention in the policy process. These agencies do not co-ordinate enough and they normally fund stand-alone programmes that have no recourse to the overall national policy. These have contributed to the fragmentation in the development process.

d. System-wide Governance Problems

According to the study, there are currently inadequate structures for good governance and accountability for public sector management and this accounts for the current public sector under performance. The governance framework for most PSIs excludes stakeholder participation. This problem has persisted because it is an excuse for public sector management to pursue non-transparent practices. However, under the new development management system, stakeholders are getting together in groups to present a front that cannot be easily discarded in the development process, especially when these stakeholders are required to provide counterpart funding for implementing a programme.

National diversity issues such as gender bias and tribal exclusions also significantly determine the level of exclusions from the governance processes which is a formidable threat to the successful implementation of the Vision 2020 and to the development policy process.

e. System-wide Constraints

The study has also shown that under the new development management system stakeholders have the right to protest against any aspect of a development policy that they object to. However, any such grievance must follow a laid down procedure but these procedures have not been effective. The evidence is the numerous conflicts that associate the Vision 2020 policy implementation.

Secondly, the study has revealed that PSIs have been slow in living up to their new role as facilitators of and partners with the private sector in development and these have resulted from inadequate communication and consultation among PSIs. The study has shown also that a number of structural constraints in Ghana's PSIs constitute a serious setback to a progressive development policy process, and this is a threat to the successful implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. These constraints include:

- a. the regulatory processes that associate policy implementation,
- b. cultural practices,
- c. inadequate monitoring and evaluation systems,
- d. the absence of well developed internal management control functions that allow management to take on greater responsibilities for decisions,
- e. insufficient operational performance linkages between MDAs, non-governmental agencies and the private sector,
- f. the lack of clearly defined client group, client needs,
- g. the insufficient linkages between policy objectives, planning, budgeting and evaluation of programmes,
- h. the lack of concern for technical efficiency in the use of centrally allocated resources, and
- i. the weak central performance inspection and audit process for ensuring accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing projects under the Vision 2020.

The study has shown that these policy implementation constraints may be factored on managerial inefficiencies. This is because public sector management is occupying the driving seat of the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation and any management inefficiency will consequently affect the policy implementation process. These problems present a formidable challenge to PSIs regarding the successful implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. Hence PSIs need to build the capacity for policy implementation to improve performance. This is why the NIRP has been conceived to restructure the governance processes and build the capacity for policy analysis in PSIs.

7.3 Dynamics of the Capacity Building Process

In view of the concerns raised in 7.2 above, the research has shown that a comprehensive programme of institutional reform has been developed under the NIRP to turn the public service into a productive and motivated unit that is capable of implementing the Vision 2020 policy objectives, and to be effective at implementing future development policies. The rationale of the NIRP process is underpinned by the ideas that development is critically dependent on the capacity of PSIs to respond to development programme initiatives (Cochrane, 1986: 57). The process of developing this comprehensive capacity for all key PSIs has caused these institutions to urgently and critically review their current capacity and to identify constraints on the effective utilization of resources throughout the public service. The process is intended to make the public sector efficient and to create an enabling environment for private sector growth.

The research has shown that these demands of the Ghana-Vision 2020 also require improvements in infrastructure and human resources, as well as restructuring various PSIs on the basis of the redefined mandates in the development management process. Furthermore and in order to secure internal efficiency, better linkages are being established between the basic roles of PSIs and procedures for resource allocation, management and accountability.

Under the mandate to build public sector capacity, NIRP has adopted a strategy to address public sector management lapses in order to enhance the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. This strategy is operated under four main themes. These are:

- a. structural transformation,
- b. human resource development,
- c. transformation of the governance framework, and
- d. attitudinal change towards the private sector and the civil society.

It is within the scheme of these four major transformations, that NIRP expects a strengthened and robust public sector capacity in policy analysis, consultation and co-operation, and efficient management of resources. These expected outcomes depend among other things on the reaction of stakeholders to the policy implementation process. The reform process has been categorised into three broad implementation phases. These are:

- a. institutional building and strengthening which focuses on the building and implementation of management systems and tools for efficiency and effectiveness,
- b. accountability and performance management which reinforces transparency, accountability and results management to improve performance, and
- c. professionalism with recourse to ethics, capacities and competencies of the public service.

These three phases are being addressed within a framework of ten years.

7.3.1 The NIRP implementation Strategy

The study has identified six component programmes of the NIRP that are relevant for building the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation capacity. The fragmentation of the programme into six component programmes is intended to make the NIRP implementation easy to manage. These six component programmes are the CSPIP, PUFMARF, Decentralisation, Incomes Policy and Administration, the Policy and Cabinet Process Reforms, and the Legal sector reforms. All these component programmes are being managed by different agencies in order to maintain focus but their method of operation points to some measure of independence. In this network of component programmes, the NIRP is the umbrella programme with responsibility to link all the reform initiatives to improve the PAS. The study shows that all these sub-programmes are addressing the bottlenecks in the rules and resources in Ghana's public sector.

The study has shown also that the NIRP essentially used consultative and participatory approach as the methodology for formulating the policy. It is significant that although each component programme embarked on a separate methodology, they all used the same instrument and approach namely consultative and participatory. The programmes also use workshops as a forum for dialogue and discussions. As part of its implementation strategy, NIRP has secured the endorsement of the office of the President. Hence the programme has assumed the status of an official national reform programme, which also has the force of law. The research has shown further that, the NIRP has made the policy implementation process interactive. However, the implementation process has some inherent inadequacies that require serious attention if the process is to be successful. For example, the programme has a clearly defined structure for implementation, but the implementation process must be closely monitored to ensure that agencies will focus enough and co-ordinate their respective areas of responsibilities. The reason is that if one area of responsibility falters, the entire implementation process may crumble, especially as the evidence have shown stark divisions among implementation agencies (see figure 3-4 for illustration).

Significantly, each component programme has a separate implementation structure. This strategy is intended to enable the various agencies focus on their required roles and to maintain links with the other agencies connected to the other component programmes. Donor funding may partly be said to have caused the independence of the sub-programmes. It is also significant that foreign consultants and experts have been contracted to manage parts of the implementation process. This shows the inadequacy of Ghana's human resources especially for the NIRP implementation. This practice also epitomizes the seriousness and extent of foreign intrusion and control into what has hitherto been considered "a home-grown" programme. This incidence has been possible because the NIRP depends to a very great extent on donor resources, and under such circumstances,

donors have to monitor and evaluate the programme to ensure that the resources invested in the programme have yielded results.

7.3.2 Resources for the ID Policy Implementation

The study has identified three fundamental resources that are available for the NIRP implementation. These are financial, human and technical resources. Of these three resources, human resources have been identified to be the most urgent (see Perera, 1968: 57). However, the study has so far shown that it is important for PSIs to acquire the capacity to effectively co-ordinate all of these resources because the absence of one component can adversely prejudice development planning and implementation (see Cochrane, 1986: 85). The discussions have shown that a number of international agencies are involved in the provision of these resources including the World Bank, the British Council, the Commonwealth Secretariat, CIDA and the DFID. These agencies are providing both financial and human resources to sustain the programme implementation. This level of donor intervention is however seen as an impediment to sustainable development. The GoG has also introduced the PIF scheme under which funds will be made available to the NIRP implementation in addition to the annual budgetary allocation. The PIF will enable NIRP to secure very urgent needs like equipment and consultancy without having to wait for the annual budgetary allocation to get through.

In order to develop the human resource capacity, NIRP has introduced a number of training packages and an incentive scheme to retain the trained and other highly skilled professionals in Ghana's public sector. This strategy emphasise the idea that the fundamental principle of capacity building places high premiums on indigenous intellectual leadership and cultural values which can only be promoted by indigenous people (see Balogun, 1997: 71). Secondly, and in spite of the need for expatriate skills, NIRP is screening the choice of consultants for the programme. The programme is also monitoring

the work of these consultants to ensure that they meet the national accepted standards in order to prevent the situation where some foreign consultants introduced “pre-cooked” systems.

7.3.3 Institutional Networking for Policy Implementation

NIRP has recognised that the process of implementing the ID policy depends on a number of institutions hence an institutional networking strategy has been put in place to ensure effective linkages both among the various component programmes, and agencies. Secondly, communication under the strategy has also improved as the programme seeks to generate debate and to secure public support. Thirdly, the strategy is ensuring stakeholder participation in the reform process although there are some aggrieved stakeholders who feel excluded from the policy process and therefore are opposed to the programme implementation. Currently different groups of stakeholders have reacted to the ID implementation process in different ways. Whereas some have embraced the programme others are opposed to some aspects of it, and some more others are pessimistic about the chances of the programme succeeding. These differing reactions constitute a formidable threat to the successful implementation of the NIRP and for that matter, the Vision 2020. The subsequent chapter discusses this finding in details.

The Logic of Ghana's Under-development and what the NIRP can do

8.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter makes argument about the causes of Ghana's under-development and how effectively the NIRP can mitigate and eliminate these problems. The chapter also draws lessons from the study and makes a case for these lessons as the study's contribution to the field of development work, that is development policy analysis. Finally, the chapter discusses the problems encountered during research process and makes recommendations on the basis of these limitations for future work.

8.2 Emerging Facts about Ghana's Under-development

The study evolved with the question that *"Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national development?"* However, as a result of the data gathered and the analysis made, the study has also identified a number of other significant causes of Ghana's under-development. These show that the causes of Ghana's under-development go beyond structural inefficiencies and insufficient skilled personnel. These newly identified causes are very fundamental to the development policy implementation process. They include ineffective framework for policy co-ordination, inadequate financial and infrastructural

resources for policy implementation, ineffective policy management processes, inadequate framework for cross-institutional linkages, diversity problems, and ineffective conflict resolution process. The study has identified the causes of Ghana's under-development as:

a. The Policy Implementation Structure

Although the development policy implementation structure offers in theory a framework for policy co-ordination, in practice this framework has not been functional due to the incessant conflicts that associate the development management process.

b. Inadequate Resource

The inadequacy of not only skilled personnel, but also financial and infrastructural resources that are required for policy implementation affect adversely the nation's development. These resource problems include:

- i. inadequate skill in PSIs caused by institutional, socio-cultural and economic factors that are endemic in the Ghanaian society.
- ii. financial resource inadequacies resulting from under-developed and inadequate local sources of revenue mobilisation. That is, the distortions and inadequacies in local resource mobilisation have given cause for donor funding of Ghana's development policies - a practice that provides donor agencies with a leverage and stake in Ghana's development management. Thus these agencies have had to monitor and evaluate the policy implementation process, and very often to determine the direction of policy. This practice distorts the development process, as was the case of the ERP in the 1980s and presently, donor funding for different programmes – some of which are inconsistent with the overall national development policy. This level of donor involvement consequently lead to the introduction of foreign values, norms and practices in the development process. These sources of funding development also deny the development process of sustainability because any policy disagreement between the donors and the GoG

may result in the withdrawal of funds for policy implementation. It is therefore significant for the GoG to introduce the programme approach to the development process in order to eliminate the practice where donor agencies fund “*stand alone*” programmes that have no recourse to the overall national policy. This will remove some of the distortions undermining Ghana’s development.

- iii. inadequate physical infrastructure such as vehicles, office, information flows and communication equipment, office space, and procurement laws.

c. Managerial Inadequacies

The processes for managing the development policy process have been ineffective and problematic. These problems have been caused by such practices as top-down and bureaucratic management that consequently leads to exclusion of certain critical and needed skills in the development policy process. This is evidence that the move to a participatory development management process is not complete yet.

d. Community Participation and Diversity Issues

In order to resolve this exclusion problem, local groups and individuals are getting together under the new development management system to ensure maximum participation in the development process. This is an innovation that is likely to make the development process sustainable. However, two major diversity issues, that is gender and tribal issues constitute a great setback to participation and ownership of the development process.

e. Institutional Networking

There is the absence of a conceptual structure to link PSIs into a coherent public service. This has created consultation and networking problems among PSIs. This problem is deepened by a conflict between the two lead institutions in the development management process - MoF and the NDPC, and arbitrary decisions of government like the forced

appointment of the chairman of the NDPC. This consultation problem distorts the development management process and makes policy implementation difficult. The problem has also affected the processes for donor operations. As noted already, these agencies commit funds to various development programmes that have no relevance to the overall national development plan and in this particular circumstance, the Ghana-Vision 2020.

f. Conflict Resolution

The conflict resolution process has not been effective as it should be. Hence a lot of institutional and personal conflicts associate the development process. These divisions are potential sources of policy implementation failure.

g. Governance Framework

The governance framework for implementing Vision 2020 policy is not adequate. Most PSIs that are involved in the implementation of the policy are not even aware of the goals of the Vision 2020 policy and hence they lack the capacity to relate to the policy objectives. There is also an apparent disregard for openness, transparency and accountability practices in the policy implementation process. These are very typical especially in the allocation of funds for policy implementation.

h. The Public Administration System

The structural configurations of Ghana's PSIs where departments and agencies have been created under ministries to implement development policies also constitute a problem to the development process. Thus, these departments and agencies are often excluded from the policy formulation process but only called in to implement the policy after the policy formulation.

i. Private Sector Role

Private sector contribution to the development process is being inhibited by the rent seeking practices of public sector officials, the persistence of outmoded legislation, the MoF's refusal to provide reliable information and statistical data on the trends in Ghana's development.

j. Cultural Values

Cultural practices are having debilitating effects on development process. Such practices include time management which has often led to ad hoc and short-term planning, the extended family system that also breeds incompetence, perception about government work that breeds apathy, the obsession for hierarchy that leads to top-down practices, and exclusions.

k. The Legislative Framework

Although legal instruments are necessary to guide the policy implementation process, the lessons from Ghana's experience shows that these are not sufficient conditions to make the implementation process successful. The evidence is that in spite of the legislation made to cover and guide the new development management practice, the system is fraught with conflicts that consequently undermine the development process. This means that, the legal instruments have not been effective at regulating the development process and has denied the process of programmes and projects that are consistent and coherent with overall national development policy. The ineffective legislative instruments has also created a situation that enable most PSIs find ways of lobbying their programmes and projects at the policy hearing meetings. In the meantime, the NDPC and MoF who oversee the development process have been unable to get together to stop these excesses. This erratic manner of managing development has been made more difficult by the lack

of prioritization in the development plan in the context of limited resources for implementation.

The study has on the other hand identified a significant progress in Ghana's development process. This is the fact that the new participatory development management approach in Ghana recognises the importance of including the private sector and civil society in the development management process. This emphasise the growing argument for government-private sector partnership for development rather than the arguments for a government-led or private sector-led development that is advocated respectively by some Third World governments and the World Bank/IMF. In Ghana's circumstances, the argument has been taken further to include local communities because members of most local communities form self-help groups both in Ghana and abroad to provide funding to develop their local communities. The government and the private sector are no longer seen as the major players in terms of resource for policy implementation. Local communities operate significantly in this area. The new approach also involved a wide variety of institutions in the development process thereby making development policy process participatory. This is underpinned by a view taken by the study that effective lines of communication is a necessary prerequisites to sustain the processes for development policy analysis in the new development management system.

The findings listed above have changed very significantly, the focal theory of this study. It has shown that Ghana's under-development is not only caused by structural inefficiencies and lack of skills in PSIs. Indeed, all the above-listed problems have played their part in under-developing Ghana, and they emphasise the World Bank's observation that Ghana must find its own Ghanaian way of faster development as was the case in South East Asia. That is, Ghana would need to achieve a judicious blend of new methods with indigenous management practices (see World Bank, 1993: 96). These problems are also evidence that Ghana's PSIs do not have adequate capacity to

implement the Ghana-Vision 2020. The NIRP is therefore seeking to build public sector capacity but the findings have shown that even the NIRP is fraught with some very fundamental problems that is making the programme's implementation difficult.

8.3 Efficacy of NIRP's Mitigating Role

The study has shown that the NIRP has been developed to deal comprehensively with the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation shortfalls through structural transformation, HRD programmes, transformation of the governance framework, and attitudinal change. The following issues emerged however from the findings of the study.

a. Consultative Process

The consultative processes in the policy formulation stage were good because the process involved the management of PSIs in formulating the NIRP. This strategy has therefore secured the commitment and participation of public sector management in the ID process.

b. Inclusion and Institutional Linkages

The study again shows that stakeholder participation and cross-institutional linkages have been good in the NIRP implementation. These have afforded the NIRP with the required co-operation that it needs to see the programme implementation through. These imperatives, together with the NIRP methodology both at the policy formulation stage and the ongoing implementation stage has kept stakeholders opposition to the reforms at a minimum. That is, apart from the rejection of the salaries rationalization scheme and the maneuvers of certain individuals notably some middle and junior management staff of PSIs, there has been general acceptance of the policy. The NIRP must therefore take advantage of this level of acceptance to maximise the changes it intends to make in public sector performance. The study has argued that the interactive model of policy

implementation that has been adopted by NIRP has been useful in terms of inducing extensive participation and consensus building for the programme.

c. The Implementation Structure

Furthermore, a comprehensive but complex implementation structure has been set up to provide technical guidance and oversee the programme implementation. This complex NIRP implementation structure has been necessitated by the comprehensive nature of the programme. That is the various component programmes have their respective implementation structure and this has enabled the various sub-programmes to focus on implementing their respective mandates. This method is captured in systems analysis as a nestling process that has efficiency as its utility. The method also emphasise Thomas's (1996: 10) argument that each institution is different and that there is no one template to fit all institutions.

It is however significant that membership of the various facets of the implementation structure especially the CDTs and the PITs is composed of senior officials from the various PSIs and this questions the adequacy of interactive processes involved in the NIRP implementation. This is a potential source of organised and un-organised opposition to the programme especially as the reforms involve re-location and re-structuring of some officials.

d. Contradictions in the Policy Framework

The study has shown however that two basic contradictions exist in the NIRP process. These contradictions relate to the orientation of the NIRP as a wholly "home-grown" product, and NIRP as a coordinator of the component programmes. The contradictions are that first, the various donor agencies such as the World Bank, the DFID and CIDA have made extensive inputs into the programme in terms of content, expertise and funding. Increasingly, these agencies are digging in deep for hold on the programme

because of the funding and other forms of support NIRP receives from them. These levels of donor-involvement in the NIRP process rid the programme off the *wholly homegrown product* classification. However, it is also very significant why these agencies especially, the World Bank do not want to be seen to be directly involved with the programme. Perhaps this is due to the blame for the failures of SAP-ERP in the 1980s.

The second contradiction is that the NIRP has not been effective at its coordinating role due to the same problem of donor funding. The individual donor agencies fund different components of the programme and all with different motives and expectations. In view of donor independence from one another and the rivalry that associate their activities in developing countries, it is impossible for the NIRP to co-ordinate their association with the component programmes in any meaningful way. This is irrespective of the fact that the new development management system is encouraging donor institutions to refrain from funding stand-alone programmes. Secondly, the phenomenon has also affected the ability of the NIRP to co-ordinate the various sub-programmes. That is the NIRP is unable to effectively co-ordinate the implementation processes of its component programmes because these sub-programmes must abide by the directives and requirements of these agencies in order to continue receiving funding. Tinbergen (1958) has however warned that in order “to assure consistency and to avoid large-scale waste and disorganization, care should be taken that the component parts of the programme from a coherent and coordinated whole”.

e. Donor Activities and the Question of Sustainability

These sources of funding (discussed above) questions the sustainability of the NIRP in terms of the conditions that normally associates donor funding and the life span of these resources. Already, the DFID funding for example is ending in August 2001 and it is very uncertain how the CSPIP will be sustained when the DFID funding ends. The study

has shown that the NIRP is putting up measures to systematically co-ordinate and manage donor contributions to the programme. However, the extent to which this can be done is uncertain because no matter what strategy NIRP adopts, these donors can easily withdraw funding once NIRP's prescriptions do not fall in line with donor policies. The extent of donor funding for the programme underpin the fact that the counterpart funding received from the GoG is not adequate. The success of the programme will therefore immensely depend on continuous flow of funds from donor agencies. This level of donor involvement with the NIRP also reflects the lack of indigenous capacity to implement the policy both in terms of financial and human resources.

The study has further acknowledged the significance of the strategy under which the various component programmes used the same but separate methodology in the policy formulation processes. Whereas this may be understood in terms of the specific nature of the component programmes, it has also contributed to the co-ordination problems. This is due to the fact that the process of policy formulation plus the independent sources of funding gave the component programmes a sense of independence.

The study also takes the view that although the NIRP is making use of local human resources which is useful for the programme in the sense that these experts are able to relate to the socio-cultural underpinnings of public sector inefficiencies, the extensive involvement of foreign experts is increasingly becoming an anathema to the NIRP. Thus, a sizable number of foreign consultants and experts have also been contracted to provide technical guidance to the reforms. It is imperative however, to blend the activities of the two sides well enough because if the inputs to the programme are skewed in favour of foreign experts, it will distort the capacity building exercise especially as these expatriates are unable to identify with the Ghanaian socio-cultural values. Besides, most of them are also known to introduce "pre-cooked" systems that have no direct relation to the local context of the reforms. Bologun (1997: 71) has emphasized that development is

not a mathematically precise, value-neutral and scientific concept that can be approached with a universal formula and an automatic technique. Jaycox (1993a: 3) has also noted that technical assistance is unable to solve African development problems. He stresses that technical assistance if anything at all is rather a systematic destructive force that undermines capacity development. Bologun (1997: 78) has added that a policy that relies on external advisers and managers is not consistent with the objectives of capacity building and of development. He therefore warns that such capacity building programme will not result in any substantial development until these external inputs are removed. Mutahaba et. al. (1992: 52) have advised that all aid or donations of any kind – be it material, human and technical – should be selected with discretion, and the process must above all put greater emphasis on self-reliance (see Mutahaba et. al., 1992: 20). It is important therefore to monitor the activities of expatriate consultants to ensure that they measure up to the requirements of the NIRP.

The study has identified that the current approach of PSIs and the CPSCMAs to implementing the reform policy shows a general lack of commitment. This may be interpreted as a passive opposition to the reform policy. This attitude is a serious threat to the successful implementation of the NIRP and consequently the success of the Ghana-Vision 2020.

f. The Implementation Time Schedules

The study takes a view that that some uncertainty surrounds the utility of the NIRP's ability to manage the needed changes for Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation. As mentioned in chapters six and five respectively, the NIRP is intended to be implemented over a ten-year period whereas the Vision 2020 is a twenty-five year development policy that is intended to be completed by the year 2020. Significantly these two programmes are being run concurrently. However, if Ghana's PSIs are to build capacity for policy analysis and good governance to enhance the successful implementation of the Vision

2020, the chances are that by the time these institutions acquire the needed capacity on the NIRP's time table, the Vision 2020 will be left with approximately fifteen years to complete. Furthermore, the fact that PSIs did not have adequate capacity within the first ten years of the Vision 2020 implementation, the probabilities are that the foundations of the Vision 2020 implementation may not have been well established. This will therefore reduce the chances for a successful implementation of the Vision 2020 by the year 2020. This is even on the assumption that at the end of the ten years, the NIRP would have been successfully implemented and sufficient capacity would have been built to achieve the intended outcomes. Under such circumstances, the capacity built can be most useful to subsequent development policies. This is on condition that these new policies do not present new challenges of their own.

These issues that have emerged from the study reinforces the thrust of the background theory (see chapter 2) that in order to remove the constraints on the development management process, it is useful and appropriate to build capacity through institutional development. However, the findings have also shown that it is not enough just to formulate and implement the capacity building policies. The NIRP's experience has shown that a lot of thought and planning has to go into the time framework for the capacity building policy vis-à-vis the development policy. This will ensure that the built up capacity becomes relevant to the development process. This is the point where the findings of the study departs from the background theory and it emphasizes Hargrove's (1975: 13) argument that policy makers understanding of issues surrounding policies is a very important element in the policy process. Bologun (1997: 80) has also warned that even though capacity building is no doubt essential to and could justifiably be deemed synonymous with development, efforts should be made to resist the temptation of regarding it as a magic wand or miracle cure for development.

8.4 Lessons from Ghana's Development Management Process

The research makes some very significant contributions to the fundamental theory underlying the under-development and the development process of Ghana. These are:

a. Strategic Planning

Development policy formulation in most cases must go hand in hand with building institutional capacity to sustain the policy process. This capacity must relate to good governance, effective institutional networking and consultation, expertise, financial and other resources procurement, and the creation of a good implementation structure. However, this capacity building process must be planned strategically and implemented well in advance of the development policy implementation in order to make the capacity so built relevant. This will remove all uncertainties like those currently surrounding the NIRP and its usefulness for the Vision 2020 implementation.

b. Sectional Interests

Governments do not always put the national interest as a priority when it comes to national development. Personal and political interests come to play even in such serious matters as national development. The GoG's unconstitutional practice of making a government favourite the head of the development planning commission provides a lesson. Such practices cause co-operation and co-ordination problems in the development policy implementation process that may render the policy impossible to implement in the end. Therefore in the development policy process, unconstitutional behaviours must be avoided in order to increase participation and co-operation.

c. Fragmentation of the Policy Process

In spite of the call for donor agencies to re-consider their policy interventions in developing countries, these agencies are still perpetrating their old intervention strategies and therefore fragmenting the development efforts and policy processes of these

countries. This is shown in the CSPIP's use of a separate but same methodology as the NIRP's to plan the programme and it is evidence of division between the NIRP and some of its component programmes.

d. Prescriptive Policies

Although donor agencies' complimentary role in Ghana's development is very important, the study also advocates for a change in methodology namely; avoiding direct interference through the use of prescriptive policies and the issue of conditional loans and grants. The study has shown that the overall development policy as well as capacity building process must be predicated on the nation's needs and culture in order to make development sustainable. In line with this argument, Lopes (1994: 17) has noted that "the application of development models, as logical and appropriate as they may sound is bound to fail if they are not anchored in solid historical and cultural ground". Regarding the capacity building process, Lopes (1996: 54) has argued that this must be based on partnership through consultation and dialogue between donor and recipient on all aspects of project planning, design and implementation. The project ownership must however rest with the indigenous people.

e. Monitoring Donor Activities

Donor agencies are a part of the development problems in Ghana and therefore must also be part of the solution (see Stevens et. al., 1998: 98). However, donor activities must be closely monitored to ensure that donor policies will not again distort the development process. Donor funding and the "common basket" concept may be useful because this require donors to put their money in a common fund, and the use of this fund will be determined by the government on the basis of national development priorities. The monitoring framework must also ensure that any capacity building process is really being built for the purposes of those it is intended to benefit and not to serve the interests of donor agencies. Currently, it is uncertain as to whose capacity the NIRP is building.

This emphasizes Steven's et. al.'s (1995: 98) argument that a country's commitment is crucial to capacity building because any substantial reform depends in the final analysis on local demand for an accountable and responsive state.

f. Institutional Cooperation

It is important for the lead institutions in Ghana's development to co-operate and be strategic in method. The differences between the NDPC and the MoF as a result of institutional ego have made these two institutions incapable of bringing other PSIs together adequately enough to facilitate the smooth implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. This is one important strategy for smothering co-operation and co-ordination problems among other institutions, and moving the development process ahead.

g. Inclusion

The study reinforces the argument for the usefulness in involving stakeholders in the policy process. The evidence is that the methodology used in formulating the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP namely; the increased participation of stakeholders has led to widespread acceptance and support for these policies. Essentially therefore, the interactive model of policy implementation has been shown by the study to be a useful tool for development policy implementation in Ghana.

h. Consensus Building

The study has refuted the popularly held idea that policy makers ought to exercise some level of direct and determined control over policy implementation. The study has rather shown that policy makers are not necessarily the providers of resources and under such circumstance, it is difficult for policy makers to impose their will on the providers of resources who are normally part of the implementation team.

i. Conflict Resolution Schemes

It is important to build conflict resolution schemes in the policy implementation process in order to reduce the incidence of reactions that will render the policy impossible to implement. The study has shown that the incidence of organised opposition to the Vision 2020 and NIRP policy implementation have generally been reduced due partly to the conflict resolution procedures that associate the policy process.

j. Human Resource Development

A nation's human resource endowment is the lever for national development, as well as for building the capacity of institutions that are responsible for managing that development. The study therefore emphasizes that in the development of nations, the human resource development component must be considered very vital. This position is underpinned by the argument that:

“the human factor remains at the heart of the success of every reform effort. Revising the legal framework to facilitate compliance is simply not enough and neither will the use of computers be. The design of a new system as well as the restructuring of the institutional roles and reporting relationships will do nothing more than help streamline the processes and make the system look nearly perfect, at least theoretically. Without a well-informed, and adequately trained cadre of enthusiastic professionals to operate the sub-systems, the expected successes would be very limited, if any at all”⁶⁴.

The above lessons have set the agenda for a new dynamism and fresh thinking on Third World Development and capacity building policies. First, the study has shown that it is not enough just to build institutional capacity as a panacea to development management problems. It is also equally important to plan the time framework involved in the two processes. This require a lot of thought and deep planning in order to make the two programmes relevant to the needs of the society they are seeking to serve. Secondly, these lessons are useful benchmarks for the development processes in developing

⁶⁴ A statement by Mr. Kofi Opoku-Manu, Chief Director of MoF, at a workshop for Project Implementation Teams, held at Akosombo, Ghana from December, 11 - 12, 1997).

countries. They will enable these societies to avoid the problems identified in Ghana's development management process and to build on the strengths of this experience.

8.5 Recommendations for Further Work

The study encountered a number of problems that have also limited the scope of the outcome in various ways. Among these are:

a. Methods

Focus Group discussions, which was part of the research design was abandoned because the participants were intimidated by fear of recriminations. They were uncertain about the political persuasions of other participants. Most of the potential participants feared that the discussion might lead them to make some pronouncements that may cost them their jobs in the long run. This problem also made some officials decline the interviews. Those who responded are suspected to have withheld some vital information. Still others did not want their interviews to be referenced. It may be useful to engage a lot of interviews and focus group discussions in any further work on this subject because the NDC government has been voted out of office and people will not feel intimidated to talk or even participate in focus groups discussion. Perhaps the new set of data that is generated may be more revealing than those obtained for the current study.

b. The Role of Private and Voluntary Sectors

The study discounted private sector and NGO role in the development process in Ghana. It only examined the enabling role provided by the public sector for NGOs and the private sector in the development management process. But the private and voluntary sectors also play very important role in the process. That is, they are partners with the public sector in the development management process. However, the study did not explore whether at all these other partners have contributed in any way towards Ghana's under-development. It is important to also look at the role of the private and voluntary

sectors in the development process in Ghana. Such a study will present a complete picture of Ghana's development problems. Secondly, any future work on institutional development and capacity building may also focus on the private sector and NGOs in terms of what capacity building programme may be necessary to facilitate private sector-NGO roles.

c. Role of Non-formal Institutions

The research discovered that non-formal institutions such as community groups also affect the development process in two important ways. These are resource provision for policy implementation and participation in local decision-making. However, no data was collected from such groups to examine their effectiveness and what problems they face in the development process, and to determine what assistance they may require to enhance their performance. It may be useful to focus a study in the future on the roles of these non-formal institutions and how these roles may be enhanced for managing development.

d. Outcomes of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP

The study could not assess the implementation outcomes of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP because both programmes are ongoing and have a considerable amount of time ahead for completion. The study could therefore only make projections based on the dynamics of the implementation processes. As a result, any future research may need to examine what impact the policy analysis methodology has had on the outcomes of these two policies in the light of these emerging issues.

e. Usefulness of the NIRP in relation to Vision 2020 Outcomes

One more important work that is worth pursuing in the future relates to the extent to which the NIRP has contributed to the success of the Vision 2020. This future study may be done in the context of the overlapping schedules of both programmes. That is, the NIRP is being implemented concurrently within a ten-year period with the Vision 2020.

This new study must attempt to provide answers to the question that: ‘how would the capacity built well into the middle of the very development policy it is suppose to serve sustain the development policy?’

f. Sustainability of the Built-up Capacity after NIRP

The interview at the NIRP Secretariat indicated that the NIRP has a strategy to ensure that the capacity building process in Ghana’s PSIs becomes an ongoing process even after the NIRP’s mandate expires. In that case the PSC will oversee the process. However, it is not exactly clear how the NIRP intends to make this possible. It will therefore be useful to focus a study on how the NIRP accomplished this objective, and how effective the PSC has been on this task.

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APPENDICES


Appendix A

An Analytical Framework for Institutional Assessment

					5	
					SUSTAINABILITY WITHIN THE BROADER ENVIRONMENT	
					4	TRANSACTIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS/ GROUPS -COMPETITION -COLLABORATION -COORDINATION
					SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS	
					LEGAL FRAMEWORK -GOVERNING THE ORGANIZATION -OTHER RELEVANT INSTITUTIONS	LEGAL FRAMEWORK -GOVERNING THE ORGANIZATION -OTHER RELEVANT INSTITUTIONS
					RESOURCES -LEADERSHIP -MANPOWER -FUNDS -TECHNOLOGY -INCENTIVES -CAPACITY TO RELATE RESOURCES TO OBJECTIVES	RESOURCES -LEADERSHIP -MANPOWER -FUNDS -TECHNOLOGY -INCENTIVES -CAPACITY TO RELATE RESOURCES TO OBJECTIVES
					3	
					STRUCTURALL ANALYSIS	
					ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE -DIFFERENCIATION & INTEGRATION OF FUNCTIONS -SPECIFICATION OF AUTHORITY & RESPONSIBILITY	ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE -DIFFERENCIATION & INTEGRATION OF FUNCTIONS -SPECIFICATION OF AUTHORITY & RESPONSIBILITY
					2	
					ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONS/SYSTEMS	
					FUNCTIONS -PERSONNEL FINANCE MARKETING, etc	FUNCTIONS -PERSONNEL FINANCE MARKETING, etc
					SYSTEMS -RECRUITMENT -EVALUATION BUDGETING	SYSTEMS -RECRUITMENT -EVALUATION BUDGETING
					PROCEDURES	PROCEDURES
					1	
					SKILL GAP ANALYSIS	
TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL MANPOWER GAPS	TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL MANPOWER GAPS	TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL MANPOWER GAPS	TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL MANPOWER GAPS	TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL MANPOWER GAPS	TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL MANPOWER GAPS	TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL MANPOWER GAPS

Source: Samuel Paul (1990: 43); Moore (1996: 7)

Appendix B **Structure of Ghana's New Development Management System**



- GUIDE:**
 NDPC: National Development Planning Commission
 RCC: Regional Co-ordinating Council
 RPCU: Regional Planning Co-ordinating Unit
 DPCU: District Planning Coordinating Unit
 MDAs: Ministries, Departments & Agencies
 Vision 2020: National Development Policy Framework
- > Development Plans
 —————> Vision 2020 & Planning Guidelines
 ◆————◆ Data & Information

Source: NDPC/12.95

Appendix C

Model Diagnostic Process

In order to guide Chief Directors and their Capacity Development Teams, this section provides details of a model diagnostic process which is recommended for use during the workshops. It is envisaged that this process would involve four (4) stages as follows:

- i. Stage One Workshop:** to introduce the diagnostic process and to define the group work in stage (ii) below. This could take one day.
- ii. Stage Two Group Work:** whereby an in-house team works on the separate elements of the diagnostic process (see below for topics). It is envisaged that this stage will take 4-6 weeks.
- iii. Stage Three Workshop:** to receive the outputs of the Stage Two work groups for discussion, assimilation and synthesis for the development of problem identification, change-actions and performance improvement plan. This could take one day.
- iv. Stage Four Report Production:** which summarises the output from the Stage (iii) workshop and includes a specific performance improvement plan.

The process involves an analysis by the in-house working group of five fundamental categories of factors which influence organisational performance:

- a. The Environment, or context in which the MDAs operate.**
- b. The Inputs made available to the MDAs.**
- c. The Activities (Organisation, Processes and Systems) internal to the MDAs.**
- d. The Outputs of the MDAs**
- e. The National Policy Goals and Mission statements of the individual MDAs.**

The four key relationships to be explored are:

- * Environment and Inputs**
- * Inputs and Activities**
- * Activities and Outputs**
- * Outputs and Goals**

The key features of this process are that it helps to develop a form of constructive strategic thinking is not always present in the Civil Service. The process requires the Chief Director and his team (including consultants) and Heads of Departments and Agencies to work back from policy goals to outputs, from outputs back to activities, from activities back to inputs, and finally a review of the inputs and the Civil Service operating environment. Working backward from outputs to input constantly focuses attention on what the priorities are for achieving the desired results.

The Stage One Workshop will be designed to open new horizons for the participants in order to give them fresh ways of understanding and addressing their management problems. It will be the starting point for an intensive MDA self-appraisal and capacity diagnosis to be undertaken by a working group in the weeks immediately to follow. In order to help facilitate and focus the discussions of your working group we indicate below various steps and issues which you are expected to work through during the diagnostic process.

Please remember that we have made plans to provide you with the following assistance if you request it:

- a. Facilitators to help with conducting your workshops and to contribute to the deliberations of your working group
- b. Training sessions on topics related to the diagnostic work

Checklist of Issues and Topics to be addressed by your Working Group

In order to help facilitate and focus the discussions of your working group we list below some of the steps as issues which you are expected to work through during the review process:

Stage One: Policy Goals and Missions

- * Read the legal statute which created the organisation and assess its current relevance.
- * Update the current mission statement in the light of the Ghana Vision 2020 document and the NIRP policy goals
- * Identify the Stakeholders interested in your mission statement and ensure their ownership of it.

- * Review your organisation's machinery for policy formulation and evaluation.
- * List any issues and problems arising from the above

Stage Two: Outputs

- * Define the outputs that will deliver your mission and objective
- * Prepare an initial specification for the levels of output which your organisation can realistically deliver given the resources likely to be available.
- * Take advantage of the beneficiary surveys to involve the users of your services and outputs in the process of setting acceptable performance standards and targets.
- * List issues and problems arising from the above

Stage Three: Activities (Organisation, Processes and Systems)

- * Assess whether your existing organisational and functional structure is consistent with your updated mission statement and the outputs which your organisation seeks to deliver.
- * Undertake a fundamental review of your activities and functions with a view to recommending which activities might be:
 - a. dispensed with
 - b. privatised
 - c. market-tested and /or contracted out
 - d. undertaken by NGOs or communities themselves
 - e. regrouped into a more compact or task-oriented form
- * List issues and problems arising from the above.

Stage Four: Inputs

- * Given that your total inputs of human and financial resources are necessarily constrained within the overall budget, assess whether the balance between the cost of item one inputs and the cost of item two to five inputs are appropriate.
- * Given the total cost of your inputs, assess your overall productivity levels and consider whether your outputs are giving value for money to the taxpayer.
- * Assess the quality and quantity of the human resources inputs which your organization employs.
- * List issues and problems arising from the above

Stage Five: Operating Environment

- * Assess whether you have sufficient freedom to manage your resources effectively within the existing Civil Service rules and regulations**
- * Review the terms and conditions which resources are made available to your organisation.**
- * Review the sector monitoring arrangements applied by, or applied to, your organisation.**
- * List any issues and problems arising from the environment in which your organisation operates.**

Summary of Issues and Problems

As stated in the preface we are keen to assist you in removing capacity constraints particularly those relating to the freedom to manage your resources more effectively under the existing Civil Service rules and regulations. In view of this we anticipate that you will provide us with a written assessment of any system-wide constraints and impediments which hinder your operations and which can only be addressed collectively.

Appendix D

Development of Your Performance Improvement Plan

Following the analytical work undertaken by your working group and the identification of issues and problems, it is anticipated that your organisation would conduct a one-day workshop to develop a series of practical change-action to address the issues and problems which have been identified.

These change-actions would then form the basis of a performance improvement plan with the following components:

1. Change-action which relate to your organisation's machinery for developing and evaluating policy and updating your mission statements.
2. Change-action which relate to your outputs, performance standards, and performance targets.
3. Change-actions which relate to identifying efficiency gains through the fundamental review of your activities and functions.
4. Change-actions which relate to inputs, particularly the inputs of human resources.
5. Change-actions which relate to the environment in which your organisation operates.

Your performance improvement plan should include an activity chart showing the dates when the proposed change-actions would be implemented.

Appendix E
Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme
Self-Appraisal Instrument

Introduction

This self-appraisal instrument is to assist you with reviewing your institutional capacity and preparing the ground for CSPIP Diagnostic Workshops to follow. The instrument is divided into two parts:

- a. the first part focuses on clarifying missions and goals, and
- b. the second part concentrates on issues relating to management, organization and systems.

This self-appraisal instrument can be used in various ways, but we would suggest that, it is used for group work by the key managers of your institutions (led by you). In this respect, it is expected that the instrument will facilitate group interaction leading to the summarising of the discussions into a report. The matters raised have been put in question format to encourage discussion.

You may wish to contact the CSPIP Team at OHCS if you feel you need any advice or clarification. The CSPIP telephone Number is 665421 Ext. 2326 and you should ask for the Director.

PART 1

1. What is the current government policy relating to your mission? Is this policy documented?
2. What is your current mission statement?
3. Does the mission statement refer to target groups and if so, who are these target groups?
4. Which other organisation, if any, has complementary goals and functions to those of your organisation, and if so, how do you synchronise your activities?

5. What was the national requirement or objective underlying the creation of your institution, and has that requirement changed in recent years or is it likely to be changed in the foreseeable future?
6. What systems and processes should be put in place in order to ensure that your mission statement is regularly reviewed?
7. Should a mission statement make adequate reference to issues such as efficiency, value for money, services and stakeholders interest? If not, how should these issues be addresses?

PART II

Institutional Accountabilities

8. Which stakeholders have an interest in the performance of your institution?
9. How is your institution's mission statement approved?
10. What will be the methods by which the interests and opinions of stakeholders are elicited with regard to the performance of your institution?

Organisation Structure

11. Please attach a copy of your organisation structure.
12. Do you have any plans to make it more compact or more effective?

Definition of Programmes, Projects and Service Delivery Capacity

13. Are your programmes, projects and service delivery activities clearly specified and linked directly to the mission statement?
14. Have you clearly defined and documented the types of services and outputs which your institution provides and the target groups who benefit from these services and outputs?
15. What will be your institution's mechanisms for and procedures for ensuring two-way communication between your institution and the recipients of your institution's output and services?

Efficiency of Your Institution

16. How do you measure the efficiency of your organisation?
17. If you do not have efficiency measures how will you put these in place?
18. Is it possible to improve efficiency by:
 - a. discounting nonessential activities?
 - b. privatising some activities?
 - c. market-testing and contracting out some activities?
 - d. hiving off some activities to NGOs and the communities themselves?
 - e. reorganising some functions into executive agencies?
19. What are the arrangements for ensuring that efficiency gains are continuously sought by your organisation?


Inter-Organisational Relationships

20. Where there is a need for collaboration and Cupertino with other institutions, what mechanisms are in place to ensure that inter-institutional activities are adequately synchronised?

Issues, Problems and Constraints

21. What problems and constraints may impede your institution from achieving your mission, objectives and targets?
22. Please divide these problems and constraints into those that can be addressed by your own institution and those that can only be resolved with the assistance of other institutions and agencies.
23. Are there some problems which are caused by the administrative environment in which your institution is expected to operate e.g. centralised decision-making external to your organisation which may adversely affect your efficiency and effectiveness?

A Functional View of Ghana's Current Public Financial Management System



Source: PUFMARF

Appendix G

Sample of Questions used in the Interviews

A. Institutions and the Development Process

1. Can you describe the role played by your institution in managing the country's development?
2. Please comment on your institution's capacity to perform this role.
3. Please comment on the monitoring and regulatory processes that associate your institution's role in the development management process.
4. Could you please comment on the dynamics of the national development management cycle?
5. How would you rate the adequacy of the national development management process?
6. How would you evaluate the following practices/values in your institution's role in the development management process: openness; transparency; accountability; cooperation and networking?
7. What do you consider to be the impact of these values on your institution's performance?
8. Can you describe the scope of managerial practices in your institution and how this impacts the development management process of this country?
9. Given the opportunity what would you want to change or maintain in the managerial practices?
10. How do you see the effects of the following values in this institution and on the development management process: cooperation; consultation; and networking?
11. How best do you think these values can be improved or maintained?
12. How does your institution encourage participation in policy issues of this institution and of the country's development?
13. Can you please comment on your institution's readiness to accommodate the views of stakeholders in the policy process and regarding service delivery?
14. Please comment on the manpower base or the skills available to your institutions. What has been the impact of this on the development process?
15. What has been the level of staff inclusion and empowerment in this institution especially in relation to the development process?

16. In what way have diversity issues like gender and ethnicity reflected decisions on training and recruitment procedures of this institution? What has been the impact of this on human resource development?
17. Generally can you describe some of the human resource issues that affect the performance of this institution?
18. What aspects of the country's culture do you consider to have been influential in the way this institution operates? How have these impacted on development management in this country?
19. Can you tell me about the scope of donor involvement in the activities of this institution? In what ways have these been useful?
20. What do you see to be the impact of this level of donor involvement on the development process of this country?
21. Please comment on the impact made on the development management process of this country by foreign values and cultures. Would you say this have been useful?

B The Capacity Building Process

1. Can you tell me about the background to the capacity building programme?
2. What are the goals of the programme?
3. Who conceived the programme?
4. How do you see the balance between expatriate technical officers and local experts on the committee that drew up the programme?
5. Please give an overview of the implementation process
6. Can you please comment on the implementation structure, and resources available to the programme?
7. What are the dynamics of the programme i.e. what are the issues involved and what are the strategies being adopted to address these issues?
8. To what extent has the programme incorporated Ghanaian values and culture?
9. What impact does the programme envisages making on the development management process?
10. How are the following values reflected on the programme: openness; transparency accountability and mass participation?

11. What has cooperation, consultation and networking processes been like in the policy formulation process?
12. What has been the level of inclusion in the programme so far?
13. Please comment on donor commitment to the programme? What has been their contribution so far to the programme?
14. What is the relationship between this programme and other reform programmes currently being implemented in the public service?
15. What has been the reaction of public sector workers to the reforms so far?

P/S

These questions were not asked in the order listed above. A lot of probes were used in the interview which meant the any of the question listed could follow any other one depending on the information being given at the point in time.

